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Preface 
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) remain among the most important and vital service providers to 
modern societies. Severe CIs’ disruptions may endanger security of the citizen, availability of 
strategic assets and even the governance stability. Not surprisingly, CIs are often targets of 
intentional attacks, either of physical or cyber nature. Newly emerging hybrid threats 
primarily target CIs as part of the warfare. 
Resilience of CIs is addressed by a growing number of researchers and research centres, 
discussed by the governments and at international organisations. The European Commission 
is currently reviewing the Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of 
European CIs. Recently the Joint Research Centre (JRC) which is the European 
Commission's science and knowledge service has completed a pilot study within the 
European Programme for European Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) to address risk 
assessment methodology and application to a selected EU energy network comprising both 
gas and electricity supply. The work performed and lessons learned led to identification of a 
number of remaining challenges in the area that were presented during the 56th ESReDA 
Seminar. 
Prevention, detection, response and mitigation of combined physical and cyber threats to 
critical infrastructure in Europe is a topic of the EU funded research programme H2020 for 
several recent calls. Just to name a few successful applications, research is being performed 
under SATIE, SAURON, STOP-IT, SECURE-GAS, DEFENDER and other CIs related 
projects. 
ESReDA as one of the most active EU networks in the field has initiated a project group (CI-
PR/MS&A-Data) on the “Critical Infrastructure/Modelling, Simulation and Analysis – Data”. 
The main focus of the project group is to report on the state of progress in MS&A of the CIs 
preparedness & resilience with a specific focus on the corresponding data availability and 
relevance. In order to report on the most recent developments in the field of the CIs 
preparedness & resilience MS&A and the availability of the relevant data, ESReDA held its 
48th, 52nd and 56th Seminars. 
The 56th ESReDA Seminar on “Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security” 
attracted about 30 participants from industry, authorities, operators, research centres and 
academia. The seminar programme consisted of 18 technical papers, two plenary speeches 
and an interactive session on Climate & CI protection.  
The editorial work for this volume was supported by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission in the frame of JRC support to ESReDA activities. A special thanks is 
due to A. Liessens (JRC) for the editorial work. 
Dr. Dmitry Efrosinin   Dr. Vytis Kopustinskas, Dr. Kaisa Simola 
Johannes Kepler University EC Joint Research Centre 
Dr. Mohamed Eid 
Commissariat for Atomic Energy & Alternative Energies 
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Risk and Reliability Engineering for Crisis Management: Using Ex-
perience from Asset Management 
Cyp F.H. van Rijn, Lecturer Risk Assessment and Safety, Master of Engineering, 
Utrecht University of Applied Sciences,  
Hon. President ESReDA 
Abstract 
History shows that scientific research in Risk and Reliability Engineering has not 
been very successful in improving Asset Management whilst a comparable disciple as 
control engineering is now fully integrated into the (process) engineering curriculum 
and widespread applied.
The author has 20 years’ experience of teaching some 300 Master students, trying to 
close the intellectual gap between (stochastic) Operations Researchers and practical 
(especially, mechanical) engineers.
Discussing a number of common decision problems, it is shown that simple models 
that visualise the results of the AM decision process in time are powerful tools to 
store the insights produced by reliability engineering tools in memory. Such under-
standing is required in deciding on maintenance strategies to be applied, as well as 
on achieving agreement and endorsement between/from the various parties involved, 
in order to guarantee a long-lasting success of an implementation and to evaluate the 
results with field data. 
Even these simple models yield results that hitherto are surprising to practicing engi-
neers, as demonstrated by their use in the long series of Master Course RAM blocks. 
It is our experience that, after graduation, most course members successfully apply 
these techniques in practice.  
Keywords: Asset Management, Decision Support Techniques, Dealing With Uncer-
tainty, Stochastic Analysis 
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List of abbreviations 
AM Asset Manager 
CFO Chief Financial Officer 
CI Critical Infrastructure 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP HAZard and OPerability Study 
MM Maintenance Manager 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
RAS Risk Assessment and Safety 
RBD Reliability Block Diagram 
RCM Reliability Centred Maintenance 
SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Time-bound 
TPM Total Productive Maintenance 
1. Introduction
Vital services continuity is a major societal security issue in modern society. The 
supply of the vital services is guaranteed thanks to a large variety of Critical Infra-
structures (CIs). Some CIs’ disruptions may endanger the security of the citizen, the 
safety of the strategic assets and even governance stability. The ESReDA project 
group (CI‐PR/MS&A‐Data) focusses on Modelling, Simulation and Analysis of these 
complex, interconnected systems aiming at providing decision support to a wide 
range of stakeholders including (multi)national emergency management, critical in-
frastructure asset managers, policymakers, and the society.  
The dependencies between such critical infrastructures are complex and frequently 
non-obvious. Examples as the electric power disruptions in California in 2001 
demonstrate cross-sectoral cascading consequences with time-dependent failure char-
acteristics and (positive) feedback of natural gas production, pipeline fuel supply, re-
finery and power production. Such consequences may in reliability engineering terms 
be typified as low probability events in complex systems with extensive consequenc-
es developing in time. Within that context the experience built up in reliability and 
risk assessment/asset management in simpler systems (like industrial production pro-
cesses, water management and the built environment, where the probability of occur-
rence is one to two orders larger and consequences the same order lower), may pro-
vide lessons learned.  
2. The History and Progress of Reliability Engineering
2.1 Where do we come from? 
The 2nd World War created the need for new systems to be developed, manufactured 
and put into operation in a short time; the learning curve had to become steeper. The 
English radar installations in the Second World War necessarily employed while still 
in the development phase showed a mean time between failures in tropical conditions 
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of a few hours. The Germans were quite unlucky with launching their first V-1 mis-
siles to destroy London; research after the war estimated a 40% failure rate of air-
launched V-1s. 
On the German side, the failures met with launching the first V-1 missiles led 
Robert Lusser, a mathematically oriented aviation engineer to presage sys-
tems theory thinking by bringing in new concepts of system representation and 
random failure. He went beyond the deterministic way of thinking of skilled 
engineers and introduced rules for the reliability of systems as a function of 
those of the components. The “weakest link” paradigm was born; the reliabil-
ity of a series system with statistically independent failure mechanisms equals 
the product of the reliabilities of the components. 
In hindsight, this observation appears rather obvious for anyone with even a 
limited insight in probability theory. However, it gives an intriguing insight 
into the deterministic engineering mindset at that time, being focussed on 
component design and apparently missing the system insight. Lusser himself 
was so convinced of his theories to get in a furious dispute with Wernher von 
Braun, who led a team to “put a man on the moon”,  declaring in 1947 openly 
[1]that “man can never go to the moon, let alone to Mars.” To his insight, be-
cause of the complexity of the spacecraft required, there was simply too much 
chance to fail; “the probability odds with which he had wrestled a lifetime 
were simply too great for the risk”. Lusser felt morally obliged to leave the 
design team, went back to Messerschmitt-Bölkow in Germany where he inves-
tigated the reliability aspects of the adaptations that the company was making 
to the F-104 Starfighter, the results of which soon turned out to be tragically 
correct. During a skiing holiday he ruptured his Achilles tendon and spent his 
last days and a lot of his personal fortune trying to market a ski binding he had 
designed to release stress just at the right time. He was 69 when he died in 
January of 1969, seven months before engineers succeeded in what he thought 
to be in reliability terms almost impossible; Neil Armstrong as the first human 
to set foot on the moon and to came back safely .
This story, in a  nutshell, exemplifies the problems we meet in the use of reliability 
engineering principles in Asset Management. The majority of asset managers have a 
mechanical, electrical or nautical engineering background.  Engineers rely on the use 
of “safety factors1”: the ratio of a structure's absolute strength (structural capability) 
to actual applied load; considered to be a measure of the reliability of a particular de-
sign. Typical values for building structural members are 2, for pressure vessels 3.5 to 
4, aircraft and spacecraft use 1.2 to 3.0 depending on the application and materials.   
This approach, however,  results in engineers mentally exclude the potential lack of 
reliability in operation; failures thus consequentially becoming regarded as “acts of 
God” or realisations of Murphy’s Law. 
These thoughts are in line with the attitude of NASA on using risk calculations 
in the Apollo project. The calculated expected mission success probability was 
that low that it discouraged [2] NASA from further quantitative risk studies un-
til after the Challenger accident in 1986. Instead, NASA relied on FMECA stud-
1 A constant required value, imposed by law, standard, specification, contract or custom, to which a structure must conform or 
exceed. This can be referred to as a design factor, design factor of safety or required factor of safety. Typical values for building 
structural members are 2, for pressure vessels 3.5 to 4, aircraft and spacecraft use 1.2 to 3.0 depending on the application and 
materials. 
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ies and extensive testing; the risk study results were not widely circulated in 
NASA and sparingly if ever, released to the public at large. 
Literature shows many examples of situations where engineers met unexpected relia-
bility/safety problems and searched for external support. Reliability Centred Mainte-
nance was born after United Airlines suffered from severe reliability problems which 
could not be solved by making the overhaul periods shorter. They took the lead to de-
fine a generally applicable approach for the design of maintenance programmes, now 
known as the MSG-1 (maintenance steering group) documents. MSG-1 is the primi-
tive forerunner of RCM (Reliability Centred Maintenance). MSG-1 was rooted in en-
gineering insight and lacked most of the quantitative aspects. MSG-1 was followed 
up by later versions up to MSG-4. The ministry of Defence[ [3] issued in 1975 a con-
tract to United Airlines to describe this process. In 1978 Stanley Nowlan and Howard 
Heap [3] fulfilled this contract and published the landmark report “Reliability-
Centred Maintenance”. In line with the DoD requirements, they brought in quantita-
tive aspects under the heading “actuarial analysis”, using hired-in statisticians. Its ra-
ther misleading interpretation of (overall /sub-system, not a component or single fail-
ure mode!) failure mechanisms (Fig. 2-1) still remains in RCM textbooks and publi-
cations. 
Fig. 1 
Throughout history [4], the pendulum has been swinging back and forth from qualita-
tive, experience (RCM, FMECA, HAZOP, TPM, ..) towards quantitative (ETA, FTA, 
RBD, ..) based decision support techniques. In cases where government bodies like 
the American Department of Defence or Industry experienced severe reliability prob-
lems, funding for academic research was widely available; technical problems were 
cast in stochastic OR research studies. However, most of the investigators had no di-
rect link with real operations and considered the problems as interesting mathematical 
problems.  
To quote Richard Barlow, one of the founders of reliability engineering [5]: “A 
mathematician is not going to read a typical engineering textbook because it is 
just too empirical.” 
It is, therefore, no surprise that the mathematical models receive little interest in the 
engineering community [6] whereas properly used they proved to be capable to solve 
real industrial problems [7]. In 2009 the author published[8] the results of a survey 
under Dutch maintenance engineers showing that in spite of the significant economic 
consequences and problems with outsourcing contracts, the level of underpinning and 
monitoring failure data and maintenance strategies leaves to be desired. The EFNMS 
(European Federation of National Maintenance Societies) survey of 2011, [9] arrives 
at similar conclusions; safety and costs score higher than system output. In both sur-
veys, engineers mainly use qualitative techniques where the chance aspects and time-
dependent characteristics are easily neglected. Ultimo [10], a provider of Mainte-
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nance Management software, published in 2018 a report based on inputs from 150 
MM’s showing that MM’s are rather focussed on technical aspects; only half of them 
having information on their contribution to the business. The repeated benchmarking 
studies from Solomon Associates [11] continue to observe apparent anomalies. From 
an engineering point of view differences in performance should logically be caused 
by such physical issues like size, age, location or organisational aspects like unionisa-
tion. However, in the long series of benchmarks [12] they continue to observe large 
variations in performance; the return on investment (ROI) varies from 16 per cent for 
the pacesetters to 4% in the bottom quartile plants. Unexpectedly, these differences 
show up for plants of the same ownership. The correlation with physical factors is 
quite weak; Solomon observes old plants both at the top as well as at the bottom of 
their ranking results and complexity plays a minor role. Such observations are in line 
with the results of the Merit team study in Shell [13].  
In conclusion, over a period of some seven decades, we observe no large progress 
from experience towards evidence-based industrial asset (maintenance) management. 
The lack of systems theory, time-dependent behaviour and dealing with uncertainty in 
the education of engineers may be regarded as an impediment. 
2.2 A comparison with control engineering 
Management problems can well be compared to process control problems. It is the 
task of a process control engineer to keep the output of a process (or any other pro-
cess variable) at the desired value  (the set point) in spite of external disturbances 
and changes in process characteristics. To that end, the actual process output value 
is compared with the desired (set) value. Any deviation (Fig. 2-2) between the two is 
translated by a controller into steering one or more control variables. 
Let us try to follow the reasoning of a control engineer. Before he/ she will start to 
work on a control problem the person will first check whether two conditions are met: 
Observability: without mathematical rigour, this means that one can determine 
the full dynamic behaviour of the entire system from the system's outputs; you 
can write down the transfer function P from input to output.  
Controllability: again loosely speaking, this describes the ability of steering 
(control) inputs to move the internal state of a system from any initial state to 
any other final state in a finite time interval. 
If one of these conditions is not fulfilled he/she knows that the control approach will 
fail. 
Take the simple example of controlling your room temperature with a gas fired 
boiler. There is a temperature sensor in the room thermostat (observability) and the 
radiators receive hot water (controllability) from a boiler.  First, think about the 
situation with-
(model-based)
CONTROLLER
PROCESS
-
control
variable(s)
process
output
set value
Fig. 2 
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out feedback control; your thermostat is decoupled and the gas flow to the boiler is 
set at a certain value. The (room) temperature will then reach an equilibrium where 
the incoming heat supply Qin just balances the heat loss Qout =( area A * heat transfer 
coefficient U* temperature difference) = A *U* (T-To). We thus have, in simple 
lumped form, for the heat mass MCp : 
( )p in o
p
in
o
dTMC Q UA T T
dt
dT T ku
dt
where
MC
UA
Qku T
UA
τ
τ
= − −
= − +
=
= +
If the gas flow rate is changed stepwise, the room temperature will reach exponential-
ly a new equilibrium value: 
( )/( ) 1 tT t e kuτ−= −
An example is given in Fig. 3. This is the open loop response of the system; with no 
control present, the room temperature will decrease if the outside temperature 
drops. If we close the loop as in Fig. 3 the response with proportional control only 
will be (Fig. 4): 
The deviation between set and measured value depends on the loop gain; the steady 
state error ε (measured value –set value) equals 1/ (1+PC) where P and C are the gains 
of the process (here 1) and controller, respectively. Time constants and external 
disturbances are reduced in the same proportion. Obviously, the control engineer aims 
Fig. 2 
Fig. 3 Examples of closed loop control with various controller gains; P = 1 
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at a minimum value of ε but now the dynamics of the system (amplitude and phase 
shift between set and measured value) play a role. First, we will make the model a 
bit more realistic: 
• The gas flow to the burner will not increase immediately; again a first-order 
process (FOP).
• The temperature of the water spiral due to the increase in burning gas flow 
leads to another FOP.
• So, will the local temperature of the water.
• The now hotter water needs to flow from the boiler to the cv radiator; control 
engineers denote this as a “distance velocity lag” or “dead time”.
• The air in the room has to be heated up with the now hotter radiator.
• The temperature measurement will inevitably show (small) delay. 
It can easily be shown that a series of exponential lags can be approximated by a dead 
time τd with a resulting phase shift ωτd. In the figure below we have extended the first 
order model with a time constant 100 of Fig. 4 with a dead time term with value 10. 
For the same controller gain setting of 10, we now observe significant oscillatory be-
haviour (Fig. 5). To understand this phenomenon we have to realise that both P and C 
are complex variables characterised by magnitude and phase shift. The transfer func-
tion reads H(s) = C(s) / (1 + P(s)C(s)) in the Laplace domain. 
Fig. 5 
Such a function may be sketched in the Nyquist diagram of Fig. 6  showing the mag-
nitude (length of the vector) and phase angle of PC for increasing frequencies. Note 
that PC may approach the value  -1  for a specific frequency where the gain tends to 
infinity. You may have experienced this phenomenon at a festival where the singer 
approaches with his microphone too close to the speakers! 
Fig. 4 The effect of a dead time on process stability 
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With the transition from pneumatic to electronic controllers and later to full 
computer control the way towards more intelligent control was opened. In a number 
of cases, control variables may be strongly correlated, e.g. if you increase the 
temperature in a polypropylene solvent type reactor, the reaction rate increases 
consuming more pro-pylene whereupon the reactor pressure will automatically drop. 
Rosenbrock [14] de-veloped an engineering, decoupling approach to deal with this 
type of multivariable problems, using models based on transfer functions in the 
complex domain thus ena-bling the transition from single input – single output 
(SISO) to multiple input – mul-tiple output (MIMO) control loops. Later, 
mathematicians like Kalman [15] and Athans [16] developed the concept of linear, 
time-invariant multivariate optimal con-trol with models in state-space notation. 
From there on, model-based, nonlinear, mul-tivariable, adaptive and robust control 
theories were developed both in the frequency, as well as in state space domain. 
Pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) signals U(i,k) excite the system in such a 
way (Fig. 7) that the response Y(I,k) can be used to fit a model in state space or in 
the time domain without seriously affecting process throughput or product quality. 
The resulting black box model is valid in a small re-gion around the nominal process 
values only and the cause-consequence relationship is lacking. A more robust model 
is obtained if apriori information about the model structure and related physical 
processes is used in combination with the identification (a grey-box model).  
The model-predictive approach was quickly taken up by Industry to stabilise and op-
timise more complex systems, respectively optimisation objectives.  Shell introduced 
Dynamic Matrix Control ([17]) already in the seventies These techniques now find 
their way, via vendors as AspenTech, Honeywell, Emerson, Rockwell Automation 
and others who offer complete model and software libraries. In all cases, optimal 
(production rate/envelope, energy, ...) operation is found either by white box models, 
correlations obtained by (on-line) system identification (black box) or a mix (grey 
box). If the model predictions start to deviate from actual behaviour, plant and 
labora-tory measurements are used to re-tune the model parameters. A distinct change 
from the analogue PID controllers is that digital model predictive control uses a 
control trajectory taking into account process constraints2 such as maximum flow 
(pump ca-pacity), maximum cooling (duty of heat exchangers), vapour transport 
(compressor).  
2 In most cases optimality is found at operation at one or more constraints! 
Fig. 6 Model identification in process control 
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Modern process control is fully accepted in Industry at large. Whereas control engi-
neering started as a specific, separate discipline with specialists groups active only in 
major plants of large companies, nowadays it is integrated into the curriculum of 
chemical/process engineers. Supported by instrumentation vendors, these chemical 
engineers are qualified to install both simple and complex control and optimisation 
loops.  
3. Decision making in Asset Management
3.1 Introduction 
To start with, in contrast with control engineers, measured information in mainte-
nance management is scarce and of a stochastic, rather than deterministic, nature. 
Since designers aim, within the scope of the budget, at high reliability, the frequency 
of observed failures is low (MTTF for critical items ranging from 5 -15 years in In-
dustry, 20 - 50 and more in civil). Reliability databases at best give a range of 
MTTF’s mainly at equipment level, seldom at a specific failure mode level. The 
trending of condition data leaves to be desired; in statutory inspections, we observe 
that only the last results are stored by both parties as a “permit to operate” for the 
next period. 
As a consequence maintenance engineers rely on “expert opinion” gathered in a series 
of team discussions where a basic system model and the few reliable data stored in the 
CMMS act as a framework for discussion. The well-known psychological traps as 
described by e.g. Kahneman and Tversky ([18])  like anchoring, scaling, bias due to 
availability, affect influenced, base rate fallacies, conjunction fallacies, ... require a 
well-skilled facilitator to steer the team and keep them motivated3 through a number 
of meetings they are unfamiliar with and compete in time with their daily duties. 
CONTROL CLIMATE
AIR HANDLING UNIT
SPECIFICATIONS: FLOW 
RATE, PRESSURE, TEMP. % 
RH, VENTILATION FREQ.
TAKE CARE OF FLOW 
RATE
CENTRIFUGAL FAN
CONTROL TEMPERATURE
HEATING UNIT
SPECIFICATIONS:
X DEGR  C +/- ...
HUMIDIFY
HUMIDIFIER
SPECIFICATIONS:
40 – 70 % RH
CONTROL PRESSURE
DAMPERS
SPECIFICATIONS:
20 -25 Pa…...
FILTER AIR
FILTER 
UNIT
SPECIFICATIONS:
99.5 – 100 %
CLEAN AIR
SPECIFICATIONS
X M3 / H +/- ...
Fig. 8 
3.2 The toolbox of MM’s 
From various sources ([19-21] we know that the most frequently used decision sup-
port models in asset management are in descending order of frequency of use: 
• Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)
3 RCM is called mockingly Resource Consuming Monster! 
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• Failure Mode Effect (and Criticality) Analysis (FMECA) in combination
with Risk Matrices.
• Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD)
• Fault / Event Tree Analysis (FTA, ETA)
All these techniques require a model of the process to be maintained (compare with 
the process control model discussed before). First of all, the asset register and the as-
sociated drawings have to be in place and updated. Functional block diagrams are 
recommended by IEC608012 and MIL_STD 1629A as a basis for FMECA and by 
Smith ([22]) as a basis for RCM. Zaal ([23]) uses the “ hamburger model” (Fig. 8)  
The question now arises how can these tools, in the light of the control engineering 
approach, support the asset manager in taking effective decisions: 
- How do we make effective use of engineering knowledge and plant data to 
understand the system behaviour? (the control model)
- How can we substantiate the link between a maintenance procedure and 
the effect on the overall system requirements  (the control action)
- How can a maintenance strategy  be secured in the organisation (stability of 
control, observability of the desired trajectory in time)
- How do we make effective use of information to update the initially cho-
sen strategy (the control feedback/ adaptation loop) 
Aspect RCM FMECA 
/RM 
FMECA/RP RBD FTA 
Goal orient-
ed’ the line of 
sight" 
     
Mental model      
Lack of bias      
Completeness 
of model      
Need for field 
data      
Time de-
pendent in-
formation 
     
Economic 
underpinning     n.a.
Acceptance 
in the organi-
sation 
    
Table I 
The asset manager requires the “line of sight”; how do his / her decisions influence 
the goals of the organisation? RCM focusses, in principle, on one specific failure 
mode and uses a broad description of the effects of failure: “trivial” versus “non-
trivial” The FMECA approach conveys, for a list of functional failures, information 
on the ranges of likelihood and consequences. The RBD is the most complete system-
modelling tool; it provides insight on the process layout and, depending on the level 
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of detail employed, it presents quantitative information on the cost-benefit of either 
“bought in reliability” in the design phase (the MTTF specification in the purchase 
order) and that of maintenance strategies. The FTA is rather similar but now the line 
of sight is mainly on the functional availability of safeguarding components to pre-
vent a critical top event; economics then does not play a strong role. 
Most of these techniques rely on input from a panel of experts. A requirement then is 
that each member of the team has an identical mental model of the problem. RCM 
does not have inherent characteristics to fulfil this goal; facilitators need to discuss 
the problem in the group to ascertain a common understanding. In FMECA the panel 
members are required to fill in significant detail on each fm but the overall system 
characteristics are part of the panel discussion 
The sloppier the method, the more a person in the team may be influenced (biased)  
by others assuming their skill/experience is better. This applies foremost for RCM; 
again the quantity of prescribed input in the FMECA approaches calls for a more 
structured common opinion. In principle, RBD’s and FT’s suffer least from bias 
since, preferably, they use factual data where possible and may analyse subjective 
opinions via sensitivity analysis. 
Building an RBD or FT is a major exercise carried out by well-trained engineers. It is 
quite common to note that these models start with coarse process blocks (mostly from 
the P&ID) and refined / more detailed in subsequent stages. In this way, the com-
pleteness of the model can well be managed. RCM, on the other hand, allows engi-
neers to pick out fm’s that have drawn attention because of system behaviour/insight 
“this component must be rather critical, because ….” or in root cause analysis “we 
now have to get rid of this recurrent problem”. The analysis thus easily can be 
stopped if the team decides that the most interesting fm’s are covered. FMECA 
stands in between; the primary list of fm’s for one system unit invites panel members 
to dis-cuss others to be added. 
Field data are essential in a learning organisation but, in practice, are difficult to get. 
RCM suffers least from this aspect; on the other end of the spectrum designers of 
RBD’s / FT’s should realise that their quantitative results critically depend on the ac-
curacy of the input data and sensitivity analyses thus are a must. FMECA stands in 
the middle; the method uses ranges rather than specific values. 
In order to be effective (SMART), the results of decisions have to be monitored over 
time. The decisionmaker thus needs to have information on the expected time-
dependent character of the eventual observations. RCM and FMECA lack this sup-
port, relying fully on long term averages. The logic background of RBD’s and FT’s 
allow in theory such a description in the time domain and RBD packages invariably 
show the decision maker what to expect in the future given his decision. Since FT’s 
are mainly used in safety/risk studies they commonly use point probabilities ( long 
term averages) and thus produce point estimates of the probability of the undesired 
top event. Dynamic FT’s have been introduced to specifically model sequence of 
events for scenario analysis. 
The CFO will require a cost-benefit analysis of the use of such decision support tech-
niques. RCM is notoriously poor at this point, FMECA provides better estimates of 
the ranges to be expected but not on the timing. RBD’s are superior; not only do they 
clearly demonstrate the underlying mechanisms of economically rewarding asset 
management decisions (the causal link) but also the pattern how and the time horizon 
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it will take to become observable4. RBD’s thus will give clear information to the final 
decision maker what and when to expect. 
For a decision support tool to be effective, it should be fully accepted in the organisa-
tion. At that point, the simplicity of RCM is a plus. FMECA’s are mainly used in 
well organised ISO 55001 compliant organisations. The more an organisation 
endorses this norm, the more FMECA will be an accepted tool. However, we also 
note that in public tenders the then required FMECA is regarded as an inevitable 
burden for which an outside consultant needs to be hired both for the process, as well 
as for the input data. It then is no surprise that the FMECA results will not easily 
become an effective improvement method. In most organisations, the construction of 
RBD’s and FT’s will be a dedicated task for in-house or external specialists. We then 
have the problem that the organisation is not well positioned to check the quality of 
this pro-cess and may take the results indiscriminately. 
We have seen before that the success of process control and optimisation relies on 
insight in the possibilities of control (controllability aspects, various types of control 
actions), in the process (the process model from black box to detailed process design 
or dynamic flowsheet type), time-dependent behaviour and feedback from observed 
data. From the list above we realise that in asset management the variety in mainte-
nance strategies is limited,  the underlying (deterioration) processes are poor under-
stood, input (reliability) data are lacking to a great extent, decision support models 
frequently are aimed at long term averages only whereas on-line information on con-
dition (and thus feedback) is scarce. A control engineer would classify such an ap-
proach as “ open loop control” and warn for the consequences! 
4. Training Asset Managers; closing the gap between theory
and practice
4.1 Introduction 
We always start the Risk Assessment and Safety (RAS) Master course block by ask-
ing the participants what specific training will help them to build up their career. The 
majority responds along the lines of; “give us the tools to convince operational c.q. 
higher management that we take the best decisions possible”; that is more 
substantiat-ed decision making.
From the control engineering, perspective the (future) MM’s then should: 
• Realise that they deal with the realisations of inherently stochastic processes, 
the outcomes of which are furthermore strongly influenced by operational 
conditions.
• Only the total system contributes to the profitability of the company, hence 
the effect of a single failure mode should be translated to the effect at system 
level.
• The selection of a maintenance strategy (the control action) depends on the 
type of deterioration process (Weibull beta), the expected economic benefit 
and the maintainability aspects/quality of execution. 
4 Later on we will discuss that the observability of these improvements may be difficult, given the in-
herent stochastic nature of the failure processes where strong overlaps in probability distributions may 
take place. 
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• In order for the decision to be accepted by the organisation and properly as-
sured over the lifetime of the process, the outcomes of the decision support 
tool need to be transparent; they should properly explain the results to be ex-
pected in time as well as the inherent variations.
• After implementation, the observed results should be compared with the deci-
sion model outcomes (the feedback loop). However, this loop is very slow due 
to the low frequency of occurrences of critical failure modes. Furthermore, the 
stochastic character requires correct statistical analysis. For high MTTF val-
ues, periodic observation of conditions is the only practical way to learn the 
effect of decisions.
• Given the usually restricted employment period of the decision maker in rela-
tion to the lifetime of the installation, significant attention has to be given to 
the necessary storage of data and underlying information. 
All this requires at first a proper understanding and mental image of the inherent un-
derlying uncertainties. All engineers in the past had some training in basic probability 
theory that will be refreshed in the Master RAS course but experience shows that they 
regard this as “mathematical exercises” like standard arithmetic’s that they solve 
along with the rules provided. A good starting point is the basic example of throwing 
a dice, students now that the chance of throwing a 3 is, as taught, on average  1/6 but 
do not realise that this holds only for a large number of repetitions. A simple Excel 
programme that shows how this probability develops over the series of throws 
(Fig. 9) effectively helps to memorise the stochastic behaviour; for most of the stu-
dents, this is an aha experience! 
4.2 Maintenance Management decision support tools 
MM’s need to learn how to change from “gut-based” reasoning to the use of data and 
(Weibull) probability distributions. Regrettably, most organisations lack a proper 
failure database, especially over time periods that are sufficient to analyse. We 
strongly advise against the use of the, since the nineties obsolete [24], MIL-
HDBK-217 figures and inform that important partners have left the OREDA 
organisation. So, we challenge them, to use the “expert opinions” of in-house 
specialists in a structured 
Fig. 9 
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team approach, paying specific attention to differences in individual opinions that un-
expectedly may cast light on failure patterns. A general observation is that these engi-
neers misinterpret the MTTF as a kind of useful life or guarantee period; to their sur-
prise discovering that at that specific moment in time roughly 2/3 have failed! Com-
bining individual  10, 50, 90 % estimates on the time to failure followed by visualisa-
tion of the expected failure pattern in time, the team arrives at ( a range of) 
reasonable estimates of the Weibull scale and shape parameters, now trusting that, if 
used in computer models, the outcomes are in line with the best, substantiated 
opinion availa-ble, but sensitivity analyses are needed. 
Fig. 10 
Such data may be used in the selection and optimisation of time-based planned 
maintenance with the Barlow-Proschan model of Fig. 4-2. In this case, the failure 
mode has an MTTF of 10 years with a beta of 3 and the cost ratio between planned 
and corrective maintenance is 5. If the costs are booked on the operational budget 
without discounting, the model calculates an optimum replacement interval of 5.8 
years where the time average PM costs are 46% of the corrective costs. It also shows 
that at this point one may expect about 13% of the failures under a corrective strategy 
leading to an apparent MTTF of 43 years.  
Compared with an RCM study, the MM now gets a view on the economic conse-
quences. The apparent MTTF plays a role in the criticality matrix of an FMECA; to 
what extent reduces PM the failure frequency compared with corrective only? 
Fig. 11 
However, if the costs of replacement are such that the CFO regards this as a capital 
investment, the discounting percentage5 plays a strong role (Fig. 11). If the MM has 
to use a discounting percentage of 8% the optimum is lost; the model advises not to 
5 Note that this DCF is one of the major instruments of a CFO to rank investments and has virtually no 
relation with the sometimes stated comparison with receiving interest from a bank or the average yield 
in the stock market! 
mttf 10 delta mttf ,% 0
bèta 3 delta beta,% 0
costs of failure 50
costs of planned maintenance 10
depreciation, % 0
time average optimal costs 2,7
optimal interval 5,75
optimal interval, fraction of MTTF 58%
lt time costs/y corr. only, depr = 0 5
average prob of failure at optimum 
cost interval 12,7%
app MTTF at optimum cost interval 43
optimal 
interval
time 
average 
optimal 
costs
average 
prob of 
failure at 
optimum 
cost 
costs 
savings 
as % of 
corrective
average values 5,75 2,68 12,66% 46%
eta low, beta low 5,75 2,68 12,66% 46%
eta low , beta high 5,75 2,68 12,66% 46%
eta high, beta low 5,75 2,68 12,66% 46%
eta high, beta high 5,75 2,68 12,66% 46%
© C.F.H. van Rijn
results
With this Excel programme you can 
optimise a single maintenance activity  in 
order to minimise time average costs or 
to arrive at minimum unavailability. The 
green areas are used for input data; 
yellow cells present calculated results.
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mttf 10 delta mttf ,% 0
bèta 3 delta beta,% 0
costs of failure 50
costs of planned maintenance 10
depreciation, % 8
time average optimal costs 0,7
optimal interval 25,00
optimal interval, fraction of MTTF 250%
lt time costs/y corr. only, depr = 0 5
average prob of failure at optimum 
cost interval 100,0%
app MTTF at optimum cost interval 10
optimal 
interval
time 
average 
optimal 
costs
average 
prob of 
failure at 
optimum 
cost 
costs 
savings 
as % of 
corrective
average values 25,00 0,74 100,00% 85%
eta low, beta low 25,00 0,74 100,00% 85%
eta low , beta high 25,00 0,74 100,00% 85%
eta high, beta low 25,00 0,74 100,00% 85%
eta high, beta high 25,00 0,74 100,00% 85%
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perform PM. This information may be used to change the opinion of the CFO to clas-
sify such replacements under the general investments. 
Fig. 12 
The CFO may also be critical on the expected economic benefit. A sensitivity analy-
sis where a range of +/- 10% in the Weibull parameters is used shows that the ex-
pected savings range between 36 and 55%. The MM now also realises that the opti-
mum replacement interval at best can be estimated to lie between 5 and 6.5 years. 
This range aspect is never used in the timing of work orders in the CMMS; exactly 
after, in this case, 5.8 years the CMMS will generate a work order. If the PM is not 
executed, the CMMS will increasingly remind the MM of the backlog in PM’s exe-
cuted. Since this is regarded as a key performance indicator, this message will even-
tually reach higher management and the MM will critically be questioned. 
This is a nice example of Goodhart’s Law6: “When a measure becomes a metric, it 
ceases to be a good measure”; in other words, when we set one specific goal, people 
will tend to optimize for that objective regardless of the consequences. The manage-
ment objective, in this case, is to reduce the frequency of failures, which subsequen-
tially should be monitored in time, but instead, the PM action required is followed. I 
have seen occasions where MM’s hired in extra, even less skilled, mechanics to keep 
this KPI at level, disregarding costs and quality of execution! 
Unfortunately, long term averages have a specific meaning only at the design level 
where equipment selection and various configurations are investigated. Operations 
are faced with performance in specific time periods; with a Design, Build, Finance 
and Maintain contract (DBFM), the contractor is responsible for the design and con-
struction of the project, as well as for financing and total maintenance over a speci-
fied time period. Furthermore, the employment period of most MM’s is short in com-
parison with the slow dynamics of critical, thus with large MTTF values, failure 
modes. Hence, the MM needs a quick analysis / “what if tool” to get a perspective on 
the realisation in time. A simple Monte Carlo analysis then is of great help (Fig. 13). 
6 More precisely: “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon 
it for control purposes.” 
mttf 10 delta mttf ,% 10
bèta 3 delta beta,% 10
costs of failure 50
costs of planned maintenance 10
depreciation, % 0
time average optimal costs 2,7
optimal interval 5,75
optimal interval, fraction of MTTF 58%
lt time costs/y corr. only, depr = 0 5
average prob of failure at optimum 
cost interval 12,7%
app MTTF at optimum cost interval 43
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eta low, beta low 5,00 3,21 13,99% 36%
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Fig. 13 
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age 12,0 1,4 13,4 120,0 143,3 263,2 6,6 263,2 0,36% 10,7%
calendar 13,0 1,4 14,4 130,0 142,8 272,8 6,8 272,8 0,37% 9,9%
corrective 0,0 4,7 4,7 0,0 466,0 466,0 11,6 466,0 0,64% 100,0%
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Instructions for use.
•	Provide a good estimate of the Weibull parameters of the failure 
distribution ( use the Weibull Excel programme). Validate your ideas 
with the opinions of your colleagues. Even better, use analysed field 
data.
•	Provide a good estimate of the costs and downtime involved with 
planned and corrective maintenance.
•	Select a project duration. Realise yourself that the first years will 
show relatively less failures if properly commissioned. Thus you may 
expect a difference between the long term and the project 
behaviour.
•	The programme will calculate the long term costs as a function of
the PM interval.
•	You may run (push the “ start simulation” button) the traditional 
PM analyses (calendar or age) and compare that with corrective 
only. To analyse the effect of condition based maintenance a fourth 
category is included where the CBM manufacturer has given a 
guarantee on early detection of incipient failure. The programme 
will run a corrective only run and afterwards analyse the results; if 
the guarantee is x% detected a drawing will decide that on average 
100-x % of the corrective results are transformed into planned 
activities.
•	In the righthand corner you will see the distribution of activities 
over the project period; the chance that 1, 2 , 3, .. events will occur.
•	In practice, you may see only one realisation -> push the single
button and study the variations to be expected (clear single erases 
the outcomes). Cell D5 allows you to state the number of identical 
items; all starting at the same time. Observe that the results of the 
ensemble show less variation.
In this model a fm has a MTTF of 8 year. Using age replacement the replacement interval is 3 year. If the fm fails earlier, it will be replaced with costs 100000 euro and a new interval is 
started. If the fm reaches the replacement time  , it is replaced with costs 10000 euro. The downtimes are respectively 480 and 48hour. If you opt for block replacement, the 
component is always replaced at the selected time, regardles of failure earlier. Option 3 is to anlyse corrective repair only. Option 4 provides a model for cbm with specified risk; in 95 
% of all cases pm takes place just before failure
discount percentage The top right graph shows the long term behaviour between replacement interval and 
annual total costs.At  3,2   year the costs are minimal k€  6,73.The risk of failure is                  
11,9 %. Deviations will occur for smaller intervals!
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In the right hand upper corner, the MM finds the long-term optimisation7 similar to 
that in Fig. 10. This optimal interval is used in a time-dependent analysis with data 
in the yellow cells. He/she may select five different maintenance strategies: 
• Corrective repair, run to failure; repair takes place after failure.
• Calendar based optimisation; a strategy where we replace at fixed calendar in-
tervals and in-between apply corrective maintenance (to an “as good as new” 
condition) whenever a failure occurs. We assume that this replacement will 
always take place at the planned moment, even if the element had to be cor-
rectively repaired just before.
• Age replacement; a maintainable element is replaced or restored to “as good 
as new” when it reaches a specific age tp. If it fails before tp we will apply cor-
rective maintenance leading to the same situation as with PM. From that mo-
ment on, we start counting the tp interval again. As such, it has a serious 
drawback on the scheduling of planned maintenance actions. Every time we 
encounter a failure within a predetermined PM interval we start a new cycle. 
• Using the PF interval (Fig. 14); a deceptively simple idea promoted by John 
Moubray [25] as a rather strange mix-up of a deterministic treatment of inher-
ently stochastic processes since both the occurrence of the first identifiable 
symptom and the interval between this value and the loss of function (failure) 
will show acceptable spread in practice and thus should be treated as stochas-
tic processes. Furthermore, we note a mix-up of concepts on a measurable 
condition (say, a wall thickness) and a probability of functional failure; the re-
lationship of which is frequently difficult to determine. Professor Anthony 
Christer  [26, 27] later on developed the concept of the delay time model 
which overcomes part of these restrictions but uses the stationary behaviour to 
find optimal solutions, for instance on the inspection interval given a probabil-
istic description of the occurrence of P and the P-F interval. 
7 For reasons of clarity, we have left out here the required sensitivity analysis on the input parameters! 
Fig. 14 
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• Using condition based maintenance; in this case, specifying only the degree of 
effectiveness, that is the percentage of imminent failures detected by the CBM 
system that early, that corrective repair could effectively take place. Note that 
the MM should primarily be interested in this result, rather than the techniques 
behind the CBM technique. 
With this tool, the MM easily gets insight into the average time-dependent behaviour 
of the various measures of control (the maintenance strategies) and their cost-
effectiveness (Fig. 15). In the top-right corner, he/she will notice the pdf of the cor-
rective / PM activities to be expected. For instance, if the calendar based PM strategy 
is chosen, 13 replacements will need to be executed but, in spite of the PM action, on 
average 1.4 failures needing corrective action are expected with  23% probability of 
zero, up to a 5% probability of 4. It is the experience of the author, however, that this 
graph does not directly lead to a mental impression that is easily memorised. 
For that purpose, the MM may opt for a series of single runs of the MC simulation of 
(Fig. 13) making the pdf clear to him/her (Fig. 16).
All CMMS system will detect patterns of successive failures with unexpected small 
time intervals in between. This raises concern in the organisation, potentially leading 
to a more specific investigation like a root cause study. The MM should realise, how-
ever, that such series of events are inherent characteristics, albeit with small proba-
bility, of a stochastic process! 
There is a strong trend nowadays towards the use of condition-based maintenance, 
predictive maintenance and exploiting the “Industrial Internet of Things, IIoT” where 
data cheaply and easily become available towards the revolution of “Industry 4.0”. 
# repl. over 
project
# repairs 
over 
project
total repl costs, k€
corr costs, 
k€
total costs, 
k €
average 
annual 
costs, k €
NPV, k€ fraction corr, %
single 
run  fm's 11,00 3,00 14,00 110,00 300,00 410,00 10,25 410,00 21,43
single 
run  fm's 13,00 0,00 13,00 130,00 0,00 130,00 3,25 130,00 0,00
Fig. 15 
Fig. 16 
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Again, this forms a fruitful area for mathematical research, but a word of caution 
is on its place. 
Fig. 17 
Bearings (roller, ball, Fig. 17) are indispensable components of rotating equipment, 
failure of which causing appreciable downtime, costs and frequently loss of produc-
tion. In theory (and in design) bearing life is determined by the number of 
hours/cycles it will take for the metal to "fatigue" which is a function (SN curve) of 
the load on the bearing, the number of rotations, and the amount of lubrication that 
the bearing receives. Hardened steel (curve A) shows a fatigue limit (or endurance 
limit); a value of the stress below which a material can presumably endure an infinite 
number of stress cycles which is the basis of the Lieblein- Zeelen [28] design equa-
tion. In practice, bearing life is limited and shows large variations (e.g.Van Rensse-
laer  [29], Zaretsky [30]) with low Weibull beta values (around 1.5). There is a com-
mon understanding that the, in theory, infinite lifetime ends by external causes (misa-
lignment, vibration, shock, dirt, corrosion pitting, excessive heat) causing operation 
outside the fatigue limit and subsequentially rapid deterioration.  
Bearing health is monitored by vibration measurements. A simple vibration alarm 
may indicate the point of onset of deterioration (comparable with the “point” P  in the 
PF interval). From that moment, the modelling of failure, the predictive approach, 
becomes cumbersome. Jardine [31], in his extensive survey article, describes a large 
number of techniques: short-time Fourier transform, wavelet transform, proportional 
hazards models, hidden Markov models, independent component analysis, cluster 
analysis, AI techniques, artificial neural networks, fuzzy logic, belief networks, ...The 
fact that that many techniques are investigated is strongly linked with the lack of a 
proper deterioration model; the first particle of bearing steel or debris causes an ava-
lanche of further deterioration in a rather random fashion, strongly influenced by op-
erational conditions. The validity of the approach than may be questioned; what is the 
decision problem of the AM? If he/she accepts the warning signal (damage initiation 
has been confirmed), the fundamental decision problem lies with the grace period un-
til this vibration increases to the shutdown level; is that period long enough to take 
proper action? Now we have a model to steer on along the philosophy of the PF inter-
val as described above. 
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The IIoT is heralded as cheaply bringing in large amounts of data. However, the crux 
lies with the translation of these data into information for decision support, the dy-
namic model of degradation. Many techniques rely on observed correlations, but the 
causality remains unaddressed; a critical perspective is required! 
4.3 Using process control models for CBM 
As outlined above, process control engineers need to model the constraints of opera-
tion in order to optimise production. These constraints are usually found as maximum 
cooling rate, maximum gas flow, etcetera. 
Fig. 18 
Fig. 18 provides an example where the heat efficiency of a shell and tube heat ex-
changer is estimated from the flowrates and the logarithmic mean temperature 
differ-ence (the red curve). This concept was introduced in Shell by my research 
group in the eighties and now receives great attention; Chevron8, using wireless 
transmitters and Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing, expects “Savings could be in 
the millions if you can monitor and predict the health across all of our exchangers”. 
Fig. 19 
A similar concept can be followed to optimise the clean out rotary vane compressors 
(Fig. 19), note the effect of the cleanout operation in September.  For pumps, the con-
dition is assessed by following the relationship between the pump head centrifugal 
and the volumetric flow rate (Q), that a pump can maintain.  
Note that, in these cases, we use process measurements that frequently will already be 
available. Secondly, the model outcomes will readily be accepted by engineers, the 
8 https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/09/05/chevron-launching-predictive-maintenance-to-oil-fields-
refineries retrieved December 2018 
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more so, since they directly may be associated with production losses. Crossing the 
traditional cultural barrier between Operations and Maintenance thus has great value. 
4.4 Maintenance Management decision support tools at system level 
The simple tools described above produce results only at failure mode level, whereas 
the economic benefit is produced at the system level.  
Fig. 20 
Any master course will therefore treat the concepts of reliability block diagrams and 
fault trees. These calculations can either be calculated analytically (SPARC, Fig. 20) 
[32] or via Monte Carlo simulation (RAPTOR (free download), commercial software 
packages like BlockSim, AvSim, Maros, RiskTec, Miriam, ...). One of the authors of 
SPARC (now solely an in-house tool in Shell) has developed an interesting package 
called ARTIS (Availability and Reliability Tracking Information System) 9  for ad-
dressing the risks to production availability which includes event tracking from a 
CMMS.
Fig. 21 
9 The user interface can be found at: www.artis.la/V24/models/artis.html, the user manual at 
wiki.artis.la 
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Artis is freely available for testing and demonstration purposes, small models can be 
run free of charge but, in this free mode, response times might be slow. Short- and 
long term service agreements are available for commercial use.  
This important system information can only be obtained if detailed information is 
available on the failure distribution and the maintenance data. In practice, the problem 
lies with the former; real data are available only after analysing data over a long peri-
od. For design purposes, where the problem frequently is to select alternatives of con-
figurations, information from databases like OREDA [33] can be used with care.  Fig. 
22 gives an example of the capacity profile calculated with ARTIS of a gas pro-
duction platform, where, using OREDA data, the initial configuration of 3 trains each 
with 35% capacity proved to yield insufficient system capacity, because of the train 
downtime. The design team proposed a fourth train but ARTIS showed that 3 trains 
each with 50% capacity were an economically better alternative. 
For the optimisation of operational asset management, we are frequently forced to use 
engineering judgement, next to sparsely available data. Inevitably, there thus will be 
appreciable uncertainty of the quantitative (system) results which need to be investi-
gated by sensitivity10 analyses. The benefit of applying RBD packages then depends 
strongly on fast, but structured, “what if” analyses steering the team in reaching a 
good decision, rather than on achieving precise quantitative output values. 
10 Both SPARC and Artis allow the user to change all or a selected group of Weibull parameters by a 
chosen percentage for such an analysis. 
Fig. 22 
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4.5 Decision support in change programmes 
Active asset managers regularly organise improvement procedures along the lines of 
"the number of unforeseen failures per month must be lower"; a valuable KPI. The 
change manager will formulate such a case in terms of: 
• Setting a new performance goal.
• Investigating the expected reasons for a lower than desired performance.
• Ranking causes of failures, thus determining focus.
• Providing a clear distinction between and prioritization of controllable and 
non-controllable aspects.
• Clarity about the relationship between improvement measures and system per-
formance.
• Controlled management of the implementation of improvement measures.
• Prognosis of effect improvement measures; how to validate the costs involved 
against the benefits expected?
• A managerial formulation of the way to monitor the progress of the improve-
ment process in time. 
Note the similarity with the process control approach!  The last bullet item touches 
upon the observability of the maintenance process; remember that this is one of the 
pre-requirements of the control engineer but he/she is dealing with deterministic 
val-ues (measurements) rather than the outcome of stochastic processes like in 
mainte-nance. The asset manager may choose to monitor: 
1. The process of improvement as observed by the estimated increase of the 
MTTF, which requires statistical investigation of the TTF of field data
2. The process of improvement as observed by the decrease in number of failures 
per time interval, which is the standard form of reporting in CMMS’s 
Suppose, we have an improvement process in which the MTTF is doubled by choos-
ing higher quality components (the scale factor eta of a Weibull distribution with 
shape factor beta 3 goes from 1 to 2). The left side of Fig. 23 shows the two probabil-
ity density curves. The "measurement" (compare with process control) of our process 
now follows from drawing samples from the probability density distribution. Howev-
er, we see that the two curves show an overlap that can be calculated from the cumu-
lative distributions of process 1 and 2 (right side Fig. 23). We arrive at a value of 
35%, which means that if we completely replace process 1 with process 2 we run a 
risk of 35% of drawing samples (observing failure) in the overlapping part. In those 
cases, we will not observe any improvement while it has indeed taken place! Hence, 
Fig. 23 
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the observability is restricted to 65%. 
Fig. 24 shows an overview in which the x-axis represents the ratio between the im-
proved situation with respect to the original value and the y-axis the fraction of ob-
servability. Suppose that in practice we achieve an improvement of a factor of 2, we 
see that at a beta value of 3 (close to the normal distribution) we have a probability of 
approximately 65% to observe this improvement from the field data.) For completely 
random failure (β = 1) the probability drops to around 25%. 
Fig. 25 
Fig. 24 
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Now, if the MM follows the number of failures in a given time period, we deal with 
a (for β > 1: pseudo) Poisson process. In such an improvement process as in Fig. 25  
where the number of failures is reduced from 40 to 30 per period, we note again an 
overlap between the probability densities as can be seen in the left graph. This over-
lap becomes smaller as the achieved improvement increases; the right-hand graph 
shows that if the # of failures are reduced by 80%, the overlap almost disappears. If 
the observations lie in the common area of the two probability density functions we 
cannot make a distinction between the two situations; a change is unobservable.  
Whereas the observability is 60% in the first case, it is 99,8%  in the last one. 
The observability depends in this case (Fig. 26) on the number of failures in a time 
period and the fraction improvement. In the case of a relatively small improvement, 
we have to average over a very long interval. 
Fig. 27 shows a simulation of a process with 40 components each having the same 
failure mode of the beta =1 type. At period 10 all 40 are replaced11 by new compo-
11 Such a sudden change is unrealistic in practice; the simulation model has a facility to take the im-
plementation period in consideration but this facility is not used here for clarity. 
Fig. 27 
Fig. 26 
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nents with twice higher MTTF; reducing the expected number of failures per period 
from 40 to 20. The orange dots indicate the observed number of failures resulting 
from the simulation process; note the difference in each period between the expected 
and observed value. The black crosses indicate the rolling 4-period average; clearly a 
lagging indicator. In this process the observability is 94%; the improvement is notice-
able after period 15.  
Realise that Fig. 27 is just one realisation of this chance process; we may also observe 
a result as sketched in Fig. 9; where the asset manager may unjustified worry about 
the sudden increase in the number of failures between period 30 and 40.   
In Fig. 29, the same process is sketched but now with an improvement of 10 %. The 
observability is here some 25% and in this specific realisation, the improvement is 
difficult to observe in the first 15 periods after the change. 
4.6 Inspection 
Statutory inspections with a regular return interval, both on the safeguarding aspects 
as well as on the physical condition, are a significant part of the Asset Management 
portfolio in complying with standards. One would, therefore, expect that results of 
Fig. 4-1 
Fig. 28 
       Fig. 29 
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these inspections over the lifetime of systems are readily available. However, in prac-
tice, frequently only the last results are stored / easily retrievable. In such cases, there 
is no trending and the information gathered thus does not contribute to a learning or-
ganisation. 
In safeguarding inspections, in line with IEC 61508, 61511, Bayes rule plays an im-
portant role, the type I type II error. The influence of human errors is clearly men-
tioned in the norms and even more detailed in application papers like [34], but in 
qualitative terms only. Since most engineers shy away from mathematics, the psycho-
logical approach of Gigerenzer [35] is effective. 
Take the case where the required probability of failure on demand 
(PFD) is 10-2. Gigerenzer warns that even an explanation in terms 
of percentages is psychologically less transparent than using pure 
numbers. Hence, he proposes the following approach: 
“Assume that you have to test this item 100 times. To the best of 
our knowledge, we know that only in 1 out of these 100 cases 
there will be a defect. So, the fact that you repeatedly observe a 
functioning system is normal.
I take it for granted, that you, as an experienced mechanic, say in 
99 out of the 100 cases will correctly find this defect, repair it, 
such that it is working again.  
The problem now lies with the 99 cases where the component is functioning correctly. 
If you are not careful enough, you may introduce a fault; for instance, forget to put 
back the override switch. Suppose that this happens in 1 out of 100 cases, you see that 
testing does not improve the situation! 
Fig. 30 shows the formal results with λ the overall constant failure rate, Ti the inspec-
tion interval and pmi the probability of maintenance induced failure. For the latter no 
formal data are available but students invariably estimate a range between 1 – 5 %. 
Accepting the views of Gigerenzer, from thereon they will better take care to guard 
the quality of intervention, for instance by using the “four eyes “principle. 
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Table II shows published data [36] on pipe wall thickness over a period of 14  years 
measured at 6 fixed locations with the fitted Weibull distributions. Note that the fit 
expressed by the R2 value in year 6 and 12 is below 0.95; the 6 (!) data points show-
ing appreciable scatter. The decrease in time of the beta values indicate the corrosion 
process to become more inhomogeneous 
The left side of Fig. 31 shows the trend of the decrease in wall thickness over time-
based on the Weibull average value, which is comparable to that of the arithmetic av-
erages of the measurements. Note the large uncertainty in extrapolated values over 
the first 6 years, gradually the expected time value of meeting the rejection limit sta-
bilises around 18 – 19 years. The right side of Fig. 31 shows that the probability of 
crossing the rejection limit (the failure) steeply increases with time. Whilst the trend-
ing of the averages focusses the asset manager on the year of occurrence of passing 
the rejection limit (18 – 19 years), this figure shows that already in year 10 the risk is 
some 10%. Such information may be used in an economic evaluation of the optimal 
time of replacement, balancing the costs of early execution against that of operating 
below the rejection limit. 
Field data are extremely valuable [37] [38] in a learning organisation. However, this 
requires the CMMS to be set up such that information at failure mode level becomes 
available whereas these systems usually focus at equipment level. The need to inter-
pret textual information generated by technicians who are not trained on later use of 
the information at maintenance execution level is cumbersome. 
Table II 
Fig. 31 
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5. Conclusions
Over the past seven decades, several benchmarking studies show that the effective-
ness of Asset Management has not significantly changed; it appears that extensive 
academic research has not found widespread application.  
We have shown that this evolution is at strong variance with that in the (comparable) 
discipline of control engineering. Process control is at the end of the learning curve 
and taught in standard curricula. Process engineers thus are professionally capable to 
use all kinds of measured/inferred process variables to set up stable simple and ad-
vanced control and optimisation systems, that are fully accepted in operation and of 
which the economic benefit is readily demonstrated.  
In Asset Management most (especially, mechanical) engineers are technically driven 
and reason mainly in deterministic terms. Compared with control engineers, their sys-
tem insight, views on observability and controllability and interest for time-dependent 
processes are less developed. Reliability engineering still is mainly an add on in engi-
neering education; companies may at best have a few in-house reliability engineering 
specialists. These persons struggle with the lack of input data for decision support 
models and lack proper information on the physics / chemistry of degradation models. 
In monitoring the effect of implemented decisions, they meet a paucity of data.  Thus, 
where applied, their decision support models do not easily find widespread support 
from colleagues and management.  These models, aiming at long term characteristics 
clash with  the drive for business results to be achieved in specific (in comparison 
with the system dynamics, short) time slots and the needs of a learning organisation.  
Many academia in stochastic OR focus, frequently underestimating the data problem, 
on black box (statistical time to failure) develop decision support models aiming at 
long term averages; physics of failure only recently being partly included. It appears 
that the academic focus more lies on mathematically elegant solutions with novel 
techniques than on AM decision making in practice. 
Discussing a number of common decision problems, we have shown that simple 
models that visualise the AM decision process in time are powerful tools to store the 
insights produced by reliability engineering tools in memory. Such understanding is 
effective in deciding on achieving agreement and endorsement between/from the var-
ious parties involved. With this insight, the inherent variability in realisations (ob-
servability) and the restrictions in management effectiveness (controllability) be-
comes part of the mental image. Structured team consultation provides suitable start-
ing data at least for ranking and evaluating decisions; sensitivity analyses are neces-
sary to provide an understanding of the spread in model outcomes. The uncertainty in 
input data should then, where possible, later on, be verified by processing field data. 
Even these simple models yield results that are hitherto surprising to practicing engi-
neers, as demonstrated by their use in a long series of Master Course RAM blocks. It 
is our experience that, after graduation, most course members successfully apply 
these techniques in practice. 
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Abstract  
 
 
The approach to define rational preventive measures of supporting reliability and 
safety for modern critical systems is proposed. The approach is based on the original 
probabilistic models and methods for processing data in “smart” monitoring system, 
presented as “Black Box” and as complex structure. The models and methods are 
applicable in real time and also for short- and long-term planning. To define rational 
preventive measures of supporting reliability and safety 5 steps of the approach are 
described and demonstrated by practical examples.  
Keywords: efficiency, method, model, probability, risk, system, technology. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The digital transformation of modern critical systems requires a cardinal turn to 
rational preventive measures of reliability and safety provision on the base of data 
monitored. Here critical systems are understood as objects of dangerous manufacture 
and the equipment, energy objects, power and transport systems etc. Implementation 
of scientifically proved rational preventive measures to support reliability and safety 
on the base of probabilistic modelling and risks predictions helps to transform data 
gathering into “smart” system of monitoring.  Different monitored data about current 
conditions of parameters become accessible in real time. A monitoring of parameters 
conditions is intended to increase reliability and industrial safety and to improve 
health management of critical systems and their operation efficiency.  Analysis of 
actual data allows to be traced the losses of established norm ranges for various 
parameters and helps to define the reasons of abnormalities in time.  
 
As the main metric only a frequency of failures is quite often used.  It means 
exponential probability distribution function (PDF) of time before failures without 
details of different performed processes and conditions. Such simplified approach 
leads to deviations in a probability of failures which may be hundreds and thousands 
percent against the results of more adequate modelling [1]. Sometimes regression 
models are used for an analysis of expected changes depending on system operating 
time. For complex systems, integrated from subsystems and the elements of different 
destination, the regression estimations don’t represent analytical dependences on 
concrete parameters and consequently don’t allow to predict "bottlenecks" and to 
solve the inverse problems connected with optimization. But the analytical benefit, 
extracted from gathered data, is far from exhausted. More exact predictions are 
connected with creation the PDF of time before expected failures. For example, for 
analysed serial and parallel structures analytical approaches of PDF composition are 
developed [2-5], formulas describing probability density function for cascading 
disruption are proposed [6]. And also differential equations and simulation models are 
used, see for example [6-8 etc.].  
 
Along with it «smart» monitoring systems differ that they should analyse gathered 
data considering high structural complexity of system, analytical dependences on the 
changes of concrete parameters, characterizing reliability and safety, on the used 
technologies of integrity diagnostics in applications to every element.  Such idea for 
“smart” monitoring systems, including justified requirements for monitoring and 
prognosis, is a base line of the last standards of system engineering ISO/IEC/IEEE 
15288,  ISO 13379, ISO 13381, ISO 17359, IEC 61508, etc. Now there is no rather 
universal analytical approach, widely applicable in different areas for processing data 
in “smart” monitoring systems, to implement this idea yet. Considering an actuality of 
the outlined problematics, the universal approach, based on the original models and 
allowing to define and rationale preventive measures of supporting reliability and 
safety, is proposed. The approach develops the existing approaches [2, 4, 9-18].  
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 2. The description of the approach   
 
The approach includes the next 5 Steps. 
 
Step 1 is to define universal formal technologies for logic describing the processes of 
occurring and activating dangers, diagnostics and recovering system integrity. 
Technologies should consider the possibilities of periodic control and monitoring and 
allow to create the probabilistic models of these processes. Performing step 1 two 
general technologies are proposed: technology 1 (periodical diagnostics of system 
integrity without the continuous monitoring between diagnostics) and technology 2 
(continuous monitoring between periodical diagnostics is added to technology 1). It is 
technology 1 in special case of technology 2– see Figure 1. 
 
Note. 1. System integrity is defined as such system state when system purposes are achieved with the 
required quality (including reliability) and/or safety. 2. It is supposed that used diagnostic tools allow 
to provide system integrity recovery after revealing the dangers or the consequences of influences.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Some accident events for technology 2 (left – “correct operation”, right – “a loss of 
integrity” during given time for prediction Treq. ) 
 
Technology 1 is based on the periodical diagnostics of a system integrity. Diagnostics 
are carried out to detect the dangers occurrences into a system or the consequences of 
their negative influences. The lost system integrity can be detected only as a result of 
diagnostic, after which a recovery of integrity is started.  Dangerous influence on a 
system operating correctly is performed step-by step: an activation time of danger 
begins after this danger occurrence in a system (correct operation is continued yet), a 
danger influence (an accident event) begins after finishing activation time – it means 
a loss of integrity. A system integrity can’t be lost before an occurred danger is 
activated, activation means this danger has influenced on a system. Otherwise the 
danger will be detected and neutralized during the next diagnostic time and 
recovering works.    
Technology 2, unlike the previous Technology 1, implies that operators (a man or 
software system or robot or special device or their combination) trace system integrity 
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between diagnostics.  In case of detecting a danger an operator initiate a recovery of 
system integrity (dangers removing and system recovery are the same as for 
Technology 1). Faultless operator’s actions provide a neutralization of a danger. 
Diagnostic measures are periodically performed and also operator possibilities are 
enough for recovering.  A danger influence is possible only if operator makes an error 
(it means the possibilities for detecting are finished) and dangerous influence occurs 
before the next diagnostic time.   
 
Step 2 is to define universal elementary ranges for the traced parameters (from 
reliability or safety point of view), monitored conditions and interpretation of events, 
allowing analytical data processing by probabilistic modeling.  
 
Step 3 is to develop probabilistic models for Technologies 1, 2, which can be used for 
“Black Box”, and the methods to generate new probabilistic models for complex 
structures, allowing prognostic researches on a level of the probability destribution 
function (PDF) of time before a next abnormality for one element, subsystem, system.    
 
Step 4 is to implement the proposed probabilistic models and methods of step 3 for 
processing data in “smart” monitoring system, to define acceptable risks.    
 
Step 5 is to estimate effects from a use of preventive measures in real time (by 
probabilistic models implemented on step 4) and to define rational preventive 
measures of supporting reliability and safety by solving optimization problems with 
limits on acceptable risks. 
 
The implementation of Steps 1 – 5 is described below.  
3. The proposed probabilistic models and methods (Step 3)  
 
3.1 The Models for “Black Box” 
The probability of system operation with required reliability and/or safety within the 
given prognostic period (i.e. probability of success) may be estimated as a result of 
use the models for technologies 1 and 2 (described above). Assumption: for all time 
input characteristic the probability distribution functions exist. Considering 
consequences risk R(Treq) to lose integrity (safety, quality or separate property, for 
example – reliability) is addition to 1 for probability P(Treq) of probability of success 
– see Figures 1 and 2.  R(Treq) =1-P(Treq), consequences are considered accordingly.  
 
There are possible the next variants for technologies 1 and 2: variant 1 – the given 
prognostic period Treq is less than established period between neighboring diagnostics 
(Treq < Tbetw+Tdiag); variant 2 – the given prognostic period Treq is more than or equals 
to established period between neighboring diagnostics (Treq ≥ Tbetw+Tdiag). Here Tbetw 
– is time between the end of diagnostic and the beginning of next diagnostic, Tdiag – is 
the diagnostic time including recovering if it needs. The next formulas for  PDF of 
time between the losses of system integrity are proposed for using [2, 4, 14-18].  
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PDF for the model of technology 1, variant 1: Under the condition of independence 
for input characteristics the probability of providing system integrity (i.e. probability 
of success) for variant 1 is equal to 
P(1)(Treq) = 1 - Ωoccur∗ Ωactiv(Treq),                                         (1) 
 
where Ωoccur(t) – is the PDF of time between neighboring occurrences of danger; 
Ωactiv(t) – is the PDF of activation time of occurred danger. These PDF  Ωoccur(t) and 
Ωactiv(t)  may be exponential PDF - see rationale in [2, 4, 14-15]. For different threats 
a frequency of dangers for these PDF is the sum of frequencies of every kind of 
threats. 
 
PDF for the model of technology 1, variant 2. Under the condition of independence 
for input characteristics the probability of providing system integrity (i.e. probability 
of success) for variant 2 is equal to 
P(2) (Treq) = N((Tbetw+Tdiag)/Treq) P(1)N(Tbetw +Tdiag) + (Trmn/Treq) P(1)(Trmn),   (2)   
 
where N=[Тreq./(Тbetw+ Тdiag.)] – may be real (for PDF) or the integer part (for 
estimation of deviations),  Trmn  = Treq - N(Tbetw+Tdiag).  
The probability of providing system integrity within the given time P(1)(Treq) is 
defined by (1). 
 
PDF for the model of technology 2, variant 1. Under the condition of independence 
for input characteristics the probability of providing system integrity for variant 1 is 
equal to  
.                                    (3) 
Here A(τ) is the PDF of time between operator’s error. A(τ) may be exponential PDF 
[2, 4, 14-15].  
 
PDF for the model of technology 2, variant 2. Under the condition of independence of 
characteristics the probability of providing system integrity for variant 2 is equal to 
P(2) (Treq) = N[(Tbetw +Tdiag)/Treq] P(1)N(Tbetw +Tdiag) + (Trmn/Treq) P(1)(Trmn),    (4) 
where  the probability of providing system integrity within the given time P(1)(Treq.) is 
defined by (3).  
 
The final clear analytical formulas for calculating are received by Lebesque-
integration of (3) expression. The models are applicable to the system presented as 
one element. The main result of such system modeling is the probability of providing 
system integrity during the given period of time.  
  
The method of forming PDF is the next: if probabilities for all points Тreq. from 0 to ∞ 
will be calculated, a trajectory of the PDF P(t) is automatically synthesized for t from 
0 to ∞. 
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3.2 Integration of probabilistic models for complex structures 
 
The main output of modelling by models 3.1 is a trajectory of the PDF depending on 
characteristics of threats, periodic diagnostics, monitoring and recoveries. And the 
building of such PDF is the real base to predict probability P and risk R for the time 
points Тreq.. It is important to know a mean time between neighbouring losses of 
integrity like mean time between neighbouring failures in reliability (MTBF), but in 
application to safety, quality etc.   
 
For complex systems with parallel or serial structure existing models with known 
PDF can be developed by usual methods of probability theory [19-20 etc.]. Let's 
consider the elementary structure from two independent parallel or series elements. 
Let’s PDF of time τi between losses of i-th element integrity is Вi(t), i.e. Вi(t) =Р (τi≤ 
t), then:  
 
1) time between losses of integrity for system combined from series connected 
independent elements is equal to a minimum from two times τi: failure of 1st or 2nd 
elements (i.e. the system goes into a state of lost integrity when either 1st, or 2nd 
element integrity is lost).  For this case the PDF of time between  losses of system 
integrity is defined by expression  
В(t) = Р(min (τ1,τ2)≤t)=1- Р(min (τ1,τ2)>t)=1-Р(τ1>t)Р(τ2 > t) = 
= 1 – [1-В1(t)] [1-В2(t)];                                             (5) 
 
2) time between losses of integrity for system combined from parallel connected 
independent elements (with hot reservation) is equal to a maximum from two times τi: 
failure of 1st and 2nd elements (i.e. the system goes into a state of lost integrity when 
both 1st and 2nd elements  have lost integrity).  For this case the PDF of time 
between losses of system integrity is defined by expression  
В(t)=Р(max(τ1,τ2)≤t)=Р(τ1≤t)Р(τ2≤t)=В1(t)В2(t).                           (6) 
Applying recurrently expressions (5)–(6) it is possible to build PDF of time between 
losses of integrity for any complex system with the combination of parallel and/or 
series structures. 
 
All these ideas for analytical modelling operation processes are supported by the 
software tools “Mathematical modelling of system life cycle processes” – “know 
how” (registered by Rospatent №2004610858), “Complex for evaluating quality of 
production processes” (registered by Rospatent №2010614145) and others [2, 4, 14, 
15]. 
 
3.3 About methods for optimization 
 
By using the models and software tools  above the problems of optimization for an 
element, subsystem, system  can be solved through the calculations of the probability 
of providing system integrity or the risk to lose system integrity during given 
prognostic period on time line. This approach considers the different threats, 
conditions and the measures of counteractions in applications to every element, 
subsystem and to whole “smart” system. The given acceptable risk can be established 
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by precedent principle. Thus the final choice of integrated measures is allocated on a 
payoff to a customer in a view of a specificity of created or maintained system.    
For example, the next general formal statements of problems for optimization can be 
used:  
 
1) for the stages of “smart” system creation: system parameters, technical and 
management measures, represented in the terms of the time characteristics of threats, 
control and/or conditions monitored and a comprehensible recovery of lost integrity 
are the most rational for the given prognostic period if the minimum of expenses for 
creation of system is reached at limitations on acceptable levels of risks to lose 
integrity (for elements, subsystems, whole system) and considering other 
development, operation or maintenance conditions and limitations;  
 
2) on operation and maintenance stages: system parameters, technical and 
management measures, represented in the terms of the time characteristics of threats, 
control and/or conditions monitored and a comprehensible recovery of lost integrity 
are the most rational for the given prognostic period if the maximum operation profit 
is reached at limitations on acceptable levels of risks and considering other operation 
or maintenance conditions and limitations. 
 
The combination of these formal statements also can be used in system life cycle. The 
proposed models and methods are applicable to be used in real time and also for 
short- and long-term planning. It is demonstrated by examples.   
 
 
 
4. Examples of implementation for processing data in “smart” 
monitoring system (with the demonstrations of Steps 1-5) 
 
Example 1 for demonstration of Steps 1-5 implementation [15-18]. In 2016 the 
“smart” remote monitoring system (RMS) was designed for the Joint-Stock Company 
“Siberian Coal Energy Company” (“SUEK” – www.suek.ru).  Because of thousands 
of system elements and subsystems should be covered by monitoring, universal 
formal technologies for logic describing the processes of occurring and activating 
dangers, diagnostics and recovering  the integrity of the values of parameters, 
maintained conditions for coal miners, normal operation of machinery, equipment and 
whole mine are established. The Technologies 1 and 2 above are met formal logic 
processes. It means the implementation of Step 1.    
 
The implemented Step 2 is explained by the next propositions. Monitored parameters 
have been chosen for all valuable conditions, machinery and equipment. For each 
parameter the ranges of possible values of conditions are established: “Working range 
inside of norm”, “Out of working range, but inside of norm”, “Abnormality”, it may 
be interpreted by similarly light signals – "green", "yellow", "red" – see Figure 2. The 
condition “Abnormality” characterizes a threat to lose system integrity after danger 
influence (on logic level this range “Abnormality” may be interpreted as failure, fault, 
unacceptable risk or quality, etc.). This construction allows to extract data for 
probabilistic modeling: time between moments of the occurrences of dangers 
(potential threats), activation time of occurred dangers, recovery time.  
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Figure 2. The universal elementary ranges for traced parameters 
 
All parameters are represented as the system elements. The conditions for coal 
miners, operating machinery and equipment are represented as complex subsystems 
integrated from serial elements (serial structure) and parallel subsystems for 
reservation (parallel structure). The whole mine is represented as complex system 
integrated from serial and parallel structures.  Logic interpretation for serial structure 
from two elements is: the structure goes into a state of lost integrity when either 1st or 
2nd element integrity is lost. Logic interpretation for parallel structure from two 
subsystems is: the structure goes into a state of lost integrity when both 1st and 2nd 
subsystems integrities are lost.  
 
Step 3 has allowed to do the adaptation of proposed probabilistic models and methods 
(models “Black Box” for Technologies 1, 2 and the methods to generate new 
probabilistic models for complex structures, allowing prognostic researches on a level 
of PDF of time before a next abnormality) for implementing to parameters, valuable 
conditions, machinery and the equipment of the whole mine. Considering 
consequences risk R(Treq) to lose integrity means probability to be though one time in 
“red” range during period Treq – see Figures 1 and 2. PDF Ωoccur(t) of time between 
neighboring occurrences of danger (from the “green” at the “yellow” range), PDF 
Ωactiv(t) of activation time of occurred danger (the time from the 1-st occurrence at the 
“yellow” range to the 1-st occurrence at the “red” range) and PDF A(τ) of time 
between operator’s error are approximated by exponential PDF – input for mean time 
see from Figure 2 and from the processing of statistics. 
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Step 4 has allowed to implement proposed probabilistic models and methods by the 
software of “smart” RMS, to define acceptable risks. RMS is intended for a 
possibility of prediction and the prevention of possible emergencies, minimization of 
a role of human factor regarding control and supervising functions. It may be reached 
on the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on 
controllable parameters of conditions, machinery and monitored equipment.  
 
Step 5 has allowed to to estimate effects from a use of preventive measures in real 
time and to define rational preventive measures of supporting reliability and safety by 
solving optimization problems with limits on acceptable risks. Effects are reached on 
the basis of gathering and analytical processing in real time the information on 
controllable parameters of objects monitored – see Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Example of implementation 
 
The proposed probabilistic models and methods help to predict in real time the mean 
residual time before the next parameters abnormalities for two different cases: 
without any reaction of responsible staff  and if obligatory adequate reaction is 
always. 
    
Example 2 for “Black Box”. Let the mean time between neighboring occurrences of 
danger (from the “green” at the “yellow” range) is 1 month, i.e. Toccur =1month, Tdiag 
=Тerr.=0. The case “without any reaction” after parameter transition from “green” into 
“yellow” range is characterized by input  Tbetw =1year, and the input  Tbetw=8hours 
(about every shift) characterizes the case “for obligatory adequate reaction in real 
time”. The result of the prediction of the mean residual time before the next 
parameters abnormalities (see Figure 3) helps to define rational preventive measures 
of supporting safety in real time [16, 17].  
Analytical results of RMS operation for responsible staff is transparent for all 
interested parties and adequate preventive reaction in time allows to increase a mean 
residual time before the next parameters abnormalities. 
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Example 3 (for complex structure). Let’s analyse a fragment of the main gas 
pipeline Bovanenkovo-Ukhta (more than 1200 km) by probabilistic modelling of 
natural and technogenic processes. It constructed over an earth surface.  Sub-
fragments between compressor stations (9 stations - Bajdaratsky, Jarynsky, 
Gagaratsky, Vorkuta, Usinsk, Intinsky, Syninsky, Chikshinsky, Maloperansky) are 
allocated. There are serial subsystems and every subsystem has parallel structure of 
elements (pipeline) - see Figure 4, 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The analyzed fragment of the main 
gas pipeline 
Figure 5. The serial-parallel structure for 
modelling processes 
 
About 75-90% from the pipelines are under natural threats, including ice drift (threats 
for constructions). It is required to estimate risk to lose integrity (quality of operation) 
of fragment Bovanenkovo-Ukhta in 2023-2043. 
 
The solving of a problem is the next [15-16].  According to estimations of experts, in 
20-30 years there will be considerable changes of climatic conditions which will 
cause rise in temperature of frozen thicknesses, increase in depth seasonal thawing 
and, as consequence, decrease in stability and bearing ability of the bases for a gas 
pipeline and other engineering constructions. Technical characteristics of elements 
between compressor stations are considered as identical, except for the first 
subfragment (between stations Bajdaratsky and Jarynsky) which is underwater 
transition (reservation by 4 elements-pipelines) – see Figure 4. Initial data for 
modelling have been generated depending on conditions of concrete sites and 
specificity of a territorial arrangement of a line. 
 
Results of modelling processes have shown, that risk to lose integrity (quality of 
operation) for 20 prognostic years during the period 2023-2043 is equal to 0.6 – 0.8. 
In comparison with other precedents these figures speak about expediency of 
undertaking of preventive measures, and also about the necessity of working out the 
Plan of emergencies liquidation. If period between system controls will be reduced 
from 6 to 3 months the risk to lose integrity in 2023-2043 is nearby 0.16 – 0.44. It is 
twice more low, rather than for an existing mode of maintenance and repair. On the 
basis of these results the following recommendations are scientifically proved: 
- to establish a risk level to lose integrity (quality of operation) 0,38 within 10 years 
of operation as unacceptable (on the base of «precedent principle»); 
- to pass to the quarterly control of a condition of system after 10 years of operation 
(i.e. since 2024); 
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- to use annual planning of maintenance measures service on the basis of modeling 
processes for rational risk management in acceptable limits. 
 
Example 4. What about the possible pragmatic effects? (Step 5)   
The Complex (as a part of global system) of risks predictions for techno-genic safety 
support on the objects of oil & gas distribution has been awarded by Award of the 
Government of the Russian Federation in the field of a science and technics for 2014. 
The created peripheral posts are equipped additionally by the means of Complex to 
feel vibration, a fire, the flooding, unauthorized access, hurricane,  and also the 
intellectual means of adequate reaction, capable to recognize, identify and predict a 
development of extreme situations. The applications of Complex for 200 objects in 
several regions of Russia during the period 2009-2014 have already provided 
economy about 8,5 Billions of Roubles. The economy is reached at the expense of 
effective implementation of the functions of risks prediction and processes 
optimization [2, 4, 14-16].    
 
Conclusion 
The universal approach, applicable in different areas for processing data in “smart” 
monitoring systems and based on the original probabilistic models, is proposed. The 
approach includes the next 5 Steps:  
- Step 1 - to define universal formal technologies for logic describing the processes of 
occurring and activating dangers, diagnostics and recovering system integrity, 
considering the possibilities of periodic control and monitoring;  
- Step 2 - to define universal elementary ranges for the traced parameters (from 
reliability or safety point of view), monitored conditions and interpretation of events, 
allowing analytical data processing by probabilistic modeling; 
- Step 3 -  to develop probabilistic models for two Technologies, which can be used 
for “Black Box”, and the methods to generate new probabilistic models for complex 
structures, allowing prognostic researches on a level of the probability destribution 
function (PDF) of time before a next abnormality for one element, subsystem, system;    
- Step 4 - to implement the proposed probabilistic models and methods of step 3 for 
processing data in “smart” monitoring system, to define acceptable risks;   
- Step 5 - to estimate effects from a use of preventive measures in real time and to 
define rational preventive measures of supporting reliability and safety by solving 
optimization problems with limits on acceptable risks. 
 
Implementation of the approach for processing data in “smart” monitoring system 
allows to define rational preventive measures of supporting reliability and safety. 
They proposed models and methods are applicable to be used in real time and also for 
short- and long-term planning.  
 
The efficiency of approach is demonstrated by the examples of implementation in the 
for the Joint-Stock Company “Siberian Coal Energy Company”, for a fragment of the 
main gas pipeline Bovanenkovo-Ukhta, for the Complex of risks predictions for 
techno-genic safety support on the objects of oil & gas distribution (applications of 
which for 200 objects in several regions of Russia during the period 2009-2014 have 
provided the economy about 8,5 Billions of Roubles). 
 
43
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
References 
[1] Kostogryzov, A., Nistratov A., Zubarev, I., Stepanov, P.,  Grigoriev, L. (2015)
About accuracy of risks prediction and importance of increasing adequacy of
used probabilistic models. Journal of Polish  Safety and Reliability Association.
Summer Safety and Reliability Seminars, Volume 6, Numbers 2, 2015, pp. 71-
80.
[2] Kostogryzov A., Nistratov G. (2004) Standardization, mathematical modelling,
rational management and certification in the field of system and software
engineering" (80 standards, 100 mathematical models, 35 software tools, more
than 50 practical examples). Armament. Policy. Conversion, Moscow.
[3] Zio E. (2006) An Introduction to the Basics of Reliability and Risk Analysis.
World Scientific.
[4] Kostogryzov, A. and Stepanov, P. (2008) Innovative management of quality
and risks in systems life cycle.  Armament. Policy. Conversion, Moscow.
[5] Kolowrocki, K., Soszynska-Budny, J. (2011) Reliability and Safety of Complex
Technical Systems and Processes. Springer-Verlag London Limited.
[6] Eid, M. and Rosato, V. (2016) Critical Infrastructure Disruption Scenarios
Analyses via Simulation. Managing the Complexity of Critical Infrastructures.
A Modelling and Simulation Approach, SpringerOpen, pp. 43-62.
[7] Di Pietro, A., Liberto, C., Flourentzou, N., Kyriakides, E., Pothof , I. and
Valenti, G. (2016) Physical Simulators of Critical Infrastructures. Managing
the Complexity of Critical Infrastructures. A Modelling and Simulation
Approach, SpringerOpen, pp. 63-84.
[8] Huiskamp, W. and van den Berg, T. (2016) Federated Simulations. Managing
the Complexity of Critical Infrastructures. A Modelling and Simulation
Approach, SpringerOpen, pp. 109-138.
[9] Kostogryzov, A., Nistratov, G., Kleshchev, N. (2006) Mathematical Models
and Software Tools to Support an Assessment of Standard System Processes.
Proceedings of the 6th International SPICE Conference on Process Assessment
and Improvement, Luxembourg, pp. 63-68
[10] Kostogryzov, A., Nistratov, G. (2006) Mathematical Models and Software
Tools for Analyzing System Quality and Risks  according to standard
requirements. Proceedings of the 6th International scientific school "Modelling
and Analysis of safety and risk in complex systems" (MASR – 2006), Saint
Petersburg, Russia, July 4 - 8, pp. 155-163.
[11] Grigoriev, L.I., Kershenbaum, V. and Kostogryzov, A. (2010) System
foundations of the management of competitiveness in oil and gas complex.
National Institute of oil and gas, Moscow.
[12] Kostogryzov A., Krylov V., Nistratov A., Nistratov G., Popov V., Stepanov P.
(2011) Mathematical models and applicable technologies to forecast, analyze
and optimize quality and risks for complex systems, Proceedings of the 1st
International Conference on Transportation Information and Safety（ICTIS),
June 30-July 2,2011, Wuhan, China, pp. 845-854.
44
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria
[13] Kostogryzov, A., Nistratov, A., Nistratov, G. (2012) Applicable Technologies
to Forecast, Analyze and Optimize Reliability and Risks for Complex Systems
// Proceedings of the 6th International Summer Safety and Reliability Seminar,
September 2012, Poland, V.3, No.1, pp. 1-14.
[14] Kostogryzov, A., Nistratov, G. and Nistratov, A. (2012) Some Applicable
Methods to Analyze and Optimize System Processes in Quality Management.
Total Quality Management and Six Sigma, InTech, pp. 127-196.
[15] Abrosimov, N., Kostogryzov, A., Mahutov, N. at al. (2015) Security of Russia.
Legal, Social&Economic and Scientific&Engineering Aspects. The Scientific
Foundations of Technogenic Safety. Under the editorship of N. Mahutov N.A. –
Znanie, Moscow.
[16] Artemyev, V., Kostogryzov, A., Rudenko, Ju., Kurpatov, O., Nistratov, G.,
Nistratov, A. (2017) Probabilistic methods of estimating the mean residual time
before the next parameters abnormalities for monitored critical
systems. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on System Reliability
and Safety (ICSRS), Milan, Italy, December 20-22, 2017,pp. 368-373
[17] Artemyev, V.,  Rudenko, Ju., Nistratov, G. (2018) Probabilistic methods and
technologies of risks prediction and rationale of preventive measures by using
“smart systems”. Applications to coal branch for increasing Industrial safety of
enterprises. Probabilistic modeling in system engineering. InTechOpen, 2018,
pp.23-51.
[18] Kershenbaum, V., Grigoriev, L., Kanygin, P., Nistratov, A. (2018) Probabilistic
modeling processes for oil and gas systems. Probabilistic modeling in system
engineering. InTechOpen, 2018, pp. 55-79.
[19] Feller, W. (1971)  An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications,
Vol. II, Willy.
[20] Klimov, G. (1983) Probability theory and mathematical statistics, Мoscow
State University, Moscow.
45
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
A Markov chain model for floods and earthquakes 
Mario Lefebvre 
Polytechnique Montréal  
2500, chemin de Polytechnique 
H3T 1J4, Montréal, Canada 
Abstract 
A Markov chain having three possible states is proposed for the worldwide variations 
of floods from month to month. After having estimated the transition probabilities of 
the chain using real-life data, we compute its limiting probabilities. The data set is 
then divided into two parts and the same calculations are made in order to detect any 
sign of climate change. Next, the same type of analysis is performed in the case of 
major earthquakes. The aim is to determine the long-term behaviour of the yearly 
occurrences of major earthquakes. In the case of floods, the monthly variations seem 
to occur almost at random. However earthquakes, and especially major ones, show a 
clear upward trend, which is a major threat for vital services providers. This work 
could be extended to other important threats. 
Keywords: modelling, forecasting, limiting probabilities, climate change.  
1. Introduction
Important threats to the continuity of vital services are major floods and earthquakes. 
Various authors have proposed stochastic processes as models for hydrological and 
geological events. In hydrology, the author used diffusion and filtered Poisson or 
renewal processes as models for river flows. The aim was to forecast the flow values 
a few days in advance (see Lefebvre, 2002a, and Lefebvre and Guilbault, 2008, in 
particular) or the values of the successive peak flows (Lefebvre, 2002b).  
In the case of major earthquakes, many authors have tried to forecast their 
occurrences and magnitudes; see, for example, Sadeghian (2012), Mostafaei and 
Kordnoori (2013), Panorias et al. (2016), Votsi et al. (2010) and Votsi et al. (2014). 
In this paper, we will use a discrete-time Markov chain having three possible states to 
model the worldwide variations of major floods from month to month. Similarly, the 
same model will be used for the worldwide variations of earthquakes from month to 
month, and finally for major earthquakes from year to year. Once the transition 
probabilities of the Markov chains have been estimated by making use of real-life 
data, we will calculate the limiting probabilities of these chains. This will enable us to 
forecast the behaviour of the variables of interest. Moreover, the data sets will be 
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divided into two parts and the analysis will be performed on each part to detect signs 
of climate change.  
In the next section, the required mathematical background will be presented. Then, 
the model will be implemented for floods and earthquakes in Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively. We will conclude this paper with a few remarks in Section 5. 
2. Mathematical background
A stochastic (or random) process is a set of random variables: {X(t): t ∈ T}. In 
general,  
t is interpreted as time, and T is a subset of the real numbers. We often choose the 
subsets T = {0, 1, 2, …} or [0, ∞). We say that X(t) is the value or the  state of the 
stochastic process at time t.  
In the case when T = {0, 1, 2, …}, the stochastic process is said to be a discrete-time 
process, and we usually write Xn for the value of the process at time n.  
In this paper, we will assume that the state space of the stochastic process {Xn , n = 0, 
1, 2, …} is the set S = {0, 1, 2}. That is, we assume that for any n, Xn = 0, 1 or 2. 
These values will actually be a coding system.    
Next, a discrete-time Markov chain is a stochastic process such that 𝑃 𝑋!!! = 𝑗 𝑋! = 𝑖,𝑋!!! = 𝑖!!!,…  ,𝑋! = 𝑖!] =  𝑃 𝑋!!! = 𝑗 𝑋! = 𝑖], 1
for all states 𝑖!,… , 𝑖!!!, 𝑖, 𝑗 in S and for any n. We say that the future (n+1), given the 
present (n) and the past (n-1, …, 0), depends only on the present. 
Moreover, it is usually assumed that the conditional probability 𝑃 𝑋!!! = 𝑗 𝑋! = 𝑖] 
does not depend on n, so that the process is time-homogeneous. We then define the 
transition probabilities 𝑝!,! = 𝑃 𝑋!!! = 𝑗 𝑋! = 𝑖]. 2
The matrix 3𝑷 =    𝑝!,!    , 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 # 
 is called the transition matrix of the Markov chain. 
Remark. The above definition can be generalized by assuming, for example, that the 
value of Xn+1 depends on both Xn and Xn-1. Then, we can define Zn = (Xn, Xn-1). 
Therefore, in the case when Xn = 0, 1 or 2 for any n, there would be 9 possible states, 
that we can denote by 0, 1, …, 8.  
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Notice that i can be equal to j in the definition of 𝑝!,!. That is, the process can make a 
transition from a given state to the same state. Let Ki denote the number of time units 
that the process spends in state i before it moves to a different state. We have, by 
independence: 𝑃 𝐾! = 𝑘 = (𝑝!,!)!!! 1− 𝑝!,!  4
for k = 1, 2, 3, … We say that the random variable Ki has a geometric distribution 
with parameter p := 1− 𝑝!,!.  
If the model that we propose is realistic, the histograms of the variables Ki, for i = 0, 
1, 2, should look like the one in Figure 1, in which a decreasing exponential function 
has been added. A geometric random variable is actually the integer part (+ 1) of an 
exponential random variable.  
Figure 1. An example of a geometric distribution. 
Under some conditions (that will be fulfilled in this paper), we can define the limiting 
probability that the process will be in state i when it is in equilibrium as follows: 𝜋! = lim!→!𝑃 𝑋! = 𝑖 . 5
Let π := (𝜋!, 𝜋!,𝜋!). To obtain the limiting probabilities, we can solve the following 
system of linear equations: 𝝅 = 𝝅𝑷, 6
together with the condition 
𝜋!!!!! = 1. 7
In the next section, the above model will be implemented in the case of major floods. 
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3. Implementation of the model for floods
On the website of the Dartmouth Flood Observatory (floodobservatory.colorado.edu), 
it is possible to download a file containing a list of large flood events worldwide from 
1985. For each flood, the file provides, in particular, the dates when it began and 
ended, its severity, the number of dead, etc.  
The magnitude of a flood is denoted by M and is defined as follows: 𝑀 = Log   Duration x Severity x Affected Area , 8
in which the Duration is in days, the Affected Area in square kilometers and the 
Severity is equal to 1, 1,5 or 2 for large, very large and extreme events, respectively.  
There are 4536 events in the list. The total number of floods having a value M greater 
than 4 is equal to 3999, and for 1257 floods M is greater than 6. A flood with an M > 
4 is considered as severe, and one with an M > 6 is very severe. Hence, the vast 
majority of the floods that are listed are at least severe. 
We used the data for the years 2000 to 2016 (because 2017 is not complete), which is 
a long enough period. There are 2825 floods in the data set. The average number of 
floods per month is 13,85. 
Let Fn be the number of floods during month n. We want to model the variations in 
the total monthly floods as a discrete-time Markov chain having the following three 
states: 
• 0: if Fn - Fn-1 < -2,
• 1: if -2 ≤ Fn - Fn-1 ≤ 2,
• 2: if Fn - Fn-1 > 2.
With these states, we obtained the histograms shown in Figures 2-4 for the variables 
K0, K1 and  K2, respectively. We see that the three histograms are quite similar to the 
one presented in Figure 1. Hence, we may conclude that the model is realistic.  
Next, we estimated the various transition probabilities 𝑝!,!. The estimated transition 
matrix is  
𝑷 =  1/6 19/66 6/119/34 27/68 23/6837/68 23/68 2/17 .  9
Then, we computed the limiting probabilities: 𝜋! = 0,3257,       𝜋! = 0,3420,       𝜋! = 0,3324. 10
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Thus, based on the data set that we used, in the long run the number of floods during 
a given month is almost as likely to increase or to decrease by more than 2, or to be 
within the interval [-2, 2], compared with the previous month. Moreover, the average 
value of  Fn - Fn-1 is 0,0345. One must therefore conclude that there has not been a 
significant change in the number of major floods worldwide during the period 2000-
2016, and that the variations from month to month occur rather at random. 
Figure 2. Histogram of the variable K0 in the case of major floods, with the observed values (k) on the 
x-axis and the corresponding frequencies on the y-axis.
  Figure 3. Histogram of the variable K1 in the case of major floods. 
To check whether there have been some significant changes between the beginning 
and the end of the time period considered, we divided the data set into two parts: from 
2000 to 2007, and then from 2008 to 2016, and we calculated the limiting 
probabilities in each case. The results are presented in Table I. We see that the 
limiting probabilities are quite similar, especially when we take into account the fact  
that the results are less reliable when the data set is smaller. Notice that there are 
actually less variations during the period 2008-2016, since state 1 has the largest 
limiting probability. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that the standard 
deviation of the monthly variations decreased  
from 7,54 (2000-2007) to 5,90 (2008-2016). We find that the mean also decreased, 
from 0,116 to -0,037.   
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  Figure 4. Histogram of the variable K2 in the case of major floods. 
Table I: Limiting probabilities calculated for the periods 2000-2016, 2000-2007 and 2008-2016. 
Period 𝜋! 𝜋! 𝜋! 
2000-2016 0,3257 0,3420 0,3324 
2000-2007 0,3368 0,3263 0,3368 
2008-2016 0,3149 0,3575 0,3275 
4. Implementation of the model for earthquakes
In the ANSS (Advanced National Seismic System) Composite Catalog, we can find 
monthly counts of earthquakes of magnitude greater than or equal to 2,5 from various 
sources (ncedc.org/anss/inventory/anss_catalog.count). We used the data provided by 
USGS (U.S. Geological Survey) National Earthquake Information Center, for the 
years 1983 to 2016.  
There have been 704.825 earthquakes in the period considered, for an average 
number of 1725,5 per month, ranging from a minimum of 524 to a maximum of 
4173. 
Let En be the number of earthquakes during month n, and define 
𝑌! =  (𝐸! − 𝐸!!!)𝐸!!!   x 100 11
for n = 2, 3, … That is,  𝑌! is the monthly percentage variation of earthquakes. We 
consider a discrete-time Markov chain {Xn , n = 2, 3, …} with state space S = {0, 1, 
2}, such that Xn is equal to 
• 0: if Yn < -10,
• 1: if -10 ≤ Yn ≤ 10,
• 2: if Yn > 10.
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As in the case of floods, we produced the histograms for the variables K0, K1 and  K2. 
They are presented in Figures 5-7. 
Figure 5. Histogram of the variable K0 in the case of earthquakes. 
Figure 6. Histogram of the variable K1 in the case of earthquakes. 
We observe that each histogram has approximately the form expected for a random 
variable having a geometric distribution. We could perform a goodness-of-fit 
statistical test to reinforce this assertion. However, in the case of  K0 and of  K2 there 
are not many different values taken by these variables. Therefore, goodness-of-fit 
tests are less reliable, because the number of degrees of freedom is small. 
Next, the estimated transition matrix is 
𝑷 =  17/96 13/32 5/1235/194 50/97 59/19445/116 53/116 9/58 ,  12
from which we obtain the following limiting probabilities: 𝜋! = 0,2394,       𝜋! = 0,4724,       𝜋! = 0,2881.  13
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This time, the 𝜋!s are quite different and 𝜋! is significantly larger than 𝜋!, implying a 
tendency to have an increase in the number of earthquakes. Furthermore, the average 
value of the variable Yn is 1,96%, which is not negligible. 
Figure 7. Histogram of the variable K2 in the case of earthquakes. 
In Table II, we present the limiting probabilities obtained by dividing the data set into 
two parts: 1983-1999 and 2000-2016. 
Table II: Limiting probabilities calculated for the periods 1983-2016, 1983-1999 and 2000-2016. 
Period 𝜋! 𝜋! 𝜋! 
1983-2016 0,2394 0,4724 0,2881 
1983-1999 0,2416 0,4820 0,2764 
2000-2016 0,2378 0,4619 0,3003 
As expected, the limiting probabilities are rather stable, with nevertheless a non-
negligible increase in the value of 𝜋!. 
4.1 The case of large earthquakes 
Large earthquakes are obviously very important threats to the continuity of vital 
services. We can find a list of earthquakes of magnitude greater than or equal to 6 on 
the website of USGS (earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes). We used the data for 
earthquakes anywhere in the world between 1980 and 2017, and we modelled the 
yearly variations again as a discrete-time Markov chain having three possible states. 
First, for earthquakes of magnitude of at least 6, in order to obtain the desired 
histograms for the variables Ki, we defined the states 
• 0: if Yn < -5,
• 1: if -5 ≤ Yn ≤ 5,
• 2: if Yn > 5.
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We then estimated the transition probabilities and calculated the limiting 
probabilities: 𝜋! = 0,3056,       𝜋! = 0,4167,       𝜋! = 0,2778.  14
Although the value of 𝜋! is larger than that of 𝜋!, the average value of Yn is 1,50%, 
denoting an upward trend.  
Finally, in the case of earthquakes of magnitude equal to 7 or more, the number of 
observations is much smaller and the yearly variations quite large. Therefore, we 
defined the states 
• 0: if Yn < -20,
• 1: if -20 ≤ Yn ≤ 20,
• 2: if Yn > 20.
The estimated limiting probabilities are the following: 𝜋! = 0,2990,       𝜋! = 0,2186,       𝜋! = 0,4825. 15
Moreover, the average value of Yn is 5,55%. Thus, the data point to a very significant 
yearly increase in the percentage variation of  very large earthquakes, with almost a 
50% chance of having, in the long run, at least 20% more earthquakes of magnitude 
7+ than the previous year. The data set covers a 38-year period, and there have been 
538 earthquakes of magnitude 7 or more worldwide, for an average of 14,16 per year. 
Therefore, we can assert that the conclusions that we drew are well supported. Notice 
that a 20% increase translates into three additional earthquakes of magnitude 7+ per 
year. 
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, two of the most important threats to the continuity of vital services have 
been considered, namely major floods and earthquakes. In both cases, it was found 
that a discrete-time Markov chain with a state space containing three values could be 
used as a realistic model for the monthly or yearly variations of the events of interest.  
Our aim was to use the model proposed in this paper to forecast the long-term 
behaviour of floods and earthquakes. While in the case of floods, based on reliable 
real-life data, the monthly variations seem to occur almost at random, earthquakes, 
and especially major ones, show a clear upward trend, which is obviously worrisome 
for vital services providers.    
As a sequel to this work, one could try to find stochastic models for other important 
threats, such as hurricanes and tsunamis. On the website Global Risk Data Platform 
(preview.grid.unep.ch), one can find links to various real-life data sets for a number 
of natural hazards. 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
54
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council 
(NSERC) of Canada. 
References 
Lefebvre, M. (2002a) Geometric Brownian motion as a model for river flows. 
Hydrological Processes, vol. 16, pp. 1373-1381. 
Lefebvre, M. (2002b) Modeling and forecasting the peak flows of a river.  
Mathematical Problems in Engineering, vol. 8, pp. 553-562. 
Lefebvre, M. and Guilbault, J.-L. (2008) Using filtered Poisson processes to model a 
river flow. Applied Mathematical Modelling, vol. 32, pp. 2792-2805. 
Mostafaei, H. and Kordnoori, S. (2013) The application of the semi-Markov model in
predicting the earthquake occurrences in Alborz fault region, Northern Iran. 
Earth Science India, vol. 6, pp. 147-159. 
Panorias, C., Papadopoulou, A. and Tsapanos, T. (2016)  On the earthquake 
occurrences in Japan and the surrounding area via semi Markov modeling. 
Bulletin of the Geological Society of Greece, vol. 50, pp. 1535-1542. 
Sadeghian, R. (2012) Forecasting time and place of earthquakes using a semi-Markov 
model: With case study in Tehran province.   Journal of Industrial Engineering 
International, vol. 8, pp. 1-7. 
 Votsi, I., Limnios, N., Tsaklidis, G. and Papadimitriou, E. (2010)  Semi-Markov 
models for seismic hazard assessment in certain areas of Greece.  Bulletin of the 
Geological Society of Greece, vol. 43, pp. 2200-2209. 
Votsi, I., Limnios, N., Tsaklidis, G. and Papadimitriou, E. (2014)  Hidden semi-
Markov modeling for the estimation of earthquake occurrence rates. 
Communications in Statistics – Theory and Methods, vol. 43, pp. 1484-1502. 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
55
Recoverability Analysis Model for Railway Networks 
Ratthaphong Meesit*, John Andrews**, Rasa Remenyte-Prescott*** 
Resilience Engineering Research Group, University of Nottingham, University Park, 
Nottingham, UK, NG7 2RD 
Email: ratthaphong.meesit@nottingham.ac.uk*, john.andrews@nottingham.ac.uk**, 
r.remenyte-prescott@nottingham.ac.uk***.
Abstract 
The occurrence of unexpected events, such as infrastructure failures and natural 
disasters, are unavoidable in railway operation. Traffic controllers and train 
operators are thus required to manage the situation and provide the best possible 
services for passengers. This paper presents a recoverability analysis model that can 
be used to evaluate the efficiency of mitigation strategies, short-turning train services 
and rail replacement bus operation, to enhance the resilience of a railway network 
during an unplanned-track blockage situation. The model is built using a discrete 
event simulation technique. Two performance indicators predicted are passenger 
delay and the cost of bus replacement operation. The computational experiment of the 
proposed model on the real-world case study shows that these indicators are useful to 
support a decision-making process during an unplanned disruption. 
Keywords: Railway disruption, Short-turning operation, Rail replacement bus 
operation, Recoverability, Resilience. 
1. Introduction
Unplanned events, such as network component failures (e.g. signals and points) or 
environmental disasters (e.g. floods, strong winds and landslides), are a major issue in 
the railway network operation. This is because once these events occur, it is difficult 
to manage resources such as crews and trains to counter the situations. Thus, such 
events commonly cause delays and cancellations of train services on the network. 
Even though the railway timetables are generally designed to include buffer times to 
absorb the impact of these unplanned events, these can only cope with small 
disruptions, not with severe disruptions that require to close a part of railway track for 
several hours (Cadarso et al., 2013). 
To this end, traffic controllers and train operators need to deal with the real-time 
situation to ensure the best possible services for passengers (Jespersen-groth et al., 
2009). The most widely used strategies during a track blockage situation are short-
turning train services on a disrupted route and providing rail replacement bus services 
to serve stranded passengers at impacted stations. These strategies are commonly 
organised and implemented based on the experience of traffic controllers and train 
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 operators (Ghaemi et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2018). The ad-hoc solution from these 
strategies may help manage a disruption in a timely manner. However, it might not be 
the effective solution that can maintain both passenger delays and operating costs to an 
acceptable level. Therefore, there is a need for developing a model that can support 
both traffic controllers and train operators to establish a suitable solution during a 
severe unplanned disruption. 
 
In the past, a great deal of research has been published on the development of 
recoverability models for railway networks. However, according to Cacchiani et al. 
(2014), most of the previous studies have focused on handling low impact disruptions 
(i.e. the application of dispatching rules such as overtaking and changing in stop 
pattern). Little attention has been paid to supporting the management of a railway 
network during a blockage situation (Ghaemi et al., 2017). Moreover, in practice the 
short-turning operation of the trains on the disrupted routes are normally deployed 
together with the rail replacement bus services. However, previous studies seem to 
model these strategies separately. For example, the works by Louwerse and Huisman 
(2014), Veelenturf et al. (2015) and Ghaemi et al. (2018) only focused on the short-
turning operations, while the models by Kepaptsoglou and Karlaftis (2009), Jin et al. 
(2015) and Gu et al. (2018) assumed the operation of a railway network and attempted 
to design bus replacement services during a disruption. Therefore, a model that can be 
used to evaluate these mitigation strategies simultaneously is still lacking. The 
interaction between train and bus operations and the simulation of passengers on the 
network once both strategies are applied require further studies. 
 
This study presents a new recoverability analysis model that can be applied to simulate 
the short-turning and rail replacement bus operation during a track blockage situation. 
The model is developed based on the railway network simulation model by Meesit and 
Andrews (2018). The discrete event simulation technique is used. The interaction 
between trains and buses is considered, and the passenger flow within the network is 
taken into account. Moreover, the key performance indicators predicted are passenger 
delay and the cost of bus replacement operation. These indicators will enable traffic 
controllers and train operators to evaluate the efficiency of different predefined 
solutions and choose the proper one to implement during a disruption. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the 
framework of the model related to two strategies: short-turning and rail replacement 
bus operation. Then, section 4 illustrates an application of the proposed model using 
the case study. Finally, section 5 summarises the paper. 
 
 
2. Short-Turning Operation Modelling 
 
2.1 Railway network simulation model 
 
This study extends the railway network simulation model by Meesit and Andrews 
(2018) to include the recoverability analysis capability for a blockage situation. The 
model by Meesit and Andrews (2018) was constructed using a stochastic-discrete 
event simulation technique. The framework of this model comprises two main 
modules: railway network modelling and passenger modelling. The first module 
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simulates the operation of a railway network. The significant characteristics of a 
railway network, such as track layouts, control systems and operational information 
(e.g. trains, service routes and timetables) were included. Thus, the detailed schedule 
of train arrivals and departures at each station, in both normal and disruptive situation 
can be obtained and used as passenger information in the second module. The second 
module then imitates passengers using the train services in the network. Three main 
activities were taken into account: arriving at a station, searching for routes and 
alighting/boarding a train. A Poisson process was used to model passenger arrivals at 
a station. Then, an origin-destination matrix was applied to distribute passengers to 
each destination station. After that the route selection process was started by 
searching for possible routes to the destinations and selects the best route in terms of 
the travel time for passengers. Once the second process has finished, passenger 
objects were created and stored at the station vector based on the station ID waiting 
for a train to the destination. Then, the alighting and boarding function were finally 
used to transfer passenger objects between trains and stations when a train stops at a 
station. These functions are also applied to simulate passengers using bus replacement 
services in this study. 
2.2 Short-turning train services during a blockage situation 
Short-turning strategy aims to maintain train services on a part or parts of the 
disrupted routes. Trains can still be operated to the nearest stations to a disruption and 
turned around to provide services in the opposite direction of their routes. For 
unplanned disruptions, this strategy can be modelled by considering the transitions of 
the timetable during a disruption, which are the transition from the original timetable 
to the disrupted timetable (Transition 1) and vice versa (Transition 2), see Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The performance of railway network during a disruption 
based on Louwerse and Huisman (2014). 
Transition 1 happens when a disruption occurs. During this time, some trains on the 
disrupted route may already begin the service from the terminal station or face the 
disruption at the middle of the route. Thus, to start the short-turning services, the 
traffic on the disrupted route needs to be managed. Traffic controllers are required to 
make a decision on the trains on the network. This study models this circumstance 
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 into three main conditions based on the position of the trains on the disrupted route as 
follows (See Figure 2 as the example). 
 
• If a train is at a terminal station, the model checks whether there is a short-
turning station on this section of the route based on the train calling stations. If 
the condition is true (e.g. T1), the train can continue its service as planned until 
the short-turning station. Otherwise, the train will be held at the terminal station 
until the disruption is clear (e.g. T5). 
• If a train is at an intermediate station, the model examines that whether the 
current station is the short-turning station or just a station nearest to the 
disruption. If the current station is the short-turning station (e.g. T2), the short-
turning event is created. The occurrence time of this event will be equal to the 
next departure time at this station in the opposite direction. However, if the train 
is delayed, the allowable delay at the turning station (tad) will be considered for 
the occurrence time of this event. If the current station is the nearest station to 
the disruption (e.g. T3 and T6), the model allows traffic controllers to decide 
whether the train should wait at the station or run back to join the short-turning 
services at the short-turning station (if applicable) by changing the running back 
factor (Frb) to 0 or 2 respectively (Figure 2). Nevertheless, if the current station is 
neither of them (e.g. T7), the train can continue running based on the normal 
procedure until it arrives the next station. Then, the process is repeated until either 
of the first two conditions are found. 
• If a train is facing the disruption (e.g. T4), traffic controllers can decide whether 
the train needs to wait, run back to the previous station and wait or run back to 
the short-turning station and join the short-turning services. These options can 
also be specified in the model by changing variable Frb to 0, 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of rail traffic on a disrupted route at the beginning of a disruption. 
 
 
Transition 2 is a state when the disruption is cleared. The trains on the disrupted route 
that are operating in the short-turning mode need to return to the normal operation. 
This state therefore requires the decision of traffic controllers, and it probably needs 
some time to bring the original timetable back to passengers. This study also models 
this circumstance based on the position of the trains on the disrupted route as 
described in Transition 1. 
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• If a train is at a terminal station, the model identifies the suitable departure time 
for the train based on the original timetable by considering the allowable delay 
at this terminal station (tad). The previous departure times that the train could 
not serve are deleted and counted as cancellations. 
• If a train is at an intermediate station, the model investigates whether the current 
station is a short-turning station. If the condition is true, traffic controllers can 
decide whether the train needs to wait and continue its service based on the 
original route or do a short-turn by changing the turning factor (Ftr) to 0 and 1, 
respectively. However, if the condition is false and the train is a waiting train 
that is directly impacted by the disruption, the train is authorised to proceed its 
service immediately once the disruption is cleared. 
• Lastly, if a train is facing the disruption, the same process as in the case of a 
train waiting at an intermediate station is applied. 
 
 
3. Rail Replacement Bus Operation Modelling 
 
The rail replacement bus service strategy aims to provide an alternative transport 
option to serve and connect passengers at the impacted stations during a blockage 
situation. This section presents a rail replacement bus service model that enables train 
operators to design the bus replacement operation in order to mitigate the impact on 
stranded passengers. The model is separated into four main events: contacting bus 
companies, starting a bus service at a disrupted station, stopping a bus at a station and 
deploying a bus service at a short-turning station. 
 
• The first event happens after the occurrence of a disruption. This event leads 
buses to be dispatched from the depots to the disrupted stations (See Figure 3). 
At this point, train operators can decide for the bus routes (i.e. the lists of station 
stops) and choose the specific stations to start the emergency service. The model 
will then deploy the bus one by one from the nearest depot to both terminal 
stations of the designed routes and the selected stations (SS), in terms of travel 
time between depots and stations (tdp-i), based on the number of buses required 
for the first service in each direction of the route (NBf-di) and the number of 
buses available at the depot (Ndp). Then, the next event “starting a bus service” 
is generated. The occurrence time of this event is equal to simulation time 
(Clock) + organised time (tob) + travel time (tdp-i). It is noted that during the 
process, the number of buses available at the nearest depot might not be enough. 
Thus, when this happens, the buses at the next nearest depot to the station is 
considered until no more bus is available in the system. 
• The second event occurs when a bus has arrived a disrupted station. If the 
station is a terminal station of a bus route, the bus will run based on the 
designed route. However, if the station is a specific station, the bus will stop at 
all stations along the disrupted route based on its direction (di). After that the 
passenger boarding function is called, and the next event “a bus stops at a 
station” is created. The occurrence time of this event is equal to Clock + dwell 
time (tbw) + travel time between stations (to-d). 
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 • The third event is an event when a bus stops to provide a service at a station. 
Once it happens, the model investigates whether the current station is an 
intermediate station, a terminal station with train connections (i.e. a short-
turning station) or a terminal station without train connections. If it is an 
intermediate station, the alighting and boarding function are called in order to 
transfer passengers. Then, the bus stops at the next station event will be 
generated as explained in the second event. However, if the current station is a 
terminal station with train connections, only the alighting function is called 
because the bus is stored into the Queue waiting for the service when the train 
arrives. Finally, if the last condition is satisfied, the bus will be turned around to 
provide the service in the opposite direction. Thus, both alighting and boarding 
function are called, and the next event will be the bus stops at the next station. 
The occurrence time of this event is equal to Clock + the turnaround time of the 
bus (tbt). 
• The last event occurs when a train arrives a short-turning station. It deploys the 
buses in the Queue to each route (br), that has the current station as a terminal 
station, based on the number of buses required for the service (NBbr). However, 
if the buses in the Queue are not enough, more buses from the nearest depot are 
called. The process assumes that these extra buses can be dispatched from the 
beginning of the disruption. Thus, the travel time of buses from the depot to the 
disrupted station is not considered again. This event leads the second event to 
happen at Clock + Connection time between trains and buses (tcc). 
 
It is noted that for the passenger simulation, all passengers are modelled to use a 
normal timetable as travel information. However, once a disruption happens and the 
mitigation solution is applied, new arrival and existing passengers on the network are 
assumed to travel based on the disrupted timetable (including both train and bus 
services). Passengers will reconsider their routes according to the new information. If 
no route is found or the delay is longer than acceptable, which is based on a Normal 
distribution (set to µ = 60 minutes, σ = 10 minutes), passengers cancel their journeys. 
After recovering from a disruption, the normal timetable becomes available again for 
passengers. 
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Figure 3. Example of bus replacement operation strategy. 
 
4. Model Application 
 
4.1 Case study 
 
The Liverpool railway network, in the UK is considered as the case study. The 
network consists of 67 stations. The total length of this network is about 120 km 
(double track), see Figure 4. There are 7 services operate daily from 6:00 to 24:00. 
These services are Southport to Hunts Cross (R1), Ormskirk to Liverpool Central 
(R2) and Kirkby to Liverpool Central (R3), and four loop routes from four terminal 
stations: Ellesmere Port (R4), Chester (R5), West Kirkby (R6) and New Brighton 
(R7), via the Liverpool Central station. All trains on the network are the British rail 
class 507/508 (3 coaches), and they stop at every intermediate station along their 
routes. For the timetable and passenger data of this network, they were obtained from 
the study of Meesit and Andrews (2019). 
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Figure 4. The Liverpool railway network (Merseyrail). 
 
 
4.2 Key performance indicators 
 
The main goal of implementing a mitigation solution is to reduce the impact of a 
disruption on passengers. However, in practice, the solution applied is subjected to 
budget constraint. To this end, this study proposes two performance indicators: total 
passenger delay (TPD) and operating cost (BOC), to evaluate the efficiency of the 
potential mitigation solutions as shown in eq. (1) and (2), respectively. 
 
 TPD = PC·ω + ADTp – PDTpPp                                           (1)  
 
BOC = dtnb·funbNBnb = 1 + dunb·renb                                         (2)  
 
where:  
• For eq. (1), PC is the number of passenger journey cancellations, and 𝜔 is the 
delay penalty (set to 60 mins in this study). ADTp and PDTp are the actual and 
planned arrival time of a passenger (p) at the destination. It is noted when a 
disruption occurs, not all passengers will be impacted. Some passengers may 
obtain a benefit from a delayed train (i.e. catching a delayed train which has not 
already departed instead of the planned train). Thus, this formula takes both 
negative and positive effect of the delay into account in order to capture this 
nature. 
DP1
DP2
DP3
DP4
DP5
DP6
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• For eq. (2), dtnb, funb, dunb and renb are the bus operating distance, the fuel 
consumption rate (£0.412/km), the rental duration and the rental cost (including 
a driver ~£80/hr) of each bus (nb), respectively. 
 
 
4.3 Model development 
 
The proposed model was developed in C++ 11 environment with Microsoft Visual 
Studio 2015. Then, the computational experiment was conducted using a computer 
with a quad core Intel i7 processor CPU 2.60 GHz and 16 GB of RAM running on 
Window 10, 64-bit. With regard to the stochastic model, the average results from each 
indicator were predicted from the results of 500 simulations, where the statistics 
sufficiently converged in about 3 minutes. 
 
4.4 Computational experiment and results 
 
To demonstrate the model, a track blockage disruption is assumed to occur between 
St Michaels an Aigburth station at 10:00 AM, affecting train services on route R1 
(See, Figure 5). The recovery time of this event follows a Normal distribution with 
mean of 3 hours and 10 minutes standard deviation. To mitigate this situation, traffic 
controllers and train operators decide to operate the trains on this route in the short-
turning mode (using Liverpool central station as the turning station) and provide the 
bus replacement services to the disconnected stations. Five potential solutions from 
these strategies are considered as presented in Table I. It is noted that buses are 
supplied from six main depots within the Liverpool area (see Figure 4), and the 
number of buses available at each depot (DP1 to DP6) is 10, 8, 15, 12, 5 and 7 
respectively. It is assumed the capacity of all buses is 80 seats. Lastly, the shortest 
distance and the travel time between the disrupted stations, and between the disrupted 
stations and the depots were acquired from the car-driving option in Google map 
(2018). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The impacted part of the network in the experiment. 
 
  
Southport (58)
Birkdale (8)
Hillside (31)
Ainsdale (1)
Freshfield (26)
Formby (25)
Hightown (30)
Hall Road (28)
Blundellsands & Crosby (12)
Waterloo (65)
Seaforth & Litherland (57)
Bootle New Strand (13)
Bootle Oriel Road (14)
Bank Hall (5)
ID56
Kirkdale (36)
Walton (64)
Orrell Park (51)
Rice Lane (54) Fazakerley (24) Kirkby (35)
Aintree (2)
Old Roan (49)
Maghull (43)
Town Green (61)
Aughton Park (3)
Ormskirk (50)
ID46
ID41
ID39
ID17 ID60 ID0 ID21 ID42 ID34
ID40
ID29
ID9
Green Lane (27)
Rock Ferry (55)
Bebington (6)
Port Sunlight (53)
Spital (59)
Bromborough Rake (16) 
Bromborough (15)
Eastham Rake (22)
Hooton 
(32)
Capenhurst (18)
Bache (4)
Chester (19)
Ellesmere Port (23)Overpool 
(52)
Little Sutton (38)
ID20
Birkenhead Park (11)
Birkenhead North (10)
Bidston (7)
Leasowe (37)
Moreton 
(47)
Meols 
(45)
Manor Road 
(44)
Hoylake 
(33)
West Kirkby 
(66)
Wallasey Village (63)
Wallasey Grove Road (62)
New Brighton (48)
L0 Northern line
Wirral line
L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
L6
L7
L8
L9
L10
L11
L12
L13 L16
L17
L18 L19 L20
L21
L22
L23
L24
L25
L26
L27
L28
L43
L44
L45
L46
L47
L48
L49
L50
L51
L52
L53
L54
L55 L56 L57
L60
L61
L62
L63
L64L65L66L67L68
L69
L70
L71
Liverpool Central (ID1),
as short-turning station
Liverpool Lime Street
Liverpool James Street
Brunswick 
(ID2)
St Michaels 
(ID3)
Aigburth
(ID4)
Cressington
(ID5)
Liverpool 
South 
Parkway
(ID6)
Hunts 
Cross
(ID7)
Moorfields
Sandhills
Hamilton Square
Birkenhead Central
Conway 
Park
Disruption
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
64
  
Table I: Example of mitigation solutions considered in the experiment. 
So
lu
tio
ns
 
Short-turning operation Bus replacement operation (tob, tcc and tbt = 5 mins) 
Frb 
(0, 1 or 2) 
Ftr 
(0 or 1) 
tad 
(at turning 
station, 
mins) 
tad 
(at terminal 
station, 
mins) 
Bus routes 
(list of station IDs) 
SS 
(specific 
stations to 
begin the 
emergency 
service) 
NBf-di 
(Number of 
buses for the first 
service at SSs for 
each direction) 
NBf-di 
(Number of buses 
for the first service 
at each terminal on 
each route) 
NBbr 
(Number of 
buses for the 
consequent 
services on 
each route) 
S1 Do-nothing solution 
S2 0 0 0 0 - - -  - 
S3 0 0 10 0 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} - - {3, 3} {1} 
S4 2 1 10 10 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, 
{1,7} 
{4} {1, 1} {2, 2}, {1, 1} {1, 1} 
S5 2 0 10 0 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, 
{1, 3, 6, 7} 
{3, 6} {1, 1},  
{1, 1} 
{2, 2}, {1, 1} {2, 1} 
 
 
Table II: Simulation results from each mitigation solution. 
Solutions Passenger 
delay (mins) 
Passenger 
journey 
cancellations 
TPD (mins) Bus operating 
Cost (£) 
Number of buses 
used 
S1 29,298 6,961 446,958 0 0 
S2 12,394 2,587 167,614 0 0 
S3 62,470 580 97,270 2,632 9 
S4  63,135 413 87,915 4,177 14 
S5 61,429 211 74,089 6,620 22 
 
 
The simulation results of the potential solutions are presented in Table II. It is 
obvious that the do-nothing solution was the worst solution in this example. 
However, for the other solutions, it is difficult to judge which solution is the most 
suitable countermeasure for this situation. This is because there was the trade-off 
between two indicators. The higher the operating cost, the smaller the passenger delay 
(TPD). In this way, traffic controllers and train operators can choose the solution to 
implement in this scenario based on the budgets and resources they have. For 
example, if the available budget is £4,500, solution 4 might be feasible to apply. Even 
though this solution produced 87,915 minutes-delay to passengers, it was still less 
than that of solutions 2 and 3 about 47.55% and 9.62%. 
 
To implement solution 4, traffic controllers are required to manage the disrupted 
trains to run backward to join the short-turning operation during the first transition 
and keep train services in the short-turning mode during the second transition of the 
timetable. Then, the train operator needs to call 14 buses to operate based on two 
routes: br1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and br2 = {1, 7}. These buses should be dispatched 
from depot 3 and 4 to station 1 (9 buses), and 4 (2 buses) and 7 (3 buses), 
respectively. The detail of this solution can be seen in Table I. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
A recoverability analysis model for railway networks is presented in this paper. The 
model is capable of evaluating the efficiency of two mitigation strategies during a 
track blockage situation: short-turning train services and providing rail replacement 
bus services. Two performance indicators were proposed: the passenger delay and the 
operating cost of bus replacement operations. These indicators are beneficial to traffic 
controllers and train operators to make a decision about the suitable mitigation 
solution for a particular disruption. In addition, the application of the model was 
demonstrated using the Liverpool railway network, and the example of the mitigation 
solution analysis was given in this paper. In the future, the model will be further 
developed to investigate the optimal solutions for these mitigation strategies. A multi-
objective optimisation method, such as a Genetic Algorithm, will be used. Thus, the 
outcomes of the model will be advantageous to improve the resilience of a railway 
network during unplanned disruptions. 
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Abstract  
 
Protection of critical infrastructures and maintaining of their continuity is a societal 
obligation aimed to avoid severe socio-economic crises. Among the threats that can 
affect critical infrastructure are unexpected failures. The chemical industry is among 
the vital systems that over the past decades, have known serious events affecting lives, 
facilities and environment, especially when it comes to thermal runaway risk. A 
method has been developed for early detection and isolation of faults in a chemical 
reactor based on a reference model. The exothermic reaction of perhydrolysis of 
formic acid is used as a system test. Based on a kinetic model of the reaction, the 
method was validated in batch reactor by simulation data in normal and abnormal 
modes. An experimental validation of this method is now in progress.  
This method seeks to improve process resilience in case of runaway event and quickly 
restores normal operation by preventing the propagation of the event, and therefore 
contributes to reducing the frequency of threats related to chemical industries, thus 
ensuring the availability of critical services. 
 
 
Keywords: Fault detection, fault isolation, critical Infrastructures, chemical 
processes, thermal runaway. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nowadays, critical infrastructures are indispensable in modern society. They provide 
goods and services that promote the social and economic development of the 
countries. However, progressive and fast development of socio-economic systems 
makes their critical infrastructures more complex and therefore vulnerable. This 
vulnerability can be translated in the case of disruptions or threat by severe socio-
economic crises and may endanger the security of the citizen. The chemical industry 
is one of the vital systems characterized by risky activity [1]. Events in this sector 
have negative impacts on economic and environmental aspects and may lead to 
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human losses. They cause social panic and even economic crises throughout society. 
In scientific literature, we found that 25% of chemical events that occurred in France, 
were caused by thermal runaway reactions [1]. The same percentage was found in 
another study on thermal runaway events in the United States [2]. Thermal runaway 
occurs when the heat-flow rate released by the reactions, becomes higher than the 
heat-flow exchanged with the cooling system of the reactor [3]. As a consequence, 
thermal runaway can result in an explosion and /or a toxic release that finally may 
lead to the destruction of the plant and to the formation of secondary fires. In the case 
of cascading failures, other nearby infrastructures may also suffer from chain 
interruptions. This phenomenon is called “domino effect”. In the history of chemical 
industries, several catastrophic events were due to thermal runaway, like Seveso 
(1976) and Bhopal (1984) disasters. The main causes of this dreaded phenomenon 
were related to the operator errors [1, 4]. Consequently, it has become a major 
challenge to prevent the events due to thermal runaway, improve the system 
resilience to different threats and manage efficiently the crisis. This challenge is 
demonstrated by monitoring chemical reactors carrying out high exothermic 
reactions. In recent years, the use of fault detection and diagnostic methods in the 
chemical engineering has experienced continued growth to treat such problem 
effectively. By looking in the literature, three methods can be distinguished: 
Quantitative Model Based methods [5, 6] (Observers, EKF, etc.), Qualitative Model 
Based methods [7] (Fault trees, Digraphs, etc.) and Process History Based methods 
[8, 9] (Neural Networks, Statistical Classifiers, PCA, etc.). 
The purpose of this manuscript is to successfully detect and diagnose failures that 
occur in chemical industry, in order to avoid their propagation and maintain the 
sustainability of critical infrastructures. In this purpose, a fault detection and isolation 
(FDI) method for thermal runaway risk was developed. This approach is based on the 
reaction model. The reaction of perhydrolysis of formic acid by hydrogen peroxide is 
used as a test system. The detection method uses a double dynamic threshold for 
detection of fault and collection of information for diagnosis. Then, the diagnostic 
method extracts the statistical characteristics of fault and project them in a 2-
dimension plan for classification. By using this method, the information extracted 
will serve as a tool to improve the resilience of the process and to resist accidental 
disturbances. For example, online control methods [10] allow the process to endure 
failures, adjust and quickly resume their normal functionality. Moreover, setting up 
preventive actions and security barriers reduces and / or stops the propagation of the 
failures when thermal threats occur [11]. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 
is dedicated to the reaction model and faults considered. The detection method and 
the faults isolation method is given in section 3. Simulation and discussion of results 
were given in section 4. Finally, the conclusion is presented in section 5. 
 
2. Problem Formulation 
 
2.1 Numerical model of the reaction 
 
In this section, a nonlinear model of perhydrolysis reaction of formic acid eq. (1) in a 
batch reactor is presented [12]. This exothermic reaction characterized by the 
presence of a reasonable risk for the operators, and it is easy to reproduce in 
controlled environment. 
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𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2  ⇄  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 +  𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻 (1) 
Where, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 is for the formic acid; 𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2 for the hydrogen peroxide; 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
for the peroxide formic acid and 𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻 for water.   
The kinetic expression of this reaction is shown in eq. (2) and Table I: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ = 𝑘𝑘0,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ. 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� .�𝐾𝐾𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻 .                 �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻.𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2 − 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 .𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻𝐾𝐾𝑐𝑐 � (2) 
Where, k0,perh is the pre-exponential factor. Ea is the activation energy. R is the gas 
constant. T is the reaction temperature and Tref  is the reference temperature. CFADK is 
the association parameter of formic acid and KC is the equilibrium parameter of the 
perhydrolysis reaction. 𝐻𝐻𝑋𝑋 represents the concentration of the chemical compound x .  
Table I: The values of kinetic and thermodynamic parameters of eq. (2) for Tref=67°C. 
Kinetic and thermodynamic parameters 𝑘𝑘0,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ (𝐿𝐿.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1. 𝑠𝑠−1) 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅  (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 
Values 0.15 150000 -5580
The main reaction is characterized by the presence of two parallel secondary reactions 
eq. (3 and 5). These decompositions reactions increase the heat of the system. 
The first decomposition reaction is:  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ⟶  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2 + 𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻 (3) 
The kinetic expression of this reaction is shown in eq. (4) and Table II: 
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝1 = 𝑘𝑘0,𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝1 . 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� .𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  (4) 
Table II: The values of kinetic and thermodynamic parameters of eq. (4) for Tref=67°C. 
Kinetic and thermodynamic parameters 𝑘𝑘0,𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝1(𝑠𝑠−1) 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎(𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅(𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 
values 0.001 20000 -359000
The second decomposition reaction is: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 ⟶  𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + 1
2
𝐻𝐻2  (5) 
The kinetic expression of this reaction is shown in eq. (6) and Table III: 
𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝2 = 𝑘𝑘0,𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝2 . 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� . [𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻]  (6) 
Table III: The values of kinetic and thermodynamic parameters of eq. (6) for Tref=67°C. 
Kinetic and thermodynamic parameters 𝑘𝑘0,𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝2 (𝑠𝑠−1) 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅  (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 
values 0.0009 20200 -163000
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Besides, the hydrogen peroxide used in the reaction can also decompose eq. (7). In 
this case, the reaction system becomes dangerous [13]. 
 𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2 ⟶  𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻 + 12 𝐻𝐻2 (7) 
 
Hydrogen peroxide can decompose in two ways: 
 
1. In the case of spontaneous decomposition under the effect of temperature, the 
kinetic expression of reaction eq. (7) is shown in eq. (8) and Table IV. 
 𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑘𝑘0,𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 . 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �−𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� .𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻  (8) 
 
 
Table IV: The values of kinetic and thermodynamic parameters of eq. (8) for Tref=140°C. 
Kinetic and thermodynamic parameters 𝑘𝑘0,𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (𝑠𝑠−1) 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅  (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 
values 0.0000924 150000 -98000 
 
2. In the case of decomposition by copper sulfate as impurity, the kinetic 
expression of reaction eq. (7) is shown in eq. (9) and Table V. 
 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝3 =  𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) (9) 
 
With: 
 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐.𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) = 2𝑘𝑘0,𝐹𝐹. 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎,𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� . [𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2+]. �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2�2 + 
 2𝑘𝑘0,𝐵𝐵. 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �− 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎,𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅 �1𝑇𝑇 − 1𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟�� . �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2�.�[𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2+] (10) 
 
Table V: The values of kinetic and thermodynamic parameters of eq. (10) for Tref=140°C. 
Kinetic and thermodynamic 
parameters 
𝑘𝑘0,𝐹𝐹 (𝐿𝐿2.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−2. 𝑠𝑠−1) 𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎,𝐹𝐹 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 𝑘𝑘0,𝐵𝐵 (𝐿𝐿2.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−2. 𝑠𝑠−  𝐸𝐸𝑎𝑎,𝐵𝐵 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 (𝐽𝐽.𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚−1) 
values 0.0163 162000 0.0035 69700 -93200 
 
The material balances for formic acid, hydrogen peroxide, peroxyformic acid and 
water in batch reactor are represented by the differential equations eq. (11). 
 
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = −𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ + 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝2 ;  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 = 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝2 
  (11.a)  
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻2 =  −𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ − 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝3  ;  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻2𝐻𝐻      =  𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ + 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑅𝑅𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝3 
  (11.b)  
 
The energy balance in the batch reactor for the reaction mixture is expressed by the 
differential equations shown in eq. (12): 
 𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠
𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 =  1∑𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅 �𝑈𝑈.𝐴𝐴. �𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 − 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅� − (∑𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 .Δ𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅 .𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅) − 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠� (12) 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
71
 
Where Rm is the initial mass of the reaction mixture. RPC is the reaction heat capacity 
of the reaction mixture. U is the overall heat-transfer coefficient. A is the heat transfer 
area. Tj is the heat carrier temperature circulating in the reactor jacket. RR is 
the reaction rate. ∆HR is the enthalpy of reaction. VR is the volume of the reaction 
mixture. lossq is the heat loss due to evaporation. 
 
2.2 Normal operating conditions 
 
A numerical model of the reaction of perhydrolysis of formic acid is represented in 
Figure 1. This model is obtained in normal operating conditions shown in Table VI. 
Figure 1 represents also the experimental measurements of the temperature variations 
of the same reaction. By comparing the theses temperature profiles, a good agreement 
between the numerical and the experimental measurements temperatures can easily be 
observed, therefore the model is able to follow correctly the thermal behavior of the 
reaction, especially between the beginning of the reaction and when the reaction 
exceeds its maximum temperature. The maximum temperature is an important 
parameter that is taken into account as a safety tool to study thermal risks [14]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Numerical model and experimental measurements of the 
temperature reaction of perhydrolysis of acid formic in function of time 
(min). 
Table VI: Normal operating conditions. 
Parameters 
of system 
Sample 
volume 
Initial conc. of 
formic acid 
Initial conc. of 
hydrogen peroxide 
Initial temperature 
of reaction 
Jacket 
temperature 
Symbol VR FA HP TR Tj 
Values 1.2 L 2.5 mol.L-1 2.8 mol.L-1 70°C 70°C 
 
2.3 Description of the major faults 
 
Several causes may lead to a thermal runaway event. The most probable causes have 
been due to operator errors according to studies carried out in France [15] and United 
Kingdom [4]. The operator errors considered in this paper have been described as 
follow: 
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• Modification of initial concentrations of reactants (formic acid FA and 
hydrogen peroxide HP) due to errors in the preparation step. 
• Presence of impurities (copper sulfate Cu) due to insufficient cleaning of the 
reactor. 
• Increase of the temperature (Tj) of the cooling jacket due to non-respect of 
procedures. 
 
The reaction system becomes more dangerous when normal operating conditions are 
exceeded because of such errors. These errors can change de reaction model and the 
thermal behaviour of the system. The behavior is considered abnormal if the maximal 
temperature of reaction reaches 79 °C. 
3. The FDI method 
 
3.1 Faults detection  
 
Fault detection is an effective method to alert and inform the operator of the existence 
of faults in the system. An early detection lets the time to operator to react before that 
the fault becomes uncontrollable. In this context, a method of early detection of faults 
based on the use of a double dynamic threshold has been developed in our previous 
works [15, 16], and shows an early detection of faults in the detection performance 
test. This detection method was improved in this paper by taking into account another 
fault type. The thresholds define dynamic tolerance ranges and it is calculated 
according to three principles: 
 
1. An increase of initial concentration of the reagents (FA and HP) and the 
presence of an impurity (Cu) in the reaction mixture cause a rise in the 
maximum temperature of the reaction above 79°C.  
2. A temperature marge of tolerance MT = 0.1°C is considered in order to avoid 
false alarms due to sensor errors. 
3. Only single faults are considered. 
 
The first threshold is used for the early detection of faults (Dlimit(t)) eq. (14), it 
represents the profile of the reaction temperature that does not exceed 79°C. While 
the second threshold is used to perform the classification of these detected faults 
(Slimit(t)) eq. (15), and it represents the profile of the reaction temperature that does 
not exceed 80°C. 
 
     DLimit(t)=max(min(TFA1(t),THP1(t),TCu1(t), TTj1(t)), TNominal(t)+MT)             (14) 
 
   SLimit(t)=max(min(TFA2(t),THP2(t),TCu2(t), TTj2(t)),  TNominal(t)+5.MT)           (15) 
 
Where TNominal(t) is the reaction temperature profile for the nominal conditions. Tx(t) 
represents the temperature reaction profile that does not exceed 79°C or 80°C for the 
maximal acceptable value of (x) shown in Table VII. 
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Table VII: Maximal acceptable values of FA, HP, Cu and Tj for Dlimit(t) and Slimit(t). 
 Maximal acceptable value of (x) 
x FA (mol.L-1) HP (mol.L-1) Cu (mol.L-1) Tj (°C) 
DLimit(t)  2.74 3.06 0.02 70.8 
SLimit(t)   2.96 3.33 0.08 71.7 
 
The definition of DLimit(t) and SLimit(t) in eq. (14 and 15) aims to avoid non-detections 
and false alarms (Figure 2) as follows:  
 
• The use of the “min” operator reduces the rate of non-detection: the dynamic 
tolerance range is constrained at each point t by the minimal value of TFA1(t), 
THP1(t), or TCu1(t) in eq. (14)  and TFA2(t), THP2(t), or TCu2(t) in eq. (15).  
• The use of the “max“ operator with the nominal temperature TNominal(t) plus 
temperature marge of tolerance MT reduces the rate of false alarms. Note that 
this condition also delays the detection. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dynamical thresholds SLimit(t)and DLimit(t) compared to TNominal(t). 
 
 
The Figure 2 shows three safeties modes of reaction according to threshold type:   
 
• The reaction is in a safe mode when the reaction temperature is below the first 
threshold DLimit(t) (green rectangle area). 
• The reaction is in a dangerous mode but still acceptable when the reaction 
temperature is between DLimit(t) and SLimit(t) (orange circle area).  
• The reaction is in an unacceptable mode when the reaction temperature is above 
SLimit(t) (red triangle area).  
 
The detection is performed by comparing the temperature measurements with the first 
dynamics thresholds DLimit(t). Because of the noise, the measured temperature is 
filtered f(T) by using an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF). The decision function of 
faults D(t) is defined as follows eq. (16):  
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                         D(t) = 1 if f(T(k)) > DLimit(k) for k ∈ {t-n+1,…t-1,t}                   (16) 
                           D(t) = 0 otherwise. 
 
A fault is detected, if the measured temperature profile exceeded the first threshold 
DLimit(t) for n=10 successive points of the measured temperature k ∈ {t-n+1,…t-1,t}, 
this condition limits isolated false alarms. Figure 3 shows an example of fault 
detection in the considered reaction due to an increase of the initial concentration of 
hydrogen peroxide (HP). 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of the considered reaction with a 
fault in the initial concentration of HP and the decision 
function. 
                    
3.2 Faults isolation 
 
Faults isolation consists of establishing a diagnosis by isolating the most probable 
candidate fault among a set of faults candidates. It is carried out as follows:  
During the reaction phase, when the detection method described above sends an alert 
indicating the detection of a fault, a time windows is used to continues to collect more 
temperature measurements (N) in the dangerous area W = {T(p), T(p+1), … 
T(p+K)}. Where p and K are the position and the size of the window W respectively 
(Figure 4). These measurements will be used to complete the diagnostic task. The 
recording stops when the temperature measurements exceeded the second threshold 
SLimit(t). The necessity of additional temperature measures appears through the 
insufficient measurements collected in the detection phase. These not enough 
measures do not allow separating the various classes of faults because during the first 
seconds of the reaction the faults behaviors are very similar. 
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Figure 4. Data collection for diagnosis issues. 
 
The temperature measurements collected and projected in the window W, are studied 
and classified according to several statistical characteristics like the average value, the 
variance, the covariance, the mode, the median, the skewness, the kurtosis, etc. of the 
temperature. According to several tests, the variance and skewness of the temperature 
shows a good separation between the different classes of faults (Figure 5).  
 
 
     
Figure 5. Fault (F) diagnosis by means of classification in window   
W = [30s 330s].  
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
In order to validate the FDI method proposed, a set of 100 simulations are emulated. 
These simulations contain initial and random faults including normal behavior of the 
reaction. In order to consider the measurement errors, a noise of magnitude 0.1°C 
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consistent with experimental conditions usually adopted with the considered reaction 
was added. The parameters used to achieve the FDI method are presented in Table 
VIII. 
 
Table VIII: Parameters of the FDI method. 
FDI parameters Values 
Sampling period 1s 
Temperature marge of tolerance MT  0.1°C 
Memory parameter n to avoid false alarms 10 
Position p of the time window for diagnosis 30s 
Size K of the time window for diagnosis 330s 
 
Delays in fault detection for 100 random simulations are represented in Figure 6. The 
results shows an early detection of these faults. The detection delay does not exceed 2 
minutes: All faults are detected between 20s and 120s. For that, the mean detection 
delay is 52s. The false alarm rate is 0% and the detection rate is 100%.   
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the delays to the detection of the 100 random 
simulations 
 
The results of faults classification are provided in the window of classification in 
Figure 7 and in the confusion matrix in Table IX.   
The matrix details the results presented in the Figure 9, it provides for each class of 
fault the classification performance. The groups (FA, HP) = 4% and (Cu, Tj) = 14% 
show that for 4% (resp. 14%) of the patterns with a fault of class FA (resp. Cu), a 
wrong decision HP (resp. Tj) is returned. One the average, good results are obtained 
for classification, except some measures of FA and Cu faults. 
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Figure 7. Fault (F) classification for the 100 random simulations 
in W = [30s 330s].  
 
 
 
 
 
Table IX: Performance of the diagnosis (confusion matrix). 
 Nominal FA HP Cu Tj 
Nominal 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
FA 0% 96% 4% 0% 0% 
HP 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
Cu 0% 0% 0% 86% 14% 
Tj 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
An FDI method has been developed to prevent thermal runaway risk in chemical 
reactors, by using a double dynamic threshold for fault detection, and the extraction 
of the statistical characteristics of fault cause for isolation. The proposed method used 
a reaction model in a batch reactor. The simulations results show an early detection of 
the faults with an average delay of 52 seconds. This detection delay is widely enough 
to control the reaction temperature and resume functionality as quickly as possible by, 
for example, injecting the solvent or by increasing the temperature of the cooling 
system (this delay is small compared to the time required to reach the maximal 
temperature of 80°C that is about 30 minutes). The analysis of the detection 
performance shows that all fault simulations are detected and no false alarms were 
found. The isolation method provides also a good result despite some wrong decision 
of FA and Cu faults due to the similarity of their behaviors with HP and Tj 
respectively. The future works are to confirm the proposed method by experimental 
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tests and to provide suitable information to choose the most adapted control method 
for each detected faults. 
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Abstract 
 
The problem of time series segmentation for real-world applications has received 
much attention recently. Different industrial machines as elements of critical 
infrastructure for energy extraction, pumping, generation and other operations are 
equipped by hundreds of sensors which measure and evaluate variety data sets such 
as temperature, vibration, accelerations, pressure, voltage and so on. In many cases 
these measurements are unreliable, incomplete, inconsistent, and noisy and hence 
they can be interpreted as realizations of some linear stochastic processes. The task 
of recognizing of anomalous operation mode of machines can be reduced to the 
problem of pattern recognition, change point detection or segmentation in time 
series. In this paper we propose a general approach for time series segmentation of 
linear stochastic processes based on supervised learning algorithms which are 
machine learning algorithms using a mapping from input samples to a target 
attribute of the data.  We also perform empirical examples for some hypothetical time 
series segmentation.  
 
 
Keywords: Time series segmentation, anomaly detection, supervised methods, 
machine learning algorithms. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The task of time series segmentation is becoming increasingly popular in 
various fields including medicine, aerospace, and finance, human and animal activity 
recognition as well as for anomaly detection by operation of industrial systems, 
equipment and machines. as part of critical infrastructure. Time series data represents 
time ordered sequences of measurements reflecting the behavior of systems. These 
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behaviors can change over time due to some systematic and random internal or 
external events. Time series segmentation [8] is based on finding the abrupt changes 
in data when different statistical properties of the time series change. These changes 
can reflect the possible future failures and confirm unexpected behavior of some 
technical system. Such problem of pattern recognition in time series generated by 
sensors is known as anomaly detection problem [5]. The proper handling of 
equipment and machines as well as timely preventive maintenance based on 
measurements generated by sensors allow to avoid failures in critical infrastructure 
which as a result can have dramatic economic, social and environmental 
consequences. As an example of such disastrous effect of a technical failure is a 
Sayano-Shushenskaya power station accident in 2009. The high vibration of the 
bearing in one of the turbine leads to destruction of the turbine cover and as a result 
the turbine hall and engine room were flooded. Significant portion of supply to the 
local electric grid was lost. This accident has shown a necessity to use modern 
sensors for generating data sets about state and operational mode of equipment as 
well as to develop appropriate methods needed to classify these data samples with the 
aim to predict possible anomalies.  
The sensor data is normally noisy and have outliers. In many cases it can be 
treated as realization of some linear stochastic process. Anomaly detection problem 
reduces then to a segmentation problem or to the change point detection problem in a 
time series. Additionally it should be taken into account that machines can have 
different operational profiles, for example variable intensities, modes and so on. 
Hence the problem of multiple segments identification must be solved in this case. 
Many machine learning algorithms have been developed and implemented for change 
point detection. A variety of supervised classifiers can be used for learning problem 
in a context of anomaly identification, time series segmentation and change point 
detection. These methods can be divided into two groups: binary class classifiers and 
multi-class classifiers. The first group includes such methods as support vector 
machine (SVM) [2], Naïve Bayes [11], Logistic Regression [3]. In multi-class case 
the following methods can be used: Decision tree [13], Neares Neighbor [10], SVM 
[7], Naïve Bayes, Bayesian Net [9], Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [14], Conditional 
Random Field (CRF) [1], Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [12]. 
 In this paper we examine for a change point detection problem a general 
methods including supervised learning algorithms that learn to map from input data 
and appropriate derived features to a target attribute of the data which will be 
specified as a segment or class label. 
2. Definitions
2.1 Stochastic processes 
Assume that a time series data stream is a finite sequence of elements {𝑥!,… , 𝑥!}, 
which is a realization of some linear stochastic process ℵ = {𝑋!}!∈ℕ!. A time series 
calls stationary if the corresponding stochastic process has finite variance and 
constant values of the moments over time.  Denote by 
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𝑍!~𝑁(0,𝜎!) 
is a normal distributed white noise process. We want to define three different types of 
linear stochastic processes: 
1. AR(p)-Processes: A process ℵ = {𝑋!}!∈ℕ!,!!! is called an AR(p)-Process
(Autoregressive) if it fulfils the following equation [4]:𝑋! − 𝜑!𝑋!!! −⋯− 𝜑!𝑋!!! = 𝑍!. 
2. ARMA(p,q)-Processes: A process ℵ = {𝑋!}!∈ℕ!,!!!"# {!,!} is called an
ARMA(p,q)-Process (Autoregressive-Moving-Average) if it fulfils the
following equation [4]:𝑋! − 𝜑!𝑋!!! −⋯− 𝜑!𝑋!!! = 𝑍! − 𝜃!𝑍!!! −⋯− 𝜃!𝑍!!!. 
3. ARCH(p)-Processes: A process ℵ = {𝑋!}!∈ℕ!,!!! is called an ARCH(p)-
Process (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) if it fulfils the
following equations [6]: 𝑋! = 𝜎!𝑍!𝜎!! = 𝑎! + 𝑎!𝑋!!!! +⋯+ 𝑎!𝑋!!!! .
A change point is a point between different states of a stochastic process which 
generates the time series data sets with corresponding segments. Change point 
detection can be defined a statistical problem of hypothesis testing, where the null 
hypothesis 𝓗𝟎 means that no change occurs while the alternative one 𝓗𝟏 stands for a 
change point, i.e. 𝓗𝟎:ℙ!! = ⋯ = ℙ!! = ⋯ = ℙ!!, 0,𝑛𝓗𝟏: ∃ 𝑘∗ ∈ : ℙ!! = ⋯ = ℙ!!∗ ≠ ℙ!!!!∗ = ⋯ = ℙ!! , 
where ℙ!! is a probability density function of time series starting at point 𝑥! and 𝑘∗ is 
a change point. 
2.2 Experimental set-up 
We construct 4 different scenarios, in every scenario we have 10000 samples 
of three different states each, where the underlying processes of the different states 
have the form as described in Table 1 
Table I: Short description of the 4 different considered cases with specification of the underlying 
processes of each of the three occurring segment 
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In Figure 1-4 we can see a realization of our different scenarios 1, where the vertical 
dotted lines mark the points where the underlying processes change. Different 
segments are easy to distinguish visually:  
Figure 1.  Depiction of a realization using the processes 
from experimental setup 1.    
Figure 2.  Depiction of a realization using the processes 
from experimental setup 2.  
Figure 3.  Depiction of a realization using the processes 
from experimental setup 3.  
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Figure 4.  Depiction of a realization using the processes 
from experimental setup 4. 
2.3 Performance metrics 
To estimate the quality of time series segmentation we use a number of 
performance metrics describing in the context of binary classification. The problem 
can be extended to classification of a greater number of classes by providing the 
measures for each class independently or in combination. In our special case we 
assume three classes and hence we calculate the following measures by merging two 
classes, such that only two classes remain. This procedure will be repeated for all 
possible combinations. Accuracy is calculated as the ratio of correctly classified data 
points to a total data points which can be ineffective for performance evaluation in a 
class-imbalanced dataset,  Accuracy = !"!!"!"!!"!!"!!". (1) 
Sensitivity or Recall is defined as the proportion of a class of interest, e.g. where 
change point between segments occurs, that was recognized correctly, Sensitivity = Recall = !"!"!!". (2) 
For imbalanced class distribution where the ratio of changes to total data is small one 
can use g-mean, which utilizes both the ratio of positive accuracy (Sensitivity) and 
the ratio of negative accuracy, 𝐺 −𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = Sensitivity ∙ Specificity, (3) 
where  Specificity = !"!"!!". (4) 
Precision is calculated as the ratio of true positive data points to total points classified 
as change points, Precision = !"!"!!". (5) 
The difference in time between estimated segments’ boundaries and the actual change 
points can be treated as performance measure as well. In this case a number of useful 
metrics can be implemented. Mean absolute error (MAE) measures the distance of the 
predicted change point 𝑦! to the actual change point 𝑦!, i=1,…,N, 
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                                                   𝑀𝐴𝐸 = |!!!!!|!!!! ! .                                                   (6) 
 
Mean squared error (MSE) can take large values if a number of sufficient outliers 
occur in the classified data, 
 
                                                 𝑀𝑆𝐸 = (!!!!!)!!!!! ! .                                                   (7) 
 
Mean signed difference (MSD) evaluates the direction of the error, i.e. if the location 
of the predicted point before or after the actual time position of the change point, 
 
                                                  𝑀𝑆𝐷 = (!!!!!)!!!! ! .                                                    (8) 
 
Root mean squared error (RMSE) accumulates square error between protected and 
actual change point and offset the scaling factor of squaring the differences, 
 
                                                𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = (!!!!!)!!!!! ! .                                               (9) 
 
Two methods can be used to normalize root mean square error (NRMSE), namely 
using the range of the observed change points or the mean of observed change points, 
 
                                            𝑁𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = !"#$!"#! !! !!"#! !! ,                                         (10) 
 
                                            𝑁𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = !"#$!! !!!!!! .                                                       (11) 
 
 
3. Main results 
 
The data was examined in a tenfold stratified cross validation classification 
scheme, where 90 percent of the data was used to calculate features and train a naïve 
Bayes classifier which was then tested on the remaining 10% of examples. This 
procedure was repeated ten times and the overall result was calculated and is 
presented in confusion matrices in the following list.  
 
As features for classifying we used: Mean, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness, 
Interquartile range and autocorrelation from order 1 up to order 3. The performance 
measures (1)-(5) are denoted with an index, which represents the class such that the 
other two are merged to a single one. In this evaluation we assume that the time 
where the behaviour possibly changes and we only want to find the class of each 
segment 
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1. Scenario 1:  
 
Table 1: Confusion Matrix for Scenario 1 
                   Estimated Class         
True Class 1 2 3 
1 9838 155 7 
2 207 9483 310 
3 15 477 9508 
 
Table 2: Performance Measures for Scenario 1 
Class 1 2 3 
Accuracy 0.9872 0.9617 0.9730 
Sensitivity 0.9838 0.9483 0.9508 
Specificity 0.9889 0.9684 0.9841 
G-Mean 0.9863 0.9582 0.9672 
Precision 0.9779 0.9375 0.9677 
 
 
 
2. Scenario 2:  
 
 
Table 3: Confusion Matrix for Scenario 2 
                   Estimated Class         
True Class 1 2 3 
1 7498 2337 165 
2 2003 7667 330 
3 15 186 9799 
 
 
Table 4: Performance Measures for Scenario 2 
Class 1 2 3 
Accuracy 0.8493 0.8381 0.9768 
Sensitivity 0.7498 0.7667 0.9799 
Specificity 0.8991 0.8739 0.9752 
G-Mean 0.8177 0.8168 0.9776 
Precision 0.7879 0.7524 0.9519 
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3. Scenario 3:  
 
Table 5: Confusion Matrix for Scenario 3 
                   Estimated Class         
True Class 1 2 3 
1 9905 42 53 
2 2 9998 0 
3 112 0 9888 
 
Table 6: Performance Measures for Scenario 3 
Class 1 2 3 
Accuracy 0.9930 0.9985 0.9945 
Sensitivity 0.9905 0.9998 0.9888 
Specificity 0.9943 0.9979 0.9973 
G-Mean 0.9924 0.9988 0.9931 
Precision 0.9886 0.9958 0.9947 
 
 
4. Scenario 4:  
 
 
Table 7: Confusion Matrix for Scenario 4 
                   Estimated Class         
True Class 1 2 3 
1 9655 345 0 
2 370 8249 1381 
3 2 1474 8524 
 
Table 8: Performance Measures for Scenario 4 
Class 1 2 3 
Accuracy 0.9761 0.8810 0.9048 
Sensitivity 0.9655 0.8249 0.8524 
Specificity 0.9814 0.9091 0.9310 
G-Mean 0.9734 0.8649 0.8899 
Precision 0.9629 0.8193 0.8606 
 
As we can see from Table 1-8, all 4 scenarios lead to good classification and high 
performance measures. 
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In addition to our fest set-ups, we also want to test for the quality of segmentation 
using our classification algorithm as described above. Therefore we defined a moving 
window of fixed length 100 and calculate for every time series in the testing set the 
classification result on series 
 𝑥! ,⋯ , 𝑥!!!! → 𝑐! , 𝑖 = 1,11,⋯ ,201,  
 
which yields a sequence 
 𝑐!, 𝑐!!  ⋯ , 𝑐!"# , 𝑐! ∈ 1,2,3 . 
 
This sequence is transformed into a two class problem by either  
 2 → 1 𝑜𝑟 2 → 3 . 
 
Considering these sequences, we define change-points as points I s.t  
 𝑐! ≠ 𝑐!!! 
 
and compare them with the actual change-point. We transform such points i to a 
change point j by 𝑗 = 10 𝑖 + 45 
 
and use j to calculate our performance measures (7)-(11), which can be found in 
Table 9: 
 
Table 9: Change-point Performance Measures for  Scenario 1-4 
Scenario + Transformation MAE MSE MSD RMSE 
1( 2 → 3) 23.527 1025.5 2.3656 32.008 
1( 2 → 1) 29.865 1430.6 -14.417 37.823 
2( 2 → 3) 34.779 1856.8 13.764 43.091 
2( 2 → 1) 32.994 2116.7 -20.600 46.008 
3( 2 → 3) 22.860 815.01 -0.021398 28.549 
3( 2→1) 28.094 1211.5 -8.6860 34.807 
3( 2→3) 42.673 2664.7 38.41 51.621 
3( 2→1) 21.452 573.39 -20.484 23.946 
 
 
4. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The classification results show quite good quality with high values for all 
considered performance measures, accuracy ranges from 83.81 % to 99.85 % in our 
experiments, while the sensitivity attains values from 74.98 % to 99.98 %.  In all our 
scenarios the different states are thus rather easy to distinguish with only a small set 
of features.  
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Of course we have to tackle additional problems in case of real scenarios, like 
highly imbalanced data, more subtle changes and violation of model assumptions. 
Moreover our feature space is tailored to the changing properties of the time series, in 
real data the construction of appropriate features is crucial and a difficult task on its 
own. The change point performance measures are also satisfying, when we consider 
that if we chose change points random and uniformly on our possible js, the resulting 
measures would be 
 
MAE: 62.5  MSE: 5825 MSD: 50/-50 RMSE: 76.32 
 
We expect that proposed methodology can be successfully implemented to real 
segmentation sensor measurements of different industrial machines used as technical 
elements of critical infrastructure to predict the anomalies and operational quality in 
realistic settings. 
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Abstract  
 
The objective of any asset is to provide value to the organization, being the corner 
stone to get a highest possible economic benefit in a sustainable way. An effective 
asset value management demands method that allow measuring and comparing the 
expected value with the real value realized at any time during its life cycle for value 
informed decision-making. Digitalization is providing new data about events and 
states related to asset condition and risk, information that can be reinterpreted to 
generate value measure strategies. This paper presents a proposal of TVO (Total 
Value of Ownership) model where it is possible to quantify and measure the value, 
including its monitoring throughout the life cycle of the asset and/or system. 
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Proposed TVO model is focused on Safety, one of the most relevant value factors for 
Industry and Infrastructure sectors. Asset events and states are intrinsically linked to 
the defined failure modes. Consequently, it is necessary to structure the system 
information around the failure modes that have been defined, in order to obtain a 
value measurement index. A railway use case is presented. 
 
 
Keywords: TVO, Condition Monitoring, Value Based management  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to present a case of a quantitative asset management tool 
consisting of obtaining a value measurement index. The index proposal and its use are 
linked to the use of TVO models to support decision making in the central phase of 
the life cycle of an asset or MoL (Middle of Life) (Roda et al., 2015). These models 
are connected to the best known TCO models. TVO proposes and emphasizes 
management by value, in accordance with the postulates of the ISO 55000 standard, 
as opposed to an exclusive management based on the economic costs of the TCO. 
The application of TCO in the industry and other sectors is mature while the TVO 
models are much scarcer and there is not enough consensus either on their design, 
calculation or their application in decision making (Srinivasan and Parlikad, 2017). 
This paper tries to make a contribution in this sense. 
 
At the same time, digitization makes new capabilities available to organizations. It 
highlights, in a significant way, the possibility of developing new models of data and 
information not available until now. In particular, this digitization allows the 
development of new uses of data extracted from a monitoring system. This study 
proposes the connection of monitoring with the calculation of an index to measure the 
value that is reliable to the organization, on which to make decisions and control the 
outcome of them in the medium and long term. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: the following section briefly reviews the key 
aspects and concepts about the developments of this work. Section 3 presents the 
methodology used to obtain the value index related to safety; Section 4 briefly 
presents a practical case that has served as support for the development of the model. 
Finally, Section 5 includes the main conclusions of this work.   
 
 
2. Background 
 
"Value" is one of the key concepts in asset management (Roda et al., 2015). The 
international standard ISO 55000 (ISO, 2015) establishes that asset management 
promotes the contribution of value, and defines the asset as the element that has or 
generates value for the organization. Asset management should be conducted around 
value control. To this end, each asset has to be managed and defined according to the 
concept of the organisation’s own value that it itself establishes (Sola et al. 2015). 
The definition of the value of each organization makes it possible to define which are 
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those assets and in what way they contribute to obtaining the expected value or its 
conservation (IAM 2010). However, there are currently not many management tools 
that integrate the concept of value, and in most cases economic indicators are used as 
the basis for decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary to deepen in the development 
of new indicators and methodologies that allow the objective measurement of value in 
order to be able to manage the assets around this concept in an efficient and effective 
way (Gonzalez-Prida et al., 2019). 
 
The Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) is the sum of all costs incurred by the owner of a 
physical asset throughout its entire life cycle (Ellram, 1995). These costs are those 
required to acquire, install, commission, operate, maintain and finally dismantle the 
equipment (Duran et al., 2016). All these costs play an important role in the decision-
making process, especially in aspects such as maintenance planning, spare parts 
purchasing and operating strategies among others. In addition, it has been proven that 
the TCO can serve as a support tool for management, obtaining a measurement and 
reduction of costs (Bacchetti et al., 2018). The TCO is a cumulative cost index as it 
includes all the costs associated with the life cycle of an asset. It makes it possible to 
estimate and monitor the cost in its different phases. 
 
The Total Value of Ownership concept extends the TCO approach to the monitoring 
and control of aspects of value such as social and environmental impact, as well as 
the economic aspect as offered by the TCO (Srinivasan and Parlikad, 2016). While 
the TCO only provides information for economic management while the TVO allows 
a management focused on the value that is promulgated by asset management (ISO, 
2015). The management focused on the TVO allows maximizing the operation for a 
certain budget, while the management focused on the TCO, minimizes the budget to 
maintain a certain level of operation (Srinivasan and Parlikad, 2017). As a result, the 
TCO makes it possible to maintain a level of service while the TVO tries to obtain the 
optimum level of service. The difficulty of implementing a management system based 
on value versus cost lies in the concepts used, the second are consolidated in the 
industry while the first are not. 
 
The processing of events/states is the basis for the quantitative indicators that 
maintenance engineering uses. In fact, the RAMS (Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety) analysis methodology is based on the management of a 
set of indicators obtained from the evaluation of the characteristic times of the 
operating and fault states that, in turn, limit the events of failure and repair (Parra and 
Crespo, 2012). A failure occurs when an asset fails to perform its required function 
(Birolini, 2017). On the other hand, the term to define the state of inactivity is not the 
failure, it is the fault (Figure 1). As schematized in Figure 1, repair is an event that 
returns the asset to the operating state. This same event/state scheme can be used in a 
more general way to model intermediate states generated from available information 
through monitoring techniques that give access to detailed knowledge about the asset 
degradation process until failure.  
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Figure 1. Basic states and events of RAMS analysis methodology. 
 
 
Condition-based maintenance (CBM) is a monitoring-based maintenance strategy that 
focuses much of the digitization efforts of maintenance, especially in the development 
of predictive solutions or PHM (Prognosis and Health Management) (Jardine et al., 
2006). Technological development has made it possible to reduce the costs of sensors 
and systems that measure assets, making it possible to obtain data on assets 
considered critical. The monitoring and analytical techniques used in the CBM make 
it possible to control the risk of failure and predict the time to failure or RUL 
(Remaining Useful Life) (Guillen et al., 2016). Risk is the product of the probability 
of occurrence of a failure and its consequence (Crespo, 2007). Condition monitoring 
is linked and allows to control the probability factor. A specific monitoring measure 
may indicate a higher probability of failure and, therefore, a higher risk. It is the 
identification of different levels of risk that supports maintenance decision making. 
These levels are defined from reference values or thresholds. 
 
Similar to what happens with failures and times between failures in the RAMS 
methodology, the new events and states identified through monitoring and their 
thresholds allow handling events and intermediate states between operation and fault 
states. The management of these states and their characteristic times can give rise to 
new indicators of interest for management. These include objective quantitative 
measures of value. In this way it is possible to link condition monitoring to value-
based decision making. 
 
 
3. Methodology for the calculation of the TVO 
 
This methodology connects the result of the monitoring to the evaluation of the TVO. 
It can be understood as part of an information management strategy aimed at 
generating new information for the digitization of decision-making processes. 
 
It is necessary to establish a structure of information related to the asset in order to 
make full use of all available data provided by monitoring. Three pillars or 
fundamentals of description have been taken into account in the modelling of asset-
related information: 
 
− Objective definition of value. Generation of value measurement index. 
− Failure mode as object of maintenance. Any data is interpreted in relation to the 
failure mode or the failure modes it affects.  
− Events and states of failure modes. The value index measurement itself refers to 
the failure mode. Events and states appear as a result of monitoring and their 
interpretation at risk levels for each failure mode.  The interpretation of the risk 
levels translates into a measure of the value index.  
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The methodology includes the following steps illustrated in Figure 2: 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Steps of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
Phase 1. Value Definition. First of all, it is necessary to define the concept of value 
according to the objectives and principles of the organization. The organization 
provides the most important factors related to its activity (e.g. safety, environmental 
impact, quality of service, etc.). These factors will allow to define the value for that 
organization, being different in each organization. Each factor can be parameterized 
in a series of measurable indicators in all assets. The evaluation of the criticality of 
the assets will be carried out from the defined factors. The definition of the factors 
has a double functionality: (i) the evaluation of the criticality and hierarchization of 
assets by value; (ii) the calculation of the TVO. In the practical case, a value 
measurement index will be generated around the Safety factor, as will be seen later. 
 
Phase 2. Description of the technical structure. The system is broken down into the 
different levels of intervention that make up its technical structure. The intervention 
levels try to describe in a precise way the element to maintain within the technical 
structure. These levels will then make it possible to determine at what level certain 
maintenance policies are applied. The correct definition of the intervention level 
conditions all subsequent decisions (López, 2018). 
 
Phase 3. Functional Analysis. It allows to obtain a description of failure modes linked 
to the general system through the technical structure. The failure mode is the basic 
element in maintenance management. Each unit performs one or more functions. The 
failure mode is associated with a maintainable component of an equipment. For each 
function performed by an equipment, there are as many failure modes as there are 
maintainable components in the equipment (López 2018). 
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Phase 4. Monitoring Risk Assessment. The methodology proposes the interpretation 
of monitoring, generating risk indicators and rules of interpretation on these 
indicators. It is possible to define different levels of risk through thresholds or 
reference values, introducing new intermediate states between operation and fault. A 
risk level is therefore the representation of a state. This begins with the event that a 
threshold is exceeded and ends when the indicator leaves that level. This level change 
may be due to a new higher risk threshold being exceeded (progress in degradation) 
or due to a reduction in the risk level (reduction may be due to maintenance action or 
spontaneous favourable evolution) (Figure 3). Figure 3 shows that when a critical risk 
level is reached (corresponds to a critical value), maintenance is carried out to avoid 
failure and ensure operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. States and events according to methodology. 
 
 
Phase 5. TVO Calculation. In order to carry out a measurement and a control of the 
value, the TVO concept will be used. This concept allows to relate the measurement 
of the value with the life cycle of the asset being of great help for decision making in 
the medium and long term. 
 
The proposed TVO model focuses on giving a measure of the value factor "Safety", 
although it would be possible to develop similar indices for any other value factor. 
The ISG is defined as a quantitative index that measures the total of equivalent days 
in which an asset or group of assets is at its maximum level of safety considering: 
 
− The maximum safety in an asset (100 % or 1) corresponds, at all times, to the 
theoretical maximum safety, i.e. the state in which the asset does not present 
any objective circumstance involving a risk of a significant reduction in safety.  
− Each level of risk determined as a result of monitoring is assigned a specific 
percentage decrease in safety. This interpretation is carried out with the 
participation of expert personnel in the installation. In this way, depending on 
the level of risk at which an asset is located, it is possible to know how much 
safety has been reduced. 
− Equivalent days: the safety reduction is computed in days, so that, if during a 
calendar day of an asset has been at 50% of its maximum safety level, only 0.5 
days will be added to the ISG calculation. 
 
 
The model used for calculating the indicator is shown in the following statement: 
 
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 (∆𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖 =  ∑ �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(∆𝑡𝑡) − ∑ 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �𝑖𝑖                               (1) 
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𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖                                            (2) 
 
Where: 
 
− i: asset on which the safety fault is identified. 
− j: failure mode detected. 
− DTi: total days in the period considered. 
− DDij: estimated days from the beginning of the problem. 
− DSDij: equivalent days of reduced safety. 
− Cssj: Severity of the failure by Safety 0-1. 
− Cci: Criticality coefficient of asset i, 0-1. 
 
As it was being searched for, it is a value measurer. It is related to the value factor 
Safety, defined during the design of the corresponding asset management model. It is 
a cumulative index, similar in this sense to the cost that serves as the basis for the 
TCO models. In this way it is possible to treat the accumulated ISG throughout the 
life cycle or the ISG during a certain period of time or until a certain date. 
 
 
4. Use case 
 
In the practical case, the proposed methodology is applied in the railway field, in 
particular on metro lines. For this purpose, information on a metro line is available. 
Information is available on the technical structure and parameters associated with the 
equipment contained therein. On the other hand, information is available on the set of 
factors in which the organisation has broken down its concept of value, which will 
allow the criticality of the functional locations to be evaluated. 
 
Between value factors, safety is the most important factor. This makes it possible to 
focus the study on the measurement of safety, leading to the creation of a total value 
model based on this factor. This need to generate the model around safety is justified 
in the following statements: 
 
− In railway systems in general, and in the metro in particular, safety is 
paramount. 
− If safety is diminished or reduced, it does not necessarily mean that a failure or 
accident occurs. 
− On the other hand, what it does imply is that during the safety degraded state, 
safety is not satisfied to its maximum possible level. 
− It has been observed that the non-detection of failures or their non-appearance 
hide reductions in safety. This mask the results of the evaluation of asset 
performance and maintenance. In this way, circumstances that may be 
important for the effective control of risk and safety are not taken into account 
in decision-making or in proposals for improvement. 
 
In order to carry out the practical case, a system has been generated that allows the 
management of assets. This system allows the processing of the information 
transmitted by the on-board monitoring system. Before receiving and processing the 
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information transmitted by the monitoring system, it is necessary to define the first 
three phases proposed in the methodology. This allows the system to have the 
necessary premises to carry out the remaining phases. 
 
Phase 1. For the railway case under analysis, a set of value factors has been defined. 
The factors defined are: safety, social and environmental impact, integrity and life 
cycle, operation and quality of service and cost of corrective maintenance. Each 
factor, according to the organisation's criteria, has been assigned a percentage, the 
sum of these percentages being 100%. The organisation has defined that 40% of 
safety has been assigned, the main reason for which a safety-centred value 
measurement index has been developed. 
 
Phase 2. In order to define the technical structure, it was necessary to define the 
levels of intervention. The intervention level is the one at which the maintenance 
policies will be applied. At the same time, this precisely determines the object of the 
analysis. The existing model of the railway track did not provide enough information, 
and it was necessary to obtain a new model. A total of seven levels of intervention 
have been defined: line, section, subsection, system, subsystem, equipment and 
component. In this way, the elements where the maintenance activities are carried out 
are precisely defined. The sub-section level allows to distinguish curves and slopes 
with specific operating conditions and degradation modes that can be related to 
monitoring. 
 
Phase 3. For each of the assets that compose the system, a study has been carried out 
on the different failure modes that can take place in them. Some of the failure modes 
that occur on a railway track are illustrated below: cracked track, worn track or dirty 
track. These failure modes have been defined on the basis of the history of failure 
modes and the advice of technical experts in railways. 
 
Phase 4. In order to evaluate the risk of failure due to a failure mode in an asset three 
requirements are necessary: (i) define a set of risk indicators whose thresholds are 
defined by the value of the monitored parameters (e.g. length of serious defect if the 
value is greater than 40 mm); (ii) an on-board monitoring system that transmits the 
information in real time; (iii) use logical rules of interpretation (combination of AND 
or OR types) of the defined risk indicators to assess the risk in each failure mode (e.g. 
the risk level is high for the failure mode "Cracked track" if the risk level of the 
"defect length" indicator is high and the risk level of the "defect width" indicator is 
medium).  
 
The graph to the left of Figure 4 shows the time evolution of a risk indicator. The 
colours grey, green, yellow and red are associated with zero, acceptable, medium and 
high risk levels respectively. It can be observed how for this risk indicator, along the 
analysed temporal horizon, its risk level increases until a maintenance action is 
carried out reducing the risk to 0. The graph to the right of Figure 4 shows the 
duration of each risk level of each failure mode for all assets analysed. The graph 
shows the duration of the risk levels for the "Dirty track" failure mode of the different 
assets. 
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Figure 4. On the left, representation of the evolution of a risk indicator in the analysed time 
horizon. On the right, the duration of the risk levels of a multi asset failure mode. 
 
 
Phase 5. The duration of the different levels of risk has a translation that is reflected 
in the measure of the value index, in this case, of the ISG. Thanks to the on-board 
monitoring system, a real-time measurement of the value can be obtained. The system 
is able to draw a graph where the comparison of the real value in real time and the 
theoretical value of the ISG is carried out. Also, it shows the value of the real TCO 
against the theoretical one in real time (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Theoretical and actual ISG and TCO on the analysed time horizon (ISG referred to left 
axe and TCO referred to right axe). 
 
 
The decision-making process for carrying out maintenance activities will be 
conditioned by two interrelated measures: the level of risk of an asset and the value of 
the asset's ISG. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Value is a concept inherent to each organization that depends on its objectives, being 
difficult to quantify because there is no general procedure for defining it. On the other 
hand, existing asset management tools and models allow decisions to be made based 
exclusively on economic value, not on the value of the organization. In order to 
define value in a clear and concise way, an asset management tool is proposed where 
information is structured around failure modes and events that take place in the assets. 
Consequently, an intelligent asset management system has been developed with the 
mentioned approach, being used in a practical case in the railway field. 
 
Monitoring makes it possible to know the state of the assets and, consequently, to 
know the level of risk they have at any given moment. The duration of the different 
risk levels of the assets has a translation in terms of equivalents days of security. The 
value of the ISG is proportional to the equivalent days of safety. The measure of the 
value in terms of security can be done through the ISG. By comparing this value 
measurement with the theoretical value calculated at the beginning of the life cycle of 
the asset, the operation of the asset can be evaluated and, where appropriate, acted 
upon. In this way it is possible to link condition monitoring to value-based decision 
making. 
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Abstract 
 
The main purpose of the REDCRIT research project (http://redcrit.unizar.es/) is the 
development and validation of a vulnerability assessment methodology for the 
topology of interdependent energy infrastructures against random faults and 
intentional attacks. For this purpose, the use of graph theory is proposed by 
calculating the geodesic vulnerability indicator in the topology resulting from the 
simulation of successive cascading failure contingencies in a coupled infrastructure 
of gas and electricity networks in Spain. The methodology developed has been 
applied to real gas and electricity transmission networks in Spain, and the coupled 
network results more vulnerable than the electrical network. In addition, the 
vulnerability of the new topologies resulting from the construction of new power lines 
and gas pipelines up to 2020 has been evaluated. 
 
 
Keywords: graph theory; cascading failures; critical infrastructure 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure does not exist in isolation; these structures are interconnected with each 
other. Technological advances make infrastructure components increasingly complex 
and mutually dependent. Once a system suffers a fault, either by external or internal 
disturbances, the fault can spread very quickly to other systems. Therefore, the 
increased interconnection between critical infrastructure systems has made them more 
vulnerable.  
 
In 2008, the European Directive 2008/114/EC “on the identification and designation 
of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their 
protection” [1] warned about the possible impact of the effects resulting from the 
interdependency between interconnected infrastructures. 
 
Among the infrastructure systems under analysis and protection, energy networks 
play a major role, since energy is the economic engine that sustains modern society. 
To protect critical energy infrastructure, comprehensive risk management 
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programmes must be developed, beginning with vulnerability analysis and risk 
assessment, both for system faults and intentional threats. 
 
The risk assessment stage should be as objective as possible, which requires 
quantitative tools that allow assessing risks expected to affect network operations, 
including both possible power outages due to severe weather conditions and technical 
faults such as intentional attacks on infrastructure. These risks can cause problems in 
one or more infrastructure components, so it is necessary to estimate the weakness of 
the system with respect to a cascading sequence of events to analyse the vulnerability 
of the energy system [2]. 
 
A more realistic simulation model provides a closer representation of the system 
under study and a better representation of the system under extreme conditions. 
However, greater realism also implies greater complexity in the models [3]. 
Alternatively, a more abstract model, although simpler, provides the foundations for 
more detailed models. In that sense, the models built on graph theory provide a new 
perspective regarding critical infrastructure systems. 
 
Many critical infrastructure systems can be represented by a network of 
interconnected nodes through links. Graph theory or complex networks [4,5] in 
electrical networks facilitate the analysis and visualisation of physical behaviour, for 
instance, the assessment of cascading failures by studying the topology of the system 
and the evaluation of impacts due to the removal of specific components in a system 
and their consequences in power-flow congestion. 
 
Important research efforts in recent years have focused on the modelling of energy 
systems as complex networks. The definition of scale-free networks, initially 
proposed in [4], was followed by the application of new concepts of statistical 
measures, vulnerability analysis and resilience estimation, with applications in 
different engineering problems [5,6,7]. In [8], the cascading failure problem in scale-
free networks was formulated by modelling a node removal strategy in a network 
following the nodal degree, which was the basis for developing the vulnerability 
assessments of electrical power networks [9]. 
 
However, [10,11] demonstrated that the statistical measures of graph theory 
(clustering, connection degree, geodesic distance, and nodal distribution) are adequate 
for the vulnerability assessment of an energy system and particularly for cascading 
failure analysis. 
 
Other researchers have used alternative measures for complex network models; for 
instance, in [12], the use of geodesic efficiency indicators is suggested for the 
analysis of cascading failures. Another approach suggested is to measure the 
betweenness of the graph [13]. 
 
Among the electrical network models based on graphs, certain studies have been 
carried out in Nordic countries [10,14] and on the electrical network of continental 
Europe [15] where the advantages of using topological indicators (clustering, 
geodesic distance, and geodesic  efficiency) to analyse the vulnerability of an 
electrical network are demonstrated. 
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Therefore, modelling with complex networks has become an accepted methodology 
for conducting protection studies on energy networks facing certain threats [16,17]. 
 
In recent years, certain research studies have been focused specifically on modelling 
interdependent infrastructure systems. In the scientific literature, there are several 
concepts of interdependency between infrastructure systems based on the existence of 
physical, logical, bidirectional, and unidirectional dependency [18-20]. However, the 
analysis and simulation of the planning and combined operation of electric power and 
gas transmission systems have also been the subject of attention in recent years [21-
23]. 
 
 
2. Research proposal  
 
Complex network theory has proven to be useful for the study of topology 
characteristics of different interdependent infrastructure systems [24] and in particular 
can be useful for vulnerability analyses of power supply networks [25]. However, this 
research field is so new that there are only a few specific methodologies and 
applications regarding combined gas and electricity transmission networks from the 
point of view of robustness and resilience. Currently, these networks are highly 
interconnected by electricity generation expansion in combined-cycle natural gas 
power stations, which makes them strongly interdependent. In Spain, 25% of the 
installed electric power from generation stations corresponds to natural gas power 
stations. In addition, these networks are part of the critical infrastructure, whose 
disruption would have direct impacts on the economy, and due to the nature of the 
interdependency, a cascading failure in one network can quickly and catastrophically 
spread to the others. 
 
The main objective of the REDCRIT project (http://redcrit.unizar.es/) is the 
development and validation of a vulnerability assessment methodology for 
interdependent energy infrastructure topologies and the application of this 
methodology to the improvement of the resilience of coupled electricity and natural 
gas transmission systems, using the previous results from the research group to 
replace the power-flow computational tools traditionally used for the analysis of 
contingencies in electrical networks with new methods based on complex network 
theory. This approach allows a rapid evaluation of network disintegration in the event 
of N-k contingencies, that is, in cascading failures of networks.  
 
Vulnerability is a concept widely studied in many research areas. In this study, 
vulnerability is defined as the general susceptibility of a system to a specific event, 
that is, the magnitude of the consequences given the incidence of that event. 
Vulnerability must be related to a certain event to be meaningful. A system could be 
vulnerable to certain faults but could be robust and resistant to others. That is why 
this project proposes to estimate the vulnerability using simulations of random faults 
and intentional attacks on different elements of the infrastructure. 
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3. Methodology of the structural vulnerability analysis 
 
The behaviour study of a scale-free network before an event is based on the 
disintegration analysis, calculating certain statistical indicators in the process of 
systematic removal of nodes by successive iterations, either randomly or deliberately. 
Each removal is associated with a contingency and is considered to be an iteration in 
the network disintegration process. The removal of a node also implies the 
disappearance of all the links that connect to that node; therefore, the respective 
geodesic paths also disappear. 
 
In this project, different statistical measures that describe scale-free graphs that allow 
for network disintegration evaluation have been analysed, that is, their evolution 
before the successive removal of nodes. The robustness of a network is generally 
measured according to the size of the largest connected network before and after a 
cascading failure [6]. The analysis of these contingencies requires the use of the 
statistical parameters of graphs that allow for measuring the functionality of the 
networks.  
 
In this project, the geodesic vulnerability index (?̅?) has been chosen to measure the 
functionality of the coupled electricity and gas network when the network is subject 
to a contingency. These indexes have been validated in previous studies on IEEE test 
networks [26] and subsequently applied to real electrical networks [27] by the same 
research group. However, these indexes have not yet been applied to coupled 
networks.  
 
The geodesic vulnerability (?̅?) allows for the normalisation of the geodesic efficiency 
and balancing in the evolution process of node removal, as indicated in (1):  
 
                                                                                                                                                
?̅? = 1 −
∑ (
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐿𝐶)𝑖≠𝑗
∑ (
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝐶)𝑖≠𝑗
                                                     (1) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐿𝐶  is the geodesic distance between the node pairs of the scale-free graph 
after each iteration of node removal, and 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝐶  is the geodesic distance between the 
node pairs of the scale-free graph for the base case.  
 
The geodesic distance is described as the shortest direct path between two nodes by 
counting the minimum number of nodes that must be covered to join the two nodes. 
The index (?̅?) varies between zero and one. The higher this index, the greater the 
impact on the power supply interruption in the coupled network. 
 
The performance of the coupled electricity and gas network, quantified by the 
geodesic vulnerability index in (1), is determined as a function of the fraction of 
nodes removed (f). 
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4. Application in the Spanish electricity and natural gas 
transmission networks 
 
The structural vulnerability measure was applied to the interconnected electricity and 
natural gas transmission networks in Spain, subjecting the topology of the networks 
to cascading failures and analysing the robustness of the respective network 
expansion plans. Therefore, the network disintegration experiments were carried out 
only under the perspective of complex network theory. 
 
This application incorporates all the assets and nodes of a single graph (power 
stations, substations, transmission towers, transformers, regasification plants, 
compression stations, gas pipelines, and consumption points) without considering 
physical distances or technical parameters (impedances, flows, or pressures).  
 
4.1. Representation of the 400-kV electrical network 
 
To represent the electrical network in Spain, the data provided by the system operator 
were considered [28]. Fig. 1 a) shows the proposed representation of the 400-kV 
electrical infrastructure in Spain. The graph is composed of a total of 611 nodes and 
672 links. This representation considers not only the buses as assets but also the 
power lines, transformers, loads, and generators. The network created in this way 
allows for a detailed vulnerability analysis. In addition, all the assets of the electrical 
network may be candidates for attack.  
 
4.2. Representation of the 80-bar natural gas network 
 
The topology of the high-pressure natural gas network was obtained from [29]. To 
adequately represent this system, 6 regasification plants, 19 compression stations, 3 
underground storage facilities, 2 reservoirs, 6 international connections, 32 direct-line 
connection points, 57 transmission-transmission connection points and 294 
transmission-distribution connection points were considered. Fig. 1 b) shows the 
proposed representation of the high-pressure natural gas infrastructure in Spain. The 
proposed graph is composed of 1380 nodes and 1402 links. The network created 
considers all the main assets of the natural gas infrastructure.  
 
4.3. Representation of coupled infrastructure  
 
Fig. 1 c) represents the coupled electricity and natural gas network in Spain. The final 
graph is composed of 2031 nodes and 2154 links. Combined-cycle power stations of 
natural gas and electric compressors act as couplings for the described networks: 
 
 In Spain, 25% of the installed electric power comprises gas power stations. The 
infrastructure includes a large number of this type of installation connected to 
substations with different voltage levels. In this study, only the 26 combined-
cycle power stations that distribute their production to the 400-kV network were 
considered. 
 However, the natural gas infrastructure includes 14 compressors that operate 
using electric power connected to the nearest electrical substations.  
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Figure 1. Graphs of electricity and natural gas 
transmission networks in Spain (taken from [31]). 
 
 
 
4.4. Results  
 
The structural vulnerability of the electricity and natural gas network in Spain was 
evaluated, considering the separate systems and the coupled system. Thus, the 
following cases arise:  
 
 Simulation of the cascading failures in each separate electricity and natural gas 
network (cases 1 and 2).  
 Simulation of the cascading failures in the coupled electricity and natural gas 
network (cases 3 and 4). 
 
The interdependent effects were not considered in the simulation of cascading failures 
in the separate networks (cases 1 and 2); however, these effects were considered for 
the coupled network (cases 3 and 4). The results are presented both for intentional 
attacks on the networks and for random faults. 
 
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results of cascading failures for the electrical (case 1) and 
natural gas (case 2) networks and for the combined coupled network (case 3). Figs. 2 
a), c) and e) include the results for random faults, while Figs. 2 b), d) and f) 
correspond to the deliberate faults. Random errors correspond to random phenomena, 
such as human errors, adverse weather conditions, and equipment faults. On the other 
hand, intentional attacks include acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, and malicious acts.  
 
To comply with the central limit theorem requirement that guarantees an appropriate 
statistical sample, the results were obtained by averaging a set of 100 tests in case of 
random errors. However, intentional attacks only require removing the most strongly 
connected nodes in descending order of nodal degree.  
 
The graphs in Fig. 2 represent the geodesic vulnerability value (?̅?) as a function of 
the fraction of nodes removed (f). When all the nodes of the network are initially 
connected, the geodesic vulnerability (?̅?) is 0. As the network decomposes, because 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
108
  
of the cascading disintegration, the value of the geodesic vulnerability (?̅?) increases 
to 1 when the power supply to all the nodes of the system has been interrupted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Simulation results for cascading failures in real 
gas and electricity networks in Spain. 
 
Fig. 2 a) shows that the electrical network collapses to random faults with the 
removal of approximately 20% of the nodes. In the same electrical network, for 
deliberate faults, Fig. 2 b) shows that the removal of less than 2% of the nodes is 
sufficient for the network to collapse. The previous analysis shows that targeted 
attacks on high connectivity nodes are an effective tactic to rapidly disintegrate the 
networks.  
 
However, Fig. 2 c) shows that the natural gas network collapses completely in the 
event of random faults when approximately 3% of the nodes in the network are 
removed. The results show that this system is more vulnerable than the electrical 
network. Meanwhile, in the face of deliberate faults, the removal of 0.7% of the nodes 
causes the disintegration of the network, as shown in Fig. 2 d). In these simulation 
cases, the natural gas network is less robust than the electrical network, which is 
explained by the different structures of the networks; the natural gas system has a 
smaller meshed topology than the electrical system.  
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Analysing the two networks in a coupled way (case 3), Fig. 2 e) shows that the 
network collapses to random faults with the removal of approximately 14% of the 
nodes in the network. However, Fig. 2 f) shows that the removal of 1% of the nodes is 
sufficient to completely collapse the network for deliberate faults.  
 
5. Evaluation of the expansion plans for the Spanish electricity and 
natural gas transmission networks  
 
In the REDCRIT project, the vulnerability of the coupled infrastructure of the gas and 
electricity transmission networks in Spain was also evaluated, considering the 
expansion plans proposed by network operators to improve the power supply security. 
The geodesic vulnerability measure was applied to the interconnected systems of 
electric power and natural gas, calculating the (?̅?) indicator in random cascading 
failures for each new topology resulting from the investment plans of the networks 
for the years 2018-2020 [30].  
 
In this evaluation, 22 case studies were considered, corresponding to the construction 
of new 400-kV high-voltage power lines and 80-bar high-pressure gas pipelines 
between 2018 and 2020. Table I shows the results for different case studies 
corresponding to the removal of a certain number of nodes in the network (f), the 
impact on the disconnection of the loads from the system by means of the geodesic 
vulnerability index (?̅?), and the fmax value, where the final disintegration of the 
system occurs [31]. 
 
Table I: Simulation results for random errors based on the fraction of nodes removed (EL: new power 
line, GL: new pipeline) 
Case Asset 〈𝒇 = 𝟐%〉 〈𝒇 = 𝟒%〉 〈𝒇 =  %〉 〈𝒇 = 𝟖%〉 〈𝒇 = 𝟏𝟎%〉 Failure  
〈𝒇𝒎𝒂𝒙〉 
Base case  0.1696 0.3924 0.5771 0.7893 0.8762 12.30 
Case 1 EL 0.1969 0.3904 0.6129 0.7368 0.8903 14.02 
Case 2 EL 0.2063 0.4480 0.6264 0.7917 0.8970 11.36 
Case 3 EL 0.1901 0.4017 0.6123 0.7575 0.9292 11.16 
Case 4 EL 0.1841 0.3946 0.5898 0.8081 0.9321 13.12 
Case 5 EL 0.2008 0.3960 0.6355 0.7826 0.9537 12.22 
Case 6 EL 0.1974 0.4101 0.6377 0.7353 0.9069 13.15 
Case 7 EL 0.1808 0.3786 0.5944 0.8005 0.9085 14.52 
Case 8 EL 0.1959 0.3978 0.6030 0.7780 0.8789 12.21 
Case 9 EL 0.1739 0.4354 0.6183 0.7655 0.8992 11.71 
Case 10 EL 0.1878 0.4002 0.6095 0.7981 0.8669 11.95 
Case 11 EL 0.1833 0.3939 0.5580 0.7904 0.8828 13.32 
Case 12 EL 0.1831 0.3779 0.6132 0.7852 0.8823 13.21 
Case 13 EL 0.1879 0.3690 0.5883 0.7391 0.8434 13.25 
Case 14 EL 0.1889 0.3739 0.5913 0.7904 0.9033 12.90 
Case 15 EL 0.1910 0.4202 0.6072 0.8009 0.8978 13.24 
Case 16 EL 0.1878 0.3747 0.6007 0.7640 0.9288 12.75 
Case 17 EL 0.1935 0.4014 0.6019 0.7592 0.8562 13.86 
Case 18 EL 0.1848 0.4400 0.6175 0.7610 0.8299 12.00 
Case 19 EL+GL 0.1761 0.3808 0.5808 0.7503 0.8522 11.75 
Case 20 EL 0.1900 0.3982 0.6225 0.7718 0.9014 12.38 
Case 21 GL 0.2303 0.3856 0.5624 0.7652 0.8418 13.01 
Case 22 GL 0.2003 0.3949 0.5667 0.7829 0.8232 11.34 
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Fig. 3 shows the geodesic vulnerability values (?̅?) for all the case studies 
corresponding to a loss of 10% of the nodes (f=10%). The trend line in Fig. 3 shows 
that the coupled system only improves when all the investments have been made 
(Case 22). The numerical values in Table I for (f=10%) demonstrate a 6% 
improvement in structural robustness, decreasing from a geodesic vulnerability value 
of 0.8762 to 0.8232 for Case 22 (taken from [31]).   
 
 
Figure 3. Geodesic vulnerability values for f=10% (taken 
from [31]). 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The REDCRIT project developed a cascading failure methodology for coupled 
natural gas and electricity systems, remarkably simplifying the assessment of 
structural vulnerability using complex network theory. This proposal was previously 
validated in test networks and was applied here to real electricity and natural gas 
transmission networks in Spain. The results show that the natural gas system is less 
robust than the electrical system. In addition, the coupled network is more vulnerable 
than the electrical network to both random and deliberate faults, and the removal of 
1% of the nodes is enough to completely collapse the network under intentional 
attacks on the infrastructure. Finally, the vulnerability of the system was evaluated 
with the construction of new power lines and gas pipelines between 2018 and 2020, 
resulting in a potential improvement of 6% in the combined robustness of the 
infrastructure. 
 
 
  
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
111
  
Acknowledgements 
 
This research was supported by the Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad 
(Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness), Spain, under project ENE2016-77172-
R. 
 
 
References 
 
[1] Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and 
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to 
improve their protection. 
[2] Baldick, R., Chowdhury, B., Dobson, I. et al. (2009) Vulnerability assessment for 
cascading failures in electric power systems. PSCE '09. IEEE/PES Power Systems 
Conference and Exposition pp. 1-9.  
[3] Brown, T. (2007) Multiple Modeling Approaches and Insights for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection." In: IOS Press, NATO Series for Peace and Security 
Services. 13, pp. 23-35. 
[4] Barabási A-L, Albert R. (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks, 
Science, 286, 509–12. 
[5] Newman, M.E.J. (2003) The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM 
Review, 45, pp.167–256. 
[6] Albert, R., Barabási, L. (2002) Statistical mechanics of complex networks. 
Reviews of Modern Physics, 74, pp. 47–97. 
[7] Murray, A., Matisziw, T., Grubesic, T. (200/ Critical network infrastructure 
analysis: interdiction and system flow. Journal of Geographical Systems, 9, pp. 
103–17. 
[8] Motter, A., Lai, Y. (2002) Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. Physical 
Review E, 66, 065102. 
[9] Crucitti, P., Latora, V., Marchiori, M., Rapisarda, A. (2004) Error and attack 
tolerance of complex networks. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications, 340, pp. 388–94. 
[10] Holmgren ÅJ. (2006) Using graph models to analyze the vulnerability of electric 
power networks. Risk Analysis, 26, pp. 955–69. 
[11] Holmgren, ÅJ. (2007) A framework for vulnerability assessment of electric 
power systems. In: Murray AT, Grubesic TH, editors. Critical infrastructure: 
reliability and vulnerability. Berlin (Germany): Springer Verlag. 
[12] Chen, G., Dong, Z.Y., Hill, D.J., Zhang, G.H. (2009) An improved model for 
structural vulnerability analysis of power networks. Physica A, 388, pp. 4259–66. 
[13] Wang, K., Zhang, B., Zhang, Z., Yin, X., Wang, B. (2011) An electrical 
betweenness approach for vulnerability assessment of power grids considering the 
capacity of generators and load. Physica A, 390, pp. 4692–701. 
[14] Jelenius, E. (2004) Graph models of infrastructures and the robustness of power 
grids. In: Master thesis in physics engineering. Stockholm (Sweden): Royal 
Institute of Technology (KTH). 
[15] Solé, R., Casals, M., Murtra, B., Valverde, S. (2008) Robustness of the 
European power grids under intentional attack. Physical Review E, 77, 026102. 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
112
  
[16] Holmgren, A.J., Jenelius, E., Westin, J. (2007) Evaluating strategies for 
defending electric power networks against antagonistic attacks. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 22, pp. 76–84. 
[17] Chen, G., Dong, Z.Y., Hill, D.J., Zhang, G.H., Hua, K.Q. (2010) Attack 
structural vulnerability of power grids: a hybrid approach based on complex 
networks. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 389, pp. 595–
603. 
[18] Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., Kelley, T.K. (2001) Identifying, understanding, 
and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems 
Magazine, 21 (6), pp. 11–25. 
[19] McDaniels, T., Chang, S., Peterson, K., Mikawoz, J., Reed, D. (2007) Empirical 
framework for characterizing infrastructure failure interdependencies. Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems. 13 (3), pp. 175–184. 
[20] Earl, E. et al. (2007) Restoration of services in interdependent infrastructure 
systems: a network flows approach. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, Part C, 37 (6), pp. 1303–1317. 
[21] Shahidehpour, M., Fu, Y., Wiedman, T. (2005) Impact of Natural Gas 
Infrastructure on Electric Power Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE, 93 (5)  
[22] Urbina, M., Li, Z. (2008) Modeling and Analyzing the Impact of 
Interdependency between Natural Gas and Electricity Infrastructures. IEEE 
Power and Energy Society General Meeting. 
[23] Cakir, B. et al. (2014) An integrated simulation model for analysing electricity 
and gas systems, International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 
61, pp. 410–420. 
[24] Ouyang, M. (2014) Review on modeling and simulation of interdependent 
critical infrastructure systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 121, pp. 
43–60. 
[25] Wang S. et al. (2013) Analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems under 
edge attack strategies, Safety Science, 51 pp. 328–337. 
[26] Correa, G.J., Yusta, J.M. (2013) Grid vulnerability analysis based on scale-free 
graphs versus power flow models, Electric Power Systems Research, vol. 101, pp. 
71–79. 
[27] Beyza, J., Yusta, J.M., Correa, G.J., Ruiz, H.F. (2018) Vulnerability assessment 
of a large electrical grid by new graph theory approach, IEEE Latin America 
Transactions,16, pp. 527–535. 
[28] REE (2017) Spanish Electricity System 2017 Report. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ree.es/en/statistical-data-of-spanish-electrical-system/annual-
report/spanish-electricity-system-2017-report. [Accessed: 27-Nov-2018]. 
[29] Enagas (2018), Gas Transmission [Online]. Available: 
https://www.enagas.es/enagas/en/Transporte_de_gas/TransporteYOperacion/Tran
sportista_de_gas_natural. [Accessed: 27-Nov-2018]. 
[30] Ministerio de Industria, Energia y Turismo, España (Ministry of Industry, 
Energy and Tourism, Spain). (2015) Planificacion Energetica. Plan de Desarrollo 
de la Red de Transporte de Energia Electrica 2015-2020  
[31] Beyza, J., Yusta, J.M. (2018) Robustness Assessment of the Expansion of 
Coupled Electric Power and Natural Gas Networks Under Cascading Failures,   
IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, Volume 12, Issue 21, 27 
November 2018, p. 5753 – 5760. 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
113
  
Challenges to protect critical energy infrastructure 
Vytis Kopustinskas1 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Directorate C - Energy, Transport and Climate 
Energy Security, Distribution and Markets Unit  
E. Fermi 2749, TP440, 21027 Ispra (VA), Italy 
Marcelo Masera2, Ricardo Bolado-Lavin3 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Directorate C - Energy, Transport and Climate 
Energy Security, Distribution and Markets Unit 
Westerduinweg 3, NL-1755 LE Petten, The Netherlands 
Abstract 
A wide plethora of traditional and emerging threats and hazards jeopardise the 
functioning of critical energy infrastructures. Hybrid threats, cyber and terrorist 
attacks, extreme climatic variations are among the more virulent. The regulatory 
environment needs to adapt to these changes, fostering the preparedness of society 
and the infrastructure operators. The European Commission has started discussions 
on the amendment of the Directive 2008/114/EC, which is in force since January 
2009. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the main challenges in the area of 
critical energy infrastructure protection and the ways the policy might change. 
Keywords: critical energy infrastructure, protection, energy security, security of 
supply, risk assessment. 
1. Introduction 
The Directive 2008/114/EC [1] is the result of work that started in 2004 when the 
European Council asked for the preparation of an overall strategy to protect critical 
infrastructures in the European Union. The Directive requested a step-by-step 
approach to identify and designate European Critical Infrastructures (ECIs). ECI is 
defined as a critical infrastructure located in one EU Member State whose disruption 
or destruction would have a significant impact on at least two EU Member States. 
The Directive takes into consideration the threat of terrorism, although it adopts a 
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general all-hazards approach. In the more than 10 years passed since the adoption of 
the Directive, it has become clear that a thorough consideration of all types of man–
made intentional threats is required in the current geopolitical situation. In different 
settings, hybrid threats and cyber attacks are among the first to be mentioned.  
The Directive in force specifically highlights the energy sector, with electricity, gas 
and oil subsectors as potential energy ECI. The other sector highlighted is the 
transport one, with road, rail, air, inland waterways transport, ocean and short sea 
shipping and ports as subsectors.  
This paper focuses on the challenges faced by the critical energy infrastructure (CEI) 
protection domain. 
2. The legislative background 
The energy infrastructure regulation under Directive 2008/114/EC [1] is strongly 
interlinked with other regulatory documents for the electricity [2] and gas [3] 
subsectors, the EU energy strategy [4] and the Energy Union strategy [Ref]. The 
Energy Union consists of five closely related and mutually reinforcing dimensions: 
• security, solidarity and trust: diversifying Europe's sources of energy and 
ensuring energy security through solidarity and cooperation between EU 
countries; 
• a fully integrated internal energy market: enabling the free flow of energy 
through the EU through adequate infrastructure and without technical or 
regulatory barriers; 
• energy efficiency: improved energy efficiency will reduce dependence on 
energy imports, lower emissions, and drive jobs and growth; 
• decarbonising the economy: the EU is committed to a quick ratification of the 
Paris Agreement and to retaining its leadership in the area of renewable energy; 
• research, innovation and competitiveness: supporting breakthroughs in low-
carbon and clean energy technologies by prioritising research and innovation to 
drive the energy transition and improve competitiveness. 
3. Challenges in critical energy infrastructure protection 
In this chapter we will present the major challenges we see affecting CEI protection. 
We identify 4 major issues that need to be addressed: 
• Identification of critical energy infrastructure; 
• Capability to carry out complete risk assessment and consequence studies; 
• Interpret and communicate quantitative and qualitative results of risk 
assessment; 
• Exercising and planning. 
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3.1 Identification of the CEI 
The major problem regarding the identification of a CEI relates to the fact that it 
might be cross-border – i.e. it can be located not only in one Member State, but also 
in more than two neighboring countries. This creates difficulties related to 
information access, regulatory framework and operational standards, especially 
during crisis situations. The regional aspect is crucial at the EU level for the 
identification of European critical infrastructures.  
In our view, identification of the CEI should be based on methodological approaches, 
with a comprehensive all-hazard risk assessment as the basis. The method applied 
should identify: 
- CEI assets whose disruption or destruction might have important local (one 
Member State) consequences; 
- CEI assets whose disruption or destruction might have important regional (two or 
more Member States) consequences. 
The latter is defined as ECI in the Directive [1]. It is obvious that a risk assessment 
performed for the identification of ECI should include a number of Member States, 
covering the region relevant for analysing the given infrastructure. If needed, the 
analysis could be split into several regions, including overlapping among themselves 
when so required. 
The regional approach is also enforced in the EU Regulation [3] for gas supply and in 
the new EU Regulation for electricity supply [5]. Both regulations also promote the 
solidarity principle of sharing resources in case of crisis, however their operational 
implementation still needs to be further detailed. 
Another issue is the protection of the identified CEI assets. Among other measures, 
this is ensured by the development of preparedness and emergency plans. Both type 
of plans are challenged in case of cross-border ECI assets. 
The preparedness action plan has to allocate limited resources to different risks 
avoiding "waiting until event happens" situation. However, both the allocation of 
costs and responsibilities to cross-border infrastructure, and the development of 
coordination mechanisms are not straightforward tasks. 
Similar challenges are foreseen for the development of emergency plans. As an 
emergency plan for a single Member State often relies on optimistic assumptions 
about possible supply from another Member State, regional emergency plans should 
be considered. Crisis preparedness and cross-border coordination must be effectively 
implemented, as crisis almost always evolves under time pressure. 
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3.2 Capability to carry out complete risk assessment and consequence studies  
The first challenge of identification of CEI should be based on a comprehensive risk 
assessment based on an all-hazard and all-threat approach at the regional scale. It 
should address: 
• Natural hazards; 
• Technological hazards and equipment failures; 
• Intentional man-made threats: cyber-attacks, hybrid attacks, insider sabotage, 
antagonist/terrorist actions; 
• Interdependencies among CEIs, cascading effects within one CEI and across 
several CEIs; 
• Single supply source evaluation. 
The consequences of hazards and threats should be evaluated regarding their impact 
on vital societal functions of one or several Member States. Currently, many studies 
end up with estimation of non-supply volumes, and the impact evaluation on societal 
functions is missing.  
There is a need to harmonise assessment approaches at the EU level taking into 
account the state of the art in Europe and worldwide. 
3.3 Interpret and communicate quantitative and qualitative results of risk 
assessment  
Many hazards listed in the section above and treated in the framework of classical 
risk assessment can be assessed quantitatively with methods described in the 
literature. However many emerging threats, especially intentional and well planned 
attacks, in which damage of CEI might be only a partial goal, followed by e.g. fake 
news background in the media or military and hybrid actions, are difficult to analyse 
quantitatively and often rely on qualitative evaluation and assessment.  
The all-hazard and all-threat approach to risk assessment requires then to merge the 
results of quantitative and qualitative analysis to obtain a single risk measure and to 
communicate it to public, policy makers and stakeholders. Having a single risk 
metrics allowing prioritisation and ranking of the main risk contributors is important 
if one wishes to develop an optimal framework to distribute limited resources for risk 
mitigation.  
The issue is even more complicated when dealing with cross-border CEIs, involving 
different languages, approaches, definitions and legal frameworks. 
3.4 Exercising and planning 
The last challenge we identify is related to exercising, planning and learning. Real 
and big crisis are rare and we cannot afford to only learn from past crisis events. 
There must be a continuous procedure to test the emergency and preparedness plans 
by means of tabletop and field exercises, continuous updating of risk assessments by 
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implementing a living risk assessment approach following the evolution of the 
infrastructure, consumer behaviors, natural hazards and the emergence of new threats.  
The future planning and development of the infrastructure should be based on the 
outcome of comprehensive regional risk assessment studies.  
Continuous updating is needed not only at the analysis level, but also at regulatory 
level. The gas supply regulation has been recently updated, the new electricity 
regulation is expected to enter into force in 2019 and preparations have started for a 
new Directive on critical infrastructure protection.  
4. Concluding remarks 
The paper describes a number of challenges we consider as the most important for 
further development of critical energy infrastructure protection, especially with a 
view of upcoming revision of the Directive [1]. Below we list the main areas of 
challenges for critical energy infrastructure protection: 
• Identification of CEI (critical nodes and facilities) considering cross-border 
importance and interdependency; 
• Capability to carry out comprehensive risk assessment and consequence studies 
• Interpret and communicate quantitative and qualitative results of risk 
assessment 
• Exercising and planning 
All these challenges are underpinned by the fact that some CEIs are located in several 
Member States or are located in one, but strongly affect the other. There is a strong 
need for regional approaches involving several Member States in many steps of CEI 
design, planning, operation, exercising and crisis management. The cross-border 
infrastructure issues are also challenged by different legal frameworks, operational 
standards, different spoken languages and approaches to crisis management.  
A special attention should be given to full scope risk assessment capabilities, as CEI 
as interdependent, cascading effects are likely to evolve during large crisis and 
intentional threats might be difficult to identify and diagnose right from the beginning 
of crisis. 
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Abstract 
 
During many years, asset management methodologies used in industry were focused 
on knowing and analysing the operational control of the daily work and the impact of 
the maintenance on the availability. Later, the costs turn into the priority, and 
strategies were focused on assesses a longer lifecycle and optimizing processes and 
contracts. Finally, recent normative have included concepts as “knowing and 
managing the risks” and the target is to prioritize the maintenance tasks to the 
critical assets. However, taking a balanced asset management model for the 
operational environment, quite a lot of facilities of Oil & Gas sector are reaching the 
end of their initially estimated lifecycle. New challenges are related to extend the life 
of the main items of the facilities or at least, to find the optimal replacement moment 
that guarantees that the maintenance strategy is being optimized. 
 
Asset Health Index methodology considers a theoretical lifecycle of an item, in which 
depending on the proximity to the end of the useful life, the probability of failure 
increases. But take this theoretical lifecycle as a base, different operation location 
factors or O&M aspects can modify this period. All these factor are quantified and 
permit us to calculate a new theoretical profile. 
 
This paper is about assess the impact of the AHI into the maintenance strategy 
optimisation. AHI enables us to compare future alternative cost profiles and assess 
the impact in the failure probability of the item. As a result, we are able to know the 
risk that is taken when we enlarge the operation of an item, and the impact in the 
operational costs. 
 
Keywords: Asset Management, Maintenance strategies, lifecycle, Asset condition 
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1. Introduction 
 
The target of the paper is to assess the profitability of the investment in a replacement 
asset process. Traditional profitability analysis takes into account standard Opex and 
Capex concepts. However, when these studies are made for long term investments or 
for long time periods, the evolution of these costs are not always well defined. 
 
Some concepts are easy to calculate because they have a lineal or non-variable 
evolution. If the asset technology is well known, electricity consumption or CO2 
emission is a direct calculation. On the other hand, costs derived from the ageing of 
the assets as corrective maintenance does not have a clear methodology to be 
calculated. 
 
Asset Health Index provides an objective technical methodology to estimate the 
lifecycle bend and, in consequence, maintenance cost profiles in the future. This 
estimation enable us to use reliability index as availability in the investment study. 
Capex and Opex have been traditionally used separately because were focused on 
specific targets; Capex for making the best investment, and Opex for reaching 
operational efficiency. However, developing methodologies that are focused on 
TOTEX guarantees the effectiveness of the asset management in long term results. 
 
2. Scope 
 
2.1 Definition 
 
An Underground Storage of Natural Gas is used to store NG in low consumption 
periods (e.g. summer) and be able to use it in consumption peaks (e.g. winter). In the 
extraction process, natural gas flows mixed with water and other condensed products 
which are taken from the ground. To avoid mixing these products with the Gas 
Transport Grid, it is necessary to cool the gas. Water and impurities get condensed 
and can be eliminated. After that, natural gas get the right levels of water and 
hydrocarbons required by the law. 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic System Diagram 
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NG is cooled by two refrigeration lines whose refrigerant fluid is ammonia. This fluid 
must be compressed to maintain the heat exchange with NG. Three compressors are 
used for this process. These compressors are actuated for three motors of different 
technologies. Two natural gas motors used for compressors of line A and Line B, and 
a third electric compressor that can operate for both lines. The basic system diagram 
is shown in Figure 1. 
 
As a result of the experience of the staff of the facility operating and maintaining the 
motors, it is proposed to change one of the natural gas motors for an electric one. It 
will avoid the CO2 emitted in the natural gas combustion and will optimise OPEX 
during the lifecycle of the item.  
 
The target of the paper is to calculate the profitability analysis of the change, 
assessing the impact of the Health Index of the motors in the operation and 
maintenance costs. This methodology allows to estimate the impact of the ageing of 
an asset during the lifecycle. 
 
2.2 Operation scenarios 
 
According to the configuration of the system, electric compressor (EM-C) was used 
just as a backup of the natural gas ones.  
 
As a result of the benefits of using the electrical motor the last year, the operating 
process time was divided at 50% for the electrical one and 50% for natural gas ones 
(25% for each one) as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Current Operational mode 
 
To maximize the benefits of the investment, the calculation is not only going to be 
based on the change of technology (GM-A for EM-D) but on the change of the 
operational mode. The scenario proposed uses electrical motors as main equipment, 
letting the natural gas one as backup. It implies that actual EM-C will work 50% of 
the time, and preferably on line B. On the other hand, the new EM-D will be used the 
other 50% of the time, and can only work on line A.  The new scenario is shown on 
Figure 3. 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
122
 
 
Figure 3. Proposal of new operational mode 
 
This proposal has several benefits that are going to have impact in the payback of the 
investment: 
 
• Improving the energy efficiency; electrical motors has better efficiency rates 
during the operation so it is assumed to be an optimised use of energy. 
• Decreasing CO2 emissions; avoiding the use of natural gas as energy for the 
NG motors can decrease significantly emissions of gases derived of combustion 
process. 
• Increasing reliability of the facility; failure rates of electric motors are 
significantly lower than NG ones. This factor increases the availability level of 
the facility. 
• Optimising maintenance costs; electric motors does not require overhauls, so 
the scheduled availability increases against NG motors. 
• Decrease the criticality of the asset; according to the criticality analysis, [1][2] 
Natural Gas Motors are more critical because of the environmental care impact. 
The change of technology decrease the criticality of the asset, and consequently 
provides the facility more flexibility in maintenance plans optimising processes. 
 
 
3. Asset Health Index Calculation 
 
Asset Health Index (AHI) represent a practical methodology to quantify the general 
health of a complex asset. [3]. The methodology is used to provide a mathematical 
base for supporting maintenance and replacement strategies. The index represent the 
asset conditioned based on a semi quantitative assessment of the factors that impact in 
the lifecycle of an item. With the assessment of the impact of the factors, we can use 
the results of operational observations, field inspections and laboratory tests, to 
simulate the lifecycle of an asset [4].  This estimation must help to know the future 
condition, and consequently the costs derived from the operation and maintenance.  
 
In this case, the methodology is going to be applied in the NG motor (GM-A). It is 
supposed that the electrical one is a new asset and the wear and tear during the period 
of the analysis is not going to be relevant, so is not going to have impact into the 
global maintenance costs. 
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3.1 Background 
 
The asset health index (AHI) is considered as a dimensionless number between 0.5 
(which corresponds to its status or condition as new equipment) and the value of 10 
(corresponding to the condition of the equipment at the end of its useful life). The 
behaviour pattern of the AHI, is supposed to be exponential along the age of the asset. 
The Figure 4 shows the different five sections into which the health index of the asset 
is divided [5]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Asset Health Index Banding 
 
The HI1 range comprised 0.5≤AHI≤4 values; for which the behavior of the 
equipment is assumed to resemble as new equipment. The HI2 range considers AHI 
values within the interval 4<AHI≤6 and corresponds to the period of time when the 
first signs of deterioration begin to appear in the equipment. In this range, the value 
corresponding to AHI=5.5, is assumed to be the health index value equivalent to the 
normal life expected for the equipment category. From this point, three intervals are 
considered in the methodology: HI3, HI4 and HI5 as the AHI exceeds the values of 6, 
7 and 8 respectively. The methodology assumes that exceeded the value of AHI=8, 
the equipment is at the end of its useful life. Due to the workshop nature of ESReDA 
Seminars, strict rules about paper length are not imposed on authors. However we 
recommend that the paper be of maximum 12 pages in length. Please use these 
guidelines when writing your paper. By following them carefully you will contribute 
to reducing the time needed to issue the proceedings. 
 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
124
3.2 Procedure 
 
The methodology followed in this paper is based on a procedure consisting in five 
consecutive steps [6]. Taking the theoretical estimated normal life based on the 
provider information and associate with a specific equipment category, several factors 
update this expected life. Every aspect related with the asset condition is taken into 
account and used in the methodology. This procedure is presented in Figure 5. 
 
Asset class
Asset 
Subclass / 
Group
Age
Expected life per 
asset category
Expected life 
(books)
Expected life
Duty factor
Operation factors
Aging rate (β)
Initial Asset 
Health
Actual Asset Health
Reliability 
modifiers
Health 
modifiers
1
2
3
4
5
Establishe
d by the 
business
Associated to 
the functional 
location where 
the asset is 
placed
Associates to 
specific 
circumstances of 
the physical 
asset, its 
operation and 
maintenance
 
Figure 5. AHI Calculation Procedure 
 
 
Using the theoretical procedure proposed [6], the practical application is going to be 
explained with the case study of NG motor (GM-A) following the five steps define 
previously. 
 
3.2.1 Asset selection and category definition: In this first step, the identification of the 
asset and all the information regarding its functional location is addressed. According 
to ISO 14224 the asset is included in rotating equipment category and the equipment 
class is known as “electric motors”. 
 
3.2.2 Evaluation of the impact of location and load factors: Once all the information 
in the previous point has been compiled, the location and loading factors are 
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evaluated. This step will quantify the impact of the specific place of the asset, and the 
load conditions derived of it, into the expected life.  
To calculate location factor (F_LT), reference standards as DNO common network 
asset indices methodology proposes collections of factors, but these must be adapted 
to the type of facility and operational process. Location factors proposed for 
Underground Gas Storage are defined in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. The range and 
the value of the factors have been defined based on the experience and knowledge of 
the staff of the facility. The range that applies for GM-A is marked in grey. 
 
Table I: Location Factor; Distance to coast 
Distance to coast (km) Factor Value 
0 Km – 1 Km  1 
1 Km – 5 Km 1.05 
5 Km – 10 Km 1.1 
10 Km – 20 Km 1.15 
> 20 Km 1.2 
 
Table II: Location Factor; Outside Temperature 
Temperature (ºC) Factor Value 
0 ºC – 10 ºC 1 
10 ºC – 20 ºC 1.1 
20 ºC – 30 ºC  1.2 
> 30 ºC 1.3 
 
Table III: Location Factor; Height above sea level  
Height  (m) Factor Value 
0  – 500 1 
500  –  1000 1.1 
1000 – 2000  1.2 
> 2000 1.3 
 
 
If there are several parameters that impacts in location factor calculation, the 
methodology defines that  𝐹!" = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐹!"!,𝐹!"!,𝐹!"#)                                                 (1) 
In this case, the first location factor (𝐹!"!) is distance to coast and the facility is off-
shore, so the distance is 0 km and the factor value is 1. The second factor (𝐹!"!) is 
outside temperature. The average value is 21ºC throughout the year so the factor 
value according to the Table 2 is 1.1. Finally, the height above sea also conditioned 
the expected life of the asset. In this case the facility is at sea level and the factor 
value is 1. As a consequence, the Location Factor is 1.1 as shown in equation 2: 𝐹!" = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(1,1.1,1)                                                                  (2) 
To calculate load factor (𝐹!) it is necessary to measure the load requested during 
operation in the specific location against the maximum admissible load measured 
during the start-up process of the equipment. 
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𝐹! = !"#$ !"#$%& !"#$%&%"#'!"#$%&% !"#$%%$&'( !"#$                                                              (3) 
After running test, the load measure for nominal conditions is 90% of maximum 
admissible. In this case, the load factor (𝐹!) is 0,9. According to the methodology we 
can now calculate a new estimate life as a result of the equation 𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 = !"#$%& !"#$!!" × !!                                               (4) 
The normal life defined by the provider is 25000 hours. It is the operation time until 
the overhaul must be done. Consequently, is the expected life noted by the provider in 
which the failure rate is the standard one, so the AHI is under 5.5. 
According to the evaluation of the impact and the location, the estimated life is higher 
and is expected to be under the standard failure rate until 25253 operation hours. 
 
 
3.2.3 Calculation of the aging rate: A fundamental hypothesis of the chosen 
methodology is that the aging of an asset has an exponential behaviour with respect to 
its age. This aging can be calculated through the parameter aging rate, and permit us 
to use this rate for express mathematically the behaviour of failure rate during the 
lifecycle.  
The calculation is  
𝛽 = !" !"!"#!"!"#$%&#!' !"#$!"#$%&#'( !"#$                                                                  (5) 
Where: 𝛽  = Aging rate. 𝐻𝐼!"# = 0.5 Health index corresponding to a new asset; 𝐻𝐼!"#!"#$%& !"#$ = 5.5 Health index corresponding to an asset arriving to its estimated 
life; 
 
3.2.4 Obtaining the Initial Health Index: After calculating the aging rate, we are able 
to obtain the Initial Health Index. This new Index represents an adaptation of the 
theoretical provider expected life into a new real expected life condition by the 
specific installation place (defined by location factors) and with a specific load 
condition (defined by the load factor). As a result, we obtain a graphical result shown 
in Figure 6. 𝐻𝐼! = 𝐻𝐼!"#𝑥𝑒!"                                                                (6) 
Where: 𝑡  = the current age of the asset (in units of time) 
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Figure 6. Initial Health Index 
 
3.2.5 Calculation of the Real Health Index: In the last step, the aging of the asset can 
be increased or decreased by other modifiers that conditioned the operation and the 
maintenance. These factors are divided into three categories; reliability, load and 
healthy modifiers.  
Reliability modifiers are shown in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6, and represents the 
results of the operation rules of the asset: 
Table IV: Reliability Modifier; Inactivity Operating Time  
Inactivity (%) Modifier Value 
  0 % – 50 %  1 
50 % – 75 % 1.05 
75 % – 100 % 1.1 
 
Table V: Reliability Modifier; Provider  
Provider (average reliabity) Modifier Value 
Under range average providers 1.05 
Into range average providers 1 
Upper range average providers 1.05 
 
Table VI: Reliability Modifier; Overhauls number  
Overhauls (number) Modifier Value 
1-3 1 
3-5 1.05 
>5 1.1 
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The healthy modifier is shown in Table 7 and quantify the impact of the specific 
operation parameter into the lifecycle of the asset. In this case the continuous start-
ups of the machine: 
Table VII: Health Modifier; Number of start-ups 
Start-ups (number) Modifier Value 
< 40 1 
40 < x < 80 1.2 
80 < x < 120 1.4 
> 120 1.6 
 
Finally, operating an asset out of load range can modify the expected life, and it must 
be represented by AHI. In this case it is represented in load modifier (Table 8). 
Table VIII: Load Modifier; Operating Load 
Average Operation Load Modifier Value 
Into the recommended range 1 
0% < X < 15% out of range 1.3 
15% < X < 30% out of range 1.5 
 
The result of the process is shown in Figure 7 and includes the comparison between 
the initial health index and the current health index. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. HI initial vs HI real 
 
Having defined all the parameters, and calculated all the factors, we can finally obtain 
the Real Health Index 𝐻𝐼! . This value shows the most objective estimation of the age 
of an asset. It is calculated according to the next equation: 𝐻𝐼! = 𝐻𝐼!"# !"!!!  𝑥 𝑀! 𝑥 𝑀!                                               (7) 
Where: 
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𝑀!  = Load Modifier 𝑀! = Healthy Modifier 𝑀!  = Reliability Modifier 
 
3.3 AHI Results 
 
Depending on the design of the model, and the values of the modifiers, the Health 
Index, and consequently, the lifecycle, can be increased or decreased against the 
theoretical proposed by the provider. These results can be used as a base for 
management decisions (Table 9). Knowing the factors that impact in the health and 
calculating the HI, allow us to prevent premature aging and advance maintenance 
tasks. On the other hand, it also allows us to optimise operation and extending the life 
of the asset. With this information, we can adjust the maintenance plan and optimise 
the OPEX. 
The results of the AHI calculated for motor (GM-A) shows that, because of the 
operation mode of the motor, its lifecycle is being shortened. According to the Health 
Index, the overhaul must be made in advance of at least two years. The Health Index 
in 2019 will reach 5.5, which is the moment when the failure rate can increase and 
consequently, impact into the reliability of the asset. This overhaul in advance, causes 
that in the period used for profitability calculation (15 years) two overhauls must be 
made instead of one. This change impacts directly in the economical result. 
 
Table IX: Load Modifier; Operating Load 
AHI Condition Expected lifetime Requirements 
0.5 - 4 Very good >5 years Normal maintenance 
4 – 5.5 Good > 4 years Normal maintenance 
6 - 7 Fair 2 – 3 years Increase diagnostic  
7 - 8 Poor < 2 years Planning replacing 
8 - 10 Very poor End of life Immediately replace  
 
 
 
4. Profitability Calculation 
 
4.1 Considerations 
 
To analyse the impact of the lifecycle maintenance cost of the motors into the 
profitability calculation, Internal Rate of Return (IRR) has been used as the main 
indicator to assess the benefits of the investment. To simplify the analysis and avoid 
unnecessary data, there have not been included all parameters that do not change 
between the scenarios that are going to be compared (replacing GM-A by EM-D or 
keeping it on GM-A).  
4.1.1 Operational considerations: the operation parameters considered for the 
investment assessment are the energy consumption of the motors (natural gas for 
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GM-A and GM-B or electricity for EM-C and EM-D) and the CO2 emitted in the 
natural gas combustion.  
The operation scenario has been defined previously. To maximize the hypothetical 
benefits of the replacement, the proposal is not just to change the motors but to use 
electrical ones as the main equipment and leave the second natural gas motor (GM-B) 
as backup item. As a consequence, it is necessary to consider not just the energy 
savings of GM-A, but adding GM-B. In the assessment we have consider a 90% of 
operational savings in GM-B. 10% of the operation time is maintained, considering 
the hypothetical backup operation of the motor, and the time used for periodical 
maintenance start-ups. 
According to the previous consideration, CO2 emissions have been calculated 
estimating a total saving of GM-A emissions and a 90% of GM-B emissions.  
4.1.2 Maintenance considerations: maintenance costs have been simplified into two 
concepts to simplify the assessment. Firstly, the general maintenance costs which 
includes periodical preventive maintenance and standard corrective maintenance 
(derived from the average failure rate). Based on AHI value, asset condition is 
supposed to be under 5.5, so corrective standard costs are fixed during the lifecycle. 
Secondly, the overhaul, which includes the major maintenance if it is required. In this 
case, this overhaul is just necessary for NG motors, and this factor is going to be 
critical in the calculation of profitability. Overtaking or delaying overhauls has a 
direct impact in the costs of the lifecycle. 
4.1.3 Price considerations: To complete the analysis, it is necessary to take parameter 
prices as reference. All prices has been estimated with the recommendation of the 
specifics specialist departments of the company. However, for the business 
profitability calculation, parameters as CO2 ton or electricity has very variable prices 
and the margin of uncertainty is important. In this case, for the theoretical 
demonstration of the impact in the lifecycle, these prices have been considered fixed. 
The price used for electricity is 0,07€/kWh and for CO2 is 9,55€/Ton. The IRR 
calculation requires also use specific economical parameters. The three economic 
factors considered have been; the discount rate (25%), the increase of consumer price 
index (2%) and the investment amortization period (15 years) 
4.1.4 Investment considerations: To complete the comparison of the changing of the 
motor, it is necessary to include the costs needed for the installation of the new asset. 
In this concept are included all the costs; the asset, works necessaries for the 
installation, facility adaptation to new asset, engineering work hours, disassembly old 
equipment and control system modification. The value or these costs is 340k€.  
 
4.2 Calculation of Internal Rate of Return 
 
To approve investment proposals, companies requires a clear profitability value. The 
key performance indicator to assess this viability is the Internal Rate of Return. The 
value required depends on the company. In most cases, no investment is approved 
with values lower than 6% (a standard value of the Return Rate just for investing in 
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the bank). The higher the IRR, the greater the probability the investment was 
approved. 
To analyse the IRR, a standard spreadsheet has been used. Costs savings derived from 
the replacement of NG motor has been considered with positive value. In Table 10 
are detailed direct costs of operation and maintenance of GM-A which are going to be 
eliminated because of the replacement: 
Table X: Cost Savings; GM-A 
Concept Asset Value (k€) Periodicity 
Overhaul GM-A 140 25.000 h 
Maintenance GM-A 10 Annual 
Natural Gas GM-A 30 Annual 
CO2 emissions GM-A 1,83 Annual 
 
As it has been explained previously, it is also considered the savings derived from the 
operational change mode. It implies a 90% reduction of annual costs, and not taking 
into account a hypothetical overhaul of GM-B, because the operational hours will not 
reach 25.000 hours during the investment calculation. The detail is shown in Table 
11. 
Table XI: Cost Savings; GM-B 
Concept Asset Value (k€) Periodicity 
Overhaul GM-B 140 Not used 
Maintenance GM-B 9  Annual 
Natural Gas GM-B 27 Annual 
CO2 emissions GM-B 1,65 Annual 
 
New costs derived from the installation of the EM-D, has been considered in the 
spreadsheet with negative value and are detailed in Table 12. 
Table XII: Cost Increase 
Concept Asset Value (k€) Periodicity 
Overhaul EM EM-D 0 Not applied 
Maintenance EM-D 4 Annual 
Electricity EM-D 50 Annual 
 
4.2.1 Calculation without AHI: If the assessment was done without including AHI 
concept, the calculation was normal. The only singular point would be to estimate 
when is going to be the overhaul done. Assuming annual operation hours defined in 
the base case, there will be necessary just one overhaul during the lifecycle of the 
investment (15 years) which might be done in the fifth year of the cycle (according to 
the actual situation of the asset). Using standard data into the spreadsheet and with the 
considerations defined along the paper, the IRR will be 7.54%. Figure 8 represents a 
simplified image of the spreadsheet. It includes the first year (moment of the 
hypothetical investment), the second year (that is the example for the rest the years) 
and the year where the overhaul is going to be executed.  
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Figure 8. IRR spreadsheet without HI 
 
4.2.2 Calculation with AHI: When the assessment is done taking into account AHI, 
some key aspects change significantly. The curve that represents 𝐻𝐼!(Figure 7) 
demonstrate that the asset condition is worse than expected for current working hours. 
The factor that have more influence in the wear and tear is the healthy modifier. It 
results in major maintenance being advanced four years. Even a second overhaul 
must be done into the analysis period. With these data included in the spreadsheet 
(Figure 9), IRR changes significantly, increasing the value until 10,56%. 
 
 
Figure 9. IRR spreadsheet with HI 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The use of the methodology of AHI for the profitability calculation has had a deep 
impact. It has conditioned significantly the maintenance strategy during the lifecycle 
of the investment.  
It is not only the final 4% of difference in the IRR between the calculations without 
AHI against the one with AHI. The reason that make the investment more realistic, is 
the knowledge of the real status of the asset. This knowledge enables us to turn a 
subjective assessment of asset condition into a mathematical calculation  
The application of the methodology allows us to know that the operational mode of 
the Gas Motor has decreased significantly its lifecycle. Assuming the information 
given by the provider, it could be possible to reach 25.000 operation hours. And this 
scenario is not necessaryly wrong. The AHI allow us to determine the risk that it is 
being assumed by waiting until the overhaul. Or even if it is possible, to advance this 
major maintenance, ensuring that the asset condition is good enough.  
In a business profitability assessment, non-lineal costs are the values most difficult to 
estimate. Especially when the asset is reaching the end of the useful life, it is difficult 
to quantify the increase of the costs derived from the wear and tear. 
Finally, is also important to remark that one of the most valuable aspects of a semi 
quantitative methodology, is the knowledge management. In this paper all the 
parameters of the procedure (modifiers, factors…) are assumed. But the process of 
obtaining the necessary agreements by the specialist, implies to sharing the 
knowledge, and recording deliverables. For companies with specialists with more 
than 40 years of experience, this process helps to prepare better the future of the 
business.  
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Abstract 
 
The tendency of the power systems develops in a direction that a larger number of 
smaller and intermittent power generating sources are introduced to the power 
system. The objective of the work is to investigate the related changes of the power 
system reliability due to the weather parameters, e.g. river flow which depends on 
precipitation. The selected method is the conventional loss of load expectation. In 
addition, its upgrade is developed, which is directed in sense that the actual possible 
power of the power plant is considered at specific time points instead of 
consideration of the nominal power at all time points. Such a method allows 
distinction between the power plants, which operate as necessary according to the 
load diagram, and the power plants, which operate as the environmental conditions 
allow. The results show that the power system reliability changes with the time 
according to the load diagram and according to the variable power capacity in time. 
 
 
Keywords: power system, reliability, renewable sources. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The power systems include more and more smaller and intermittent power generating 
sources. The large conventional thermal power plants and the large nuclear power 
plants face difficulties at the open market of electrical energy, where the subsidies for 
the renewable sources are exceeding the amount, which would not cause significant 
consequences on the open market of electrical energy. The consequence of huge 
amount of money invested in terms of subsidies for renewable power plants causes 
the decrease of the price of electrical energy, which causes the closure of the less 
competitive power plants, which are mostly coal thermal power plants. If their 
replacement by the wind power plants, the solar power plants and the other means of 
renewable power is considered, some prerequisites needs to be evaluated and assured. 
The energy balance needs to be assured, the power flow needs to be determined 
according to the load flow diagram, the frequency control needs to be assured and the 
appropriate power reserve needs to be secured in order that the quality of electric 
energy is not reduced. The power system reliability is hidden within definition of the 
electric energy quality, which requires acceptably constant frequency, acceptable 
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shape of the voltage and the continuity of supply [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. In other words, 
the interruptions are not desired for continuity of supply and this is measured through 
several indicators, which all somehow contribute to the power system reliability [6].   
The objective of the work is to investigate the related changes of the power system 
reliability connected with the weather parameters (river flow as a consequence of 
precipitation, solar radiation and wind speed) through calculation of loss of load 
expectation. The focus is placed to the variability of hydro power, which can be later 
combined with the contribution of wind and solar power.  
The selected method is loss of load expectation together with its upgrades [7]. The 
upgrades of the original method were performed in several ways [8], [11], [14], [15], 
[16], [17], [18], [19]. The recursive algorithm for consideration of a large number of 
power plants in the system was developed [5]. Namely, the number of states increases 
significantly K=2n with the number of power plants considered. So an advanced 
algorithm was developed, which can deal with the problem of large number of states. 
It is a recursive algorithm, which deals one plant at a time adding it to the model [5], 
[16]. In addition, attempts were made for ranking of the most important generating 
sources based on the reliability measures [1], [12]. 
 
2 Methods 
 
The loss of load expectation (LOLE) is a method, which was developed for 
evaluation of the reserve in the power system in order to assure the required level of 
the static power system reliability. The method evaluates the expected time duration 
when the load is not being supplied with the required power capacity [7].  
The probabilities of states of generating power plants are analysed in sense of the 
combinations where the generating power plants are considered one by one as 
available or unavailable with the respect to others [8], [9], [10]. The model of daily or 
monthly, or yearly load diagram is used to determine the number of hours of expected 
power production capacity shortages during the period considered, e.g. one day, one 
month or one year.  
The mathematical model of the method is described in literature [5], [7], [11].  
The basic equation representing the straightforward calculation of LOLE summarizes 
probabilities of state k, p(k), multiplied with the time durations of loss of capacity of 
state k, tloss(k), for the number of all states, K, where k is the index of specific 
considered state. 𝐿𝑂𝐿𝐸 = 𝑝(𝑘) ∙ 𝑡!"##(𝑘)!!!! 	 	(1)	 	
The probability of each specific state (k) is determined based on the probabilities of 
each particular generating power plant. The generating capacity can be available or 
not available. The number of all power plants is represented by the number n. The 
number of available ones in specific state is the number n1 and the number of 
unavailable ones in specific state is n2. The probability of each specific state k is the 
product of availabilities of the available power plants and unavailabilities of the 
unavailable plants. The parameter a(r) means the availability of plant r and the 
parameter 1-a(s) means unavailability of plant s, calculated as the complement of its 
availability. 
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𝑝(𝑘) = 𝑎(𝑟) ∙ (1− 𝑎 𝑠)!!!!!!!!!! 	 (2)	 	
Forced outage rate, which is normally available for most of the plants, represents the 
unavailability of the plant. 
Table 1 shows an example calculation of LOLE, where three power plants are 
considered. The nominal power of the first is 40 MW and it is 30 MW and 10 MW 
for the second and the third, respectively. Daily load diagram is represented by the 
curve and indicates the constant power of 55 MW in the first hour and 35 MW for the 
next 11 hours and 20 MW for the rest of the time, which represents the last 12 hours 
of one day.  
For state 1 (k=1), all the units A, B and C are in operation, which means that the 
power system capacity in service equals to 80 MW. None of the plants is unavailable, 
thus the power capacity of power plants which do not operate is 0 MW, or the 
capacity lost is 0 MW. The probability of state 1 is the product of three specific plant 
availabilities (0.9·0.95·0.96=0.8208). The power of the capacity in service (80 MW) 
is larger than the load in the load diagram for all the time considered (24 hours), so 
the time duration of the loss of capacity where this would not be true, is tloss = 0.  
In state 2, the plants A and B are operable and the plant C is not operable. The power 
capacity of the power system is 70 MW. The power capacity lost is 10 MW, because 
the plant C with this power is the only one not available. The power of the capacity in 
service (70 MW) is larger than the load in the load diagram for all the time considered 
(24 hours), so the time duration of the loss of capacity where this would not be true, is 
tloss = 0. 
In such a way, all the rows of the capacity table are filled up. 
In state 7, only the plant C is considered operable, so the power capacity in service is 
10 MW. The capacity lost is 70 MW as this is the sum of power capacity of both 
power plants A and B, which do not operate. In this state, the load is all the time 
larger than 10 MW and the power capacity is insufficient for 24 hours, thus Tloss = 
24 hours. 
Table 1: Example calculation of LOLE 
State Unit A Unit B Unit C Capacity  lost 
Capacity  
in service  
Probability of each  
capacity state p(k) 
tloss(k) 
(h)   k 40 MW 30 MW 10 MW (MW) (MW) 
		 a(A)= 
=0.9 
a(B)= 
=0.95 
a(C)= 
=0.96 
		 		
1 1 1 1 0 80 0.9·0.95·0.96=0.8208 0.8208 0 0 
2 1 1 0 10 70 0.90·0.95·0.04=0.0342 0.0342 0 0 
3 1 0 1 30 50 0.90·0.05·0.96=0.0432 0.0432 1 0.0432 
4 0 1 1 40 40 0.10·0.95·0.96=0.0912 0.0912 1 0.0912 
5 1 0 0 40 40 0.90·0.05·0.04=0.0018 0.0018 1 0.0018 
6 0 1 0 50 30 0.10·0.95·0.04=0.0038 0.0038 12 0.0456 
7 0 0 1 70 10 0.10·0.05·0.96=0.0048 0.0048 24 0.1152 
8 0 0 0 80 0 0.01·0.05·0.04=0.0002 0.0002 24 0.0048 
	    	
	 	
LOLE	(hours/day)=	0.3018 
 
Figure 1 shows the load diagram for the example calculation. 
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Figure 1: Example calculation of LOLE 
The method was improved in sense that the static calculation of LOLE is made more 
dynamic by considering the actual power of the power plants, which power depends 
on the weather parameters, instead of the nominal power through all the time 
considered. In each time interval, the evaluation was performed by considering actual 
power of the power plants. The supporting computer code was developed, which can 
consider static LOLE or its upgraded evaluation, where in every hour (or an instance 
of an hour) the changes of the power generating capacities are considered. It allows 
consideration of the actual power changed in time instead of considering the nominal 
power as a constant. Figure 2 shows an example variability of the generating capacity 
variability in the selected power system, which can be considered by the developed 
computer code. The variability depends on the weather parameters, which mean 
variability of the river flow dependent on precipitation and other weather parameters. 
 
 
Figure 2: Example variability of generating capacity variability in the selected power system 
 
3 Analysis and Results 
 
Example includes power system with 77 power plants and suits the real regional 
power system. Table 2 shows a part of the plant data: plant identification, its nominal 
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power and its forced outage rate (FOR). Figure 3 shows the load diagram, which is 
ordered by the load required by the power system and not by the running time. 
Table 2: Example plant data (part of the complete table) 
Plant  
Identification 
Power  
(MW) FOR 
Plant  
Identification 
Power  
(MW) FOR 
Plant  
Identification 
Power  
(MW) FOR 
NEK 696 0.01 HEDEMOŽB1 24.4 0.01 HESELMAV2 19 0.01 
TEŠ6 544 0.08 HEDEMOŽB2 24.4 0.01 HESELMED1 12.5 0.01 
TEŠ5 316 0.09 HEDEMOŽB3 24.4 0.01 HESELMED2 12.5 0.01 
 
Figure 4 shows the results. Loss of load expectation is calculated for every time point 
considering the real power plant power in the particular time point instead of the 
nominal power. Dotted line shows the average loss of load expectation, while the full 
line shows its values evaluated in all the time points. Normally, if the capacity of the 
power plants in the system is smaller, the loss of load expectation is larger and thus 
the power system reliability is smaller. The results show that the most of the time, the 
loss of load expectation is small enough. If its value is less than couple of hours per 
year, the reliability of the power system is sufficient. Namely, the reliability 
guidelines in some countries are determined considering the quantitative value of the 
loss of load expectation. 
The results presented on figure are expected because the selected power system has a 
large reserve power. The peak load is 2660 MW and the theoretical power capacity of 
the system is 4818 MW. 
With less reserve power, the loss of load expectation can increase significantly if 
some power capacity is not available. 
 
 
Figure 3: Load diagram for the selected power system 
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Figure 4: Calculated LOLE for the selected power system 
Figure 5 shows the results of the similar power system with some plants less and with 
total capacity of the system 4120 MW. The peak load is the same as for the initial 
example system and it is 2660 MW. The calculated loss of load expectation is 
significantly higher and consequently the power system reliability is significantly 
lower. For a notable time of the year its reliability is even not within the guidelines 
(less than 2.4 hours per year for example guidelines, or less than 10 hours per year for 
other example guidelines). 
 
 
Figure 5: Calculated LOLE for the selected power system 
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If the conventional power plants are replaced with renewables, the average reserve 
power may decrease and the system reliability may decrease, which needs to be 
considered at the power system planning. 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The objective of the work is to investigate the related changes of the power system 
reliability due to the weather parameters, e.g. river flow which depends on 
precipitation. The computer code was prepared to evaluate the upgraded loss of load 
expectation method, which facilitates the calculation of the load of load expectation 
for various time points, where the actual power of the power plants is considered in 
specific time intervals together with the yearly load diagram and together with the 
plant reliability data. 
The example was selected as a case study and the data of the regional power system 
with 77 power plants was considered for evaluation. The results show good reliability 
of the power system, because the power reserve in this system is large. If the reserve 
is decreasing, the reliability can decrease significantly. This needs to be considered 
when the changes in the power system are made, specially, in the case of shutting 
down large power plants, which can operate all the time on nominal power and 
adding more intermittent power plants with theoretically large nominal power, which 
can be relatively difficult to be reached for a notable percentage of the year. 
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Abstract 
 
Natural threats have become more familiar, to the extent that requires ensuring the 
resilience of critical infrastructures. Critical infrastructures have always been 
complicated to study and assess, as they are all characterized by a collection of 
components that have numerous dependencies and interactions. Recently, several 
methods and frameworks have been put forward to assess and analyse 
comprehensively system's resilience. However, these methods have insufficiencies in 
identifying some hidden risks arising in a complex infrastructure. Therefore, it is 
essential to go beyond conventional methods and to develop risk strategies and 
decision-making techniques in order to overcome classical static assessment methods. 
This paper contributes to analyse the context of critical infrastructures with the 
ultimate objective of proposing new methods of choosing preventive maintenance 
strategies. It represents a modelling approach based on Petri nets to study the 
dynamic behaviour of the system when exposed to deterioration mechanisms and to 
support maintenance decision-making. The application is carried out on torrential 
checkdams in which the model results are presented and discussed in the paper. 
 
 
Keywords: Critical infrastructures, degradation modelling, preventive maintenance, 
decision-making, Petri nets, checkdams. 	
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Recently, societies have become more and more reliant on infrastructures which 
constitute a network of man-made systems that delivers permanently and 
cooperatively major benefits, supplies, and services (e.g. electric power, 
telecommunication, transportation, water supply). Infrastructures are important for 
enhancing social environment and for economic prosperity. However, the complexity 
and interdependency of these infrastructures have turned them into a critical system-
of-systems [1].  
 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are usually exposed to various types of threats (technical, 
natural, man-made attacks, etc.) which cause them damage. Consequently, the 
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destruction or weakness of CIs may foster the risk due to the resulted impact on the 
economy, safety, and society as a whole [2]. Hence, analysing their reliability and 
safety but also choosing the best maintenance strategy is very essential. The internal 
or external interdependencies of CIs might also trigger risk such as the risk of 
cascading failures [3]. In other words, an initial failure of a CI which has 
dependencies with other CIs can result in disastrous proportions across the whole 
system. This reveals that interdependency increases the complexity of the system of 
CIs [4]. Nevertheless, not all infrastructures are considered to be critical. They can be 
classified based on a criticality scale which is identified after assessing the impact of 
the infrastructure disruption [5]. 
 
Another kind of CIs is linked to protection works against natural phenomena. 
Protection structures in the mountainous regions (e.g. Alpine) seek to fight against 
natural hazards generated in these areas. Torrents, avalanches, landslides, and other 
mountainous natural phenomenon are mostly caused by a gravitational and rapid 
movement of complex mixtures of fluids and solids [6]. According to the intensity of 
each natural phenomenon, several damages may arise. The impact can be expressed 
by the extent of the area that has been destructed, number of people affected, 
materials and assets disrupted (buildings, roads, infrastructures, etc.), financial 
damages, and the recovery rate of the resulted deterioration. 
 
Due to the fact that torrential protection works (checkdams, sedimentation dams, 
levees, etc.) aim in preventing or mitigating the risk and thus protect people and 
assets from the imposed danger resulting from the natural phenomena, deep attention 
has been given to them. Unfortunately, protection works age, deteriorate, and may be 
damaged overtime when exposed to hazards. Their deterioration will influence their 
level of performance and thus will affect the possibility of reducing risk as much as it 
should be reduced. Moreover, these structures are interdependent in which a failure of 
a certain component (one structure) of the system (series of protection works) can 
lead to the perturbation of other components within the same system. Also, certain 
type of failure in one component may trigger another type of failure in the same 
component. All of the previous aspects lead to the conclusion that protection works 
are complex structures and can be considered as CIs. Checkdams are the most used 
torrential protection works in France. They represent around 14,000 civil engineering 
protection works in the French state forests [7].   
 
To better understand the ability of protection structures in preventing damage, 
mitigating losses, and to be restored after an event requires mainly resilience analysis 
[8]. The term resilience refers to the ability of a system to withstand and adapt 
unfavourable events and its capacity to be recovered after being influenced due to 
such situations. Resilience analysis will give a comprehensive knowledge regarding 
the performance of these structures during and after the occurrence of hazards. 
Researchers have suggested several methods for quantifying resilience. Some 
researchers have concentrated on modeling the restoration of critical structures 
especially for bridge [9] and railway track [10] asset management hoping to improve 
their resilience.  
 
Due to the fact that the system can be repaired following different maintenance 
strategies, decision-aiding models can help to choose the most preferable strategy. 
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These models analyse the behavior of the system over its lifetime period while being 
deteriorated or repaired. Such decision-aiding models can be implemented and 
assessed using Petri nets modeling tools and Monte Carlo simulation, which allow 
choosing between several maintenance strategies based on degraded-state conditions.  
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the methodology used to 
implement the desired model; Section 3 presents the modelling approach which 
models the behaviour of the system from one state to another; Section 4 considers a 
case study applied on check dams after identifying the possible failure modes and 
maintenance strategies; Finally, section 5 provides results coming from the simulation 
of the model.  
 
 
2. Methodology Used: Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs) 
 
Petri nets (PNs) are dynamic models used in modelling the behaviour of a system 
(e.g. failure, repair, etc.) and in dependability calculations [11]. They present a 
graphical and mathematical tool for modelling complex systems and their evolution 
over time. Carl Adam Petri was the German who invented the graphics and the rules 
of PNs in the 1962 to be used in automation systems [12]. PNs allow analysing the 
dynamic behaviour of the system by modelling the transitions between its different 
states. Following their invention, PNs were developed by going far from traditional 
analytical approaches and using Monte Carlo simulation instead. In addition, the use 
of stochastic transitions has proven its efficiency for dependability (reliability, 
availability, and maintainability) analysis and for system safety [13]. 
 
Recently, SPNs are used to model complex systems, mainly the deterioration of 
critical infrastructures, such as railway networks [14]. SPNs are particularly well 
suited to model the evolution of the system while changing from one state to another 
and are able to compute the time spent by the system in each state and the number of 
each type of intervention that was carried out based on Monte Carlo simulation [15]. 
They can therefore extend and complement existing methods providing static 
effectiveness assessment [16].  
  
PNs are a collection of four main elements. Places represent a condition and reflect 
the state of the system and are symbolized by circles. Transitions are symbolized by 
rectangles and correspond to events that cause a change of state in the system. The 
state of the system is characterized by marking places with tokens. Arcs are arrows 
that connect a place to a transition or a transition to a place only. They are associated 
with multiplicities which are responsible for the operation of the PN. If an arc does 
not indicate any multiplicity, the value will be one by default.  
 
Once the PN model is constructed and the lifetime period tf of the system is 
identified, Monte-Carlo simulation starts and the tokens will keep on moving around 
the model until tf  is reached. The movement of tokens is governed by the following 
rules: 
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1. When the number of tokens in each input place of a transition is at least equal to 
the multiplicity of the arcs connecting each, the transition is enabled and will be 
fired after a specified transition firing time.  
2. When a transition is fired, a number of tokens equal to the multiplicity of the 
arc is removed from the input places, and added to the output places.  
 
An additional characteristic of PNs is the inhibitor arc. This arc is represented by a 
dotted arrow and can be only directed from a place to a transition. Its aim is to inhibit 
the firing of the transition which it is connected to when its multiplicity is equal to the 
number of tokens located in its input place. 
 
 
 
   Figure 1: Simple PN showing the transition firing process. 
 
 
A simple PN is illustrated in Figure 1. P1 and P2 are both marked with a number of 
tokens satisfying the rule of enabling a transition. Therefore, T1 is enabled. After time 
t, T1 is fired in which 1 token (multiplicity = 1) is removed from P1, 2 tokens 
(multiplicity = 2) is removed from P2, and 1 token (multiplicity = 1) is added to the 
output place P3.    
    
 
3. SPN Modelling and Assessment Framework for a Deteriorating 
Structure 
 
In this section, a general modelling framework using SPN is presented. The aim is to 
represent the evolution of the state of a CI when exposed to degradation mechanisms 
or to maintenance operations and then to support decision-making by comparing 
different maintenance strategies.  
 
3.1 Degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes 
 
The modelling of the degradation process is illustrated in Figure 2 [17]. P1-P4 
represents the four degraded states which are linked by stochastic transitions T1-T3 
associated with exponential distribution firing times assumed and judged by an 
expert. In order to detect the state of the system, inspection must be carried out 
periodically. At t=0, a token is added to P1 (initial state) and to P5 waiting for T5 to 
fire so that the token moves to P6 where inspection takes place. In this study, 
inspection is scheduled every year. After the firing of one of the immediate transitions 
T6-T8, the condition of the system is revealed where a token appears in one of the 
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places P7-P9. In this case, the respective maintenance operation begins and after a 
specific time needed for reparation, T9, T10, or T11 fires depending on the condition 
revealed and the system returns back to its initial state waiting for another inspection. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A basic PN model showing the degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes [17]. 
 
  
3.2 Decision-making support 
 
In order to make a decision and choose between the different possible maintenance 
operations, inhibitor arcs should be added to the model. The presence of a token in 
P10 or in P11 inhibits respectively maintenance operation 1 or maintenance operation 
2 from being carried out over the lifetime period of the system.  
 
After implementing each strategy, the results provided after Monte Carlo simulation 
reveals the time spent by the system in each state (sojourn time) and the number of 
maintenance operations performed within the lifetime period of the system. These 
outputs allow comparing between the different maintenance strategies in terms of 
time and cost. 
 
 
4. Application to Checkdams 
 
Checkdams, like any other protection structures, are constructed to perform certain 
functions.  Their major functions involve bed stabilization, bed elevation and slope 
reduction, retention of sediment deposits, flow centring, and prevention of 
longitudinal erosion. However, due to their age, wear and tear, and the intensity of the 
phenomenon that they must resist, different kinds of pathologies may appear affecting 
their performance level. The assessment of the efficacy of protection structures to 
reduce risk is based on three components: structural, functional, and economical 
efficacy [16]. To limit their degradation, these structures should be inspected and 
maintained regularly. Besides, in order to choose a suitable maintenance strategy, it is 
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important to have a comprehensive knowledge on the types of failures that 
checkdams may be subjected to.  
 
It is also essential to differentiate between functional and structural failures. This is 
due to the fact that the structure may be stable from a structural point of view but is 
not fulfilling a certain function. On the other hand, the structure may have some bad 
structural properties but is still fulfilling its functions.  Structural failures are linked to 
the external (e.g. sliding, overturning, etc.) and internal (e.g. reinforcement, material 
strength, etc.) stability of the structure.  Functional failures includes the phenomena 
of lateral bypass in which the dam is no more able to release the flow from its 
hydraulic section and the phenomena of scouring where intense clear water flow 
removes the soil under the base of the dam’s foundation.  
 
The present study aims to prove the ability of SPN models in choosing between 
different maintenance strategies to be applied on checkdams highlighting on some 
aspects such as time, cost, and efficiency. The application presented below aims to 
study the stability of a checkdam when exposed to scouring. Figure 3, represents the 
different possible functional (FS) and structural (SS) states of the dam depending on 
the increase level of scouring under the foundation.   
 
 
 
       Figure 3. State-degradation due to scouring under the foundation of a checkdam. 
      
       
In this paper, the functional and structural degradations are modelled separately 
without taking into account the dependencies and interactions between both failures.  
 
4.1 Evaluation of functional degradation states 
 
In this section, the SPN model describes the behaviour of the checkdam when 
exposed to functional failure. The different functional states are presented assuming 
that the system is stable from a structural point of view. Four stability states were 
defined as shown in Figure 4. Regarding maintenance operations: minor maintenance 
can be applied when the slight deterioration can be easily repaired (SS1, FS2), major 
maintenance is needed in order to repair the serious degradation level that the 
structure has reached (SS1, FS3), and corrective maintenance is required when the 
structure completely fails and should be replaced (SS1, FS4). 
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Thus the structural state is fixed to SS1 and four functional states are defined FS1, 
FS2, FS3, and FS4 corresponding to an increased level in scouring. When the system 
is not in its initial state, minor, major, or corrective (replacement) maintenance 
operations are to be carried out. 
 
In addition, the system can only be maintained by three minor operations and two 
major operations before replacing the system with a new one. This is illustrated by 
the presence of P12 and P13 (Figure 4) linked with inhibitor arcs with respective 
multiplicities 3 and 2. Meaning that when 3 tokens appear in P12, minor operations 
are inhibited and when 2 tokens appear in P13, major operations are inhibited. 
However, after each replacement, P12 and P13 should be emptied from tokens in 
order to enable again minor and major operations. This function is included within the 
properties of T11 (reset transition) in which upon firing, it removes all the tokens in 
P12 and P13. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. SPN model showing the functional degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes 
(improved and adapted version of [17]). 
 
 
The input data needed to run this model are the firing delay times associated with 
each transition. In this study, no historical data are available, therefore these data are 
assumed and assessed by experts in the field of checkdams and presented in Table I 
and Table II. 
 
Four different strategies are identified. In strategy 1, reparation is done as soon as the 
condition revealed after inspection does not correspond to the new state. In strategy 2, 
a token is added to P10 which inhibits minor operations. In strategy 3, a token is 
added to P11, thus major operations are inhibited. In strategy 4, P10 and P11 are 
marked with tokens meaning that only corrective maintenance can be carried out. 
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4.1 Evaluation of structural degradation states 
 
In this section, the SPN model describes the behaviour of the checkdam when 
exposed to structural failure. The different structural states are presented assuming 
that the system is fixed to a functional state FS3 where scouring already exists. Four 
structural states are defined SS1, SS2, SS3, and SS4. The structural state of the dam 
degrades in which the dam will start to tilt until it finally overturns when scouring 
reaches a critical level. Scouring level can be used as an indicator to describe the 
behaviour of the checkdam from structural point of view. The four different stability 
states are represented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. SPN model showing the structural degradation, inspection, and maintenance processes    
(improved and adapted version of [17]). 
 
 
Regarding maintenance operations: major maintenance can be applied by reinforcing 
the checkdam to avoid its failure by overturning after reaching state (SS3, FS3) and 
corrective maintenance is required when the structure completely fails and should be 
replaced (SS4, FS3). In state (SS2, FS3), the checkdam is subjected to mild tilting in 
which no need for a maintenance operation to be carried out at this stage. Moreover, 
Figure 5 reveals that only two major operations can be carried out before the 
Transition Exponential Failure rate λ (years-1) 
T1 0.5 
T2 0.1 
T3 0.033 
Table I: Failure rates of degraded-states 
transitions. 
Transition Firing time (years) 
T4 T6 T7 T8 0 
T5 1 
T9 0.013 
T10 0.022 
T11 0.041 
Table II: Constant transitions firing times. 
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replacement of the system. The firing delay times corresponding to structural 
deterioration are estimated by an expert and given in Table III and Table IV. 
 
 
Table III: Failure rates of degraded-states 
transitions. 
Transition Exponential Failure rate λ (years-1) 
T1 0.5 
T2 0.25 
T3 0.5 
Table IV: Constant transitions firing times. 
Transition Firing time (years) 
T4 T7 T8 0 
T5 1 
T10 0.082 
T11 0.33 
 
 
For structural degradation, two maintenance strategies are suggested. In strategy 1, 
reparation is done when the system reaches state (SS3, FS3). In strategy 2, P11 is 
marked with a token in which only corrective maintenance can be carried out. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
The SPN models are constructed using GRIF-Workshop developed by TOTAL. The 
simulation of the previous models is based on Monte-Carlo simulation. After each 
simulation, the mean sojourn time in each state and the number of maintenance 
operations carried out during the lifetime period of the system will be given. The 
model is simulated over a period of 100 years. It is noticed that convergence in results 
occurs after 200 simulations.  Tables V - VIII provide all the results obtained after the 
simulation of the different strategies applied for functional and structural degradation 
over a period of 100 years.  
 
Table VI reveals the effect of each maintenance strategy on the mean sojourn time. It 
is noticed that the longest sojourn time in the initial state (21 years) occurs by 
performing strategy 1. This is due to the fact that the system is repaired as soon as it 
degrades further from the initial state. For strategy 2, minor operations are inhibited, 
thus the system will remain in a degraded state for a long time. This is the reason 
behind the decrease in the sojourn time in the initial state (11 years) when applying 
strategy 2. 
 
 
     Table V: Average expected number of interventions - functional degradation. 
Strategy Minor Maintenance Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance 
1 6 3 1 
2 0 4 1 
3 7 0 2 
4 0 0 3 
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     Table VI: Average expected sojourn time (years) – functional degradation. 
Strategy (SS1, FS1) (SS1, FS2) (SS1, FS3) (SS1, FS4) 
1 21 46 32 0 
2 11 53 35 1 
3 20 24 55 1 
4 6 28 65 1 
 
 
     Table VII: Average expected number of interventions – structural degradation. 
Strategy Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance 
1 8 5 
2 0 11 
 
 
     Table VIII: Average expected sojourn time (years) – structural degradation. 
Strategy (SS1, FS3) (SS2, FS3) (SS3, FS3) (SS4, FS3) 
1 30 56 11 2 
2 25 46 22 6 
 
 
In Table VIII, it is also clear that when major maintenance is inhibited, the sojourn 
time of the system in the initial state (SS1, FS3) will be less than that when 
maintenance is applied directly if the system degrades to state (SS3, FS3). The results 
obtained in Table V and Table VII, allow comparing the different strategies in terms 
of cost. It is assumed that for functional degradation, the cost of minor maintenance, 
major maintenance and corrective maintenance are 5 000 €, 15 000 €, and 45 000 € 
respectively. For structural degradation, it is assumed that the cost of major 
maintenance and corrective maintenance are 60 000 € and 150 000 € respectively. 
 
Knowing the cost of each type of operation and using the data in Table V and Table 
VII, the total cost of each strategy can be computed. The results are given in Table IX 
and Table X. It can be seen that for functional degradation, strategy 4 is the most 
expensive because of the huge number of corrective maintenance to be done (3 
replacements). Strategy 2 has the lowest cost since the system is allowed to 
deteriorate before being maintained with minor operations.  
 
 
Table IX: Total maintenance cost (€) for each strategy – functional degradation. 
Strategy Minor Maintenance Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Total Cost 
1 30 000 45 000 45 000 120 000 
2 0 60 000 45 000 105 000 
3 35 000 0 90 000 125 000 
4 0  0 135 000 135 000 
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Table X: Total maintenance cost (€) for each strategy – structural degradation. 
Strategy Major Maintenance Corrective Maintenance Total Cost 
1 480 000 750 000 1 230 000 
2 0 1 650 000 1 650 000 
 
 
Similarly, for structural degradation, strategy 2 is more expensive than strategy 1 due 
to the large number of corrective maintenance operations. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 This paper addresses the development of a decision-aiding method regarding 
resilience and maintenance of CIs. The main objective is to go beyond traditional 
safety and reliability techniques for efficacy and resilience assessment. Based on the 
results, SPN approach, combining Monte Carlo simulation and state-based modelling 
technique has proved to be favourable and can be an appropriate tool to be used later 
for 1) analysing the interdependencies among CIs and 2) choosing the best operating 
strategies. The limitations in this study include modelling the system without taking 
into account the dynamic interactions between the different failure modes that may 
occur on the structure and how an event may foster the occurrence of another event 
(accident sequence). Calculations are based on expert assumptions and further works 
are needed to improve and determine modelling hypothesis (e.g. failure rates). 
Furthermore, acquiring reliable results in the domain of resilience and preventive 
maintenance is not easy due to a number of barriers such as information imperfection 
and the absence of real historical data. This study will be developed by taking into 
consideration interdependencies which increase the risk of failure. The strong reliance 
on CIs points out that it is a priority to assure their safety and availability. 
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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to present the concept of the complex engineered systems 
resilience assessment in the case of disruptive events occurrence. Firstly, the basics 
of service dominant approach will be discussed, and then the concept of 
operationality related attributes of engineered systems will be presented. Finally,  the 
structure of a general dependability model has been proposed, which consists of four 
partial models, namely: availability, safety, security, and resilience ones. On this 
basis, using the service continuity oriented approach, the quantitative model of 
complex engineered systems resilience will be proposed. For quantitative evaluation 
of the complex systems resilience to a disruption risk we propose the resilience metric 
- a collective term described by four main indicators: absorbability, recoverability, 
adaptability and disruptive event impact. 
Keywords: resilience, modelling, service engineering, continuity, complex systems 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally the term resilience means the tendency or ability to spring back, and 
thus the ability of a body to recover its normal size and shape after being pushed or 
pulled out of shape, and general any ability to recover to normality after a 
disturbance. It means being able to withstand shocks and deviations from the intended 
state and go back to a desirable or acceptable state. The function of a complex 
engineered system is to generate results in line with the goals and objectives of the 
system, regardless of the state of the system and its environment. In practice, the 
function of production systems is the effective and efficient production of certain 
products, whereas service systems come down to providing services in accordance 
with the requirements of the customers at prices favourable to both sides. Therefore, 
resilience for complex engineered systems can be generally defined as the ability to 
deliver, maintain and improve service when facing threats and evolutionary changes.  
A limitation of maximum tolerable disturbance measures is that we may well be 
interested in characterizing how well a system under consideration rebounds from 
smaller disturbances. For instance, given a form of fault tolerance that allows for 
some degradation of service, we may then want to measure not only how far the 
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system can be pushed before failing altogether, but also the relationship between the 
size of disturbances and the degradation of performance. Since for most systems of 
interest the resilient behaviour is non-deterministic in practice, we are no longer 
interested in whether the system will rebound from a disturbance but in the 
probability of it successfully rebounding (survive) and the distribution of the time 
needed for the system to return to a desired state (recover). Thus in the area of 
dependable computing we talk about the ‘coverage’ factor of a fault-tolerant 
mechanism, and we can talk about the distribution of the latency (time to detection) 
of a component fault or data error (Avisienis et al. 2004). 
A concern in the resilience engineering literature is that measures of outcomes may 
lack predictive power: success in the past is no guarantee of success in the future. 
Thus, a search for leading indicators that can be used to assess future resilience is 
difficult because of the multidimensionality of resilience. Westrum (2006) writes: 
“Resilience is a family of related ideas, not a single thing. The various situations that 
we have sketched offer different levels of challenge, and may well be met by different 
organizational mechanisms. A resilient organization under Situation I will not 
necessarily be resilient under Situation II (these situations are defined as having 
different degrees of predictability). Similarly, because an organization is good at 
recovery, this does not mean that the organization is good at foresight”. 
Although the ideas of vulnerability and resilience have been introduced relatively 
recently, they have already been examined in many serious studies, both theoretical 
and practical, in the area of engineered systems (e.g.: Aven 2011; Dekker et al. 2008; 
Holling et al. 2006; Kröger and Zio 2011; Francis and Bekera 2014; Park et al. 2013; 
Sheffi 2007) . Also in the area of service engineering and logistics a significant 
number of interesting works have been published (e.g.: Christopher and Peck 2004; 
Pettit et al. 2013; Peck 2006; Waters 2007). However, engineered systems as well as 
production and service processes within these systems are closely related to the 
human factor, the environment and cybernetic systems. Increasingly interconnected 
social, technical and economic networks create large complex engineered systems in 
a globalized society, and resilience assessment of many individual subsystems 
becomes more and more complicated, or even impossible. Thus, there is an urgent 
need for a comprehensive and holistic approach to the problem of ensuring resilience 
of complex engineered systems. This approach requires crossing the boundaries of 
particular disciplines, and therefore the application of transdisciplinary perspectives. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a general resilience model for complex 
engineered systems which is based on the service continuity oriented approach.  For 
this purpose, a review of the literature from the service engineering perspective was 
carried out, and on this basis the concept of service continuity approach was 
developed to perform quantitative evaluation of the vulnerability and resilience of 
complex engineered systems to a disruption risk.  
2. Fundamentals of service dominant approach 
A service can be described as: all intangible effects resulting from a client interaction 
that creates and captures value (ERISS, 2016). Currently, services combine both 
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products and services, and the distinction between the two is fuzzy and vague. 
Services are offered by a provider to its consumers. Baida et al. (2004) defined 
business services as activities delivered by a service provider to a service consumer to 
create a value for the consumer. Business services are typically discovered and 
invoked manually, but their realization may be performed by automated or manual 
means. Services lack of concrete characteristics. Thus, services must be defined 
indirectly in terms of the effects they have on consumers. This makes the description 
of services one of the most important undertakings for the future.  
Service knowledge is an area of expertise which involves: business, management, 
industrial engineering, information and communication technology (ICT), socio-legal 
sciences, and economics. Service science has developed in response to the need to 
combine technological and non-technological innovations in a rapidly growing and 
changing environment. The discipline focuses on the innovative creation of value by 
using various transdisciplinary approaches. A service-dominant approach is starting 
to take over from the traditional goods-dominant approach. Main key factors of the 
service-dominant approach include:  
• the realization of a service as a process, 
• a focus on dynamic resources, 
• outsourcing and globalization, 
• complex interdependences between elements. 
Service science, management, and engineering (SSME) is a term introduced by IBM 
to describe service science, an interdisciplinary approach to the study, design, and 
implementation of service complex systems in which specific arrangements of people 
and technologies take actions that provide value for others. SSME has been defined as 
the application of science, management, and engineering disciplines to tasks that one 
organization beneficially performs for and with another (Sampson 2010). A Service 
System is a term that frequently appears in the service management, service 
operations, services marketing, service design, and service engineering literatures 
(Salvendy and Karwowski 2010). Service involves both a provider and a client 
working together to create value. These relationships and dependencies can be viewed 
as a complex system in which the parts interact with each other in a non-linear 
manner, and which have emergent properties. In many cases, the main source of 
complexity in a service system is its people: the client, the provider, or other 
organizations.  
Service engineering is a new methodology to the analysis, design and implementation 
of service-based ecosystems in which organizations and IT provide value for others in 
the form of services. Service Engineering not only provides methodologies to handle 
the increased complexity of numerous business actors and their value exchanges, but 
also provides tools for constructing and deploying services that merge the IT and 
business perspectives (Cardoso et al. 2009). Service Engineering is a structured 
approach for describing a part of an organization from a service perspective that 
expresses the way the organization works (Salvendy and Karwowski 2010). It 
provides a discipline for using models and techniques to guide the understanding, 
structure, design, implementation, deployment, documentation, operation, 
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maintenance and modification of typical services as well as e-services. This approach 
should systematically translate an initial description from a natural language that 
expresses the way stakeholders think and communicate about the organization 
through a sequence of representations using various models to a representation that is 
accepted and understood by all the participants of the system.  
The fast-growing discipline of service engineering is related to service economy 
growth and the global need for innovation, developing and implementing of different 
kinds of services (Sampson 2010). Often the biggest problem lies in bridging the gap 
between business and IT. This challenge requires a set of design principles, 
patterns, and techniques that currently have not been identified precisely enough. 
Therefore, the Internet of Services cannot be realized without giving a strong 
emphasis on both the business as well as the technological side of services. 
The Unified Service Theory (UST) developed by Scott E. Sampson could serve as 
theoretical background for building the general model of Service Engineering. The 
basis for a UST is the assumption that: “Services are production processes wherein 
each customer supplies one or more input components for that customer’s unit of 
production” (Sampson 2010). The concept of a process is defined in standards (e.g. 
EN ISO 9000:2015 and EN ISO 9001:2015) and in professional literature in a variety 
of ways. On the basis of considerations made in previous sections, it is proposed to 
adopt two types of process definitions. The first one was based on the systems theory 
ST system definition. It is of formal nature and reads as follows: A process is a 
system whose elements are events and activities connected by flow relations. 
Events are a change in the state of the system or its environment which can initiate the 
start of a process, interfere with it causing errors and pauses or end it when the 
desired outcome is achieved. Activities are understood as intentionally designed and 
implemented actions. We divide them into: 
• Operations, which apply to individual activities, 
• Tasks, understood as sequences of activities or operations performed by the 
same ‘actor’ on the same object, and 
• Decisions, which are choices, as a result of which the process can branch into 
two or more paths. 
Flows are relations that consist in the movement of goods (transport) and information 
(communication). The process structure can be described in the form of a PS graph as 
following (Bukowski 2019): 
    𝑃𝑆 ⊂ (𝐸,𝐴,𝑅)      (1) 
where: E - process initiating, disturbing and terminating events, 
 A – activities (operations, tasks, decisions), 
 R - relations between events and flow relations. 
The components of the structure can be set up in the following form: 
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𝐸 = (𝑒!: 𝑖 = 1,2,3,… , 𝑙)    (2) 𝐴 = (𝑎!: 𝑗 = 1,2,3,… ,𝑚)    (3) 𝑅 = (𝑟!: 𝑘 = 1,2,3,… ,𝑛)    (4) 
Business practice recommends using descriptive definitions, therefore the following 
definition of a process is proposed: A process is a structured chain of events and 
actions interconnected by flow relations, the aim of which is to achieve the desired 
result. 
Process approach is to be understood as the identification of processes, their 
dependencies and order, determination of the criteria and methods ensuring and 
evaluating effectiveness, regular monitoring, measurement and analysis, as well as 
the implementation of any corrective actions necessary to achieve planned results and 
their continual improvement.  
3. Operationality related attributes of engineered systems 
Based on the service dominant approach as well as the assumptions made in sections 
1 and 2, we propose a general model of an engineered system - S, which is controlled 
for operationality reasons. The term operationality means the ability of a given system 
to perform the required functions.  
Figure 1. General model of an engineered system with the operationality control (Bukowski 2019) 
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Figure 1 shows schematically the concept of this model, which is based on the control 
engineering rules. The main block of the system is a SB-element whose role is to 
transform the input X into the state of system Z. The next FD-block is responsible for 
the fault detection of the S system, assigning the appropriate faulty state kind Fi for 
each faulty Zi state. The next step is FI – fault identification, in which the Fi is 
compared with the typical faults kinds given by the fault classifier FC. The result of 
the comparison in the form of a fault category FC is supplied to the decision-maker 
DM, who based on his background knowledge K, makes decision M, which should 
modify the external input T so that the modified internal input X gives, after the 
transformation, the correct output Z (proper state of the system S). 
In practice the correct service is delivered when the system's behaviour allows it to 
fulfil the required functions, described by the system specification. A fault is that part 
of the system states that may cause a subsequent failure. A failure is an event that 
occurs when a fault alters the service quality, and the delivered service deviates from 
a correct service. A system may fail either because it does not comply with the 
specification, or because the specification did not adequately describe its function. 
Thus, a failure is a transition from correct service to incorrect service, which means 
that the system does not implement the intended function. A transition from incorrect 
service to correct service is a service recovery. The time interval during which 
incorrect service is delivered is a service outage. A system can fail in different ways, 
therefore we can distinguish different fault categories and failure modes. 
The ability to provide a service that can justifiably be trusted is called dependability, 
and is used as a collective term describing the time-related operating quality of a 
system. The concept of dependability includes the constituent properties that can be 
represented in the form of a "dependability tree", consisting of three levels. 
Dependability is divided into four main attributes (Bukowski 2016):  
• Availability (AV) – ability to be in state to perform the required functions under 
given work conditions, is described by: 
o Reliability (REL)  – ability to perform the required functions, without 
failure, for a given time interval, under given work conditions; 
o Maintainability (MAI) – ability to be retained in, or restored to a state to 
perform as required, under given conditions of use and maintenance; 
o Maintenance Support Performance (MSP)  – effectiveness of an 
organization in respect to maintenance support; 
• Safety (SA)  – ability to operate, normally or abnormally, without danger of 
causing human injury or death and without damage to the system’s 
environment, it consists of: 
o Absence of Critical Damages (ACD);  
o Protection of the environment against the effects of any potential critical  
damages (PRO); 
• Security (SE) – ability to prevent an unauthorized access to, or handling of 
system state, can be described by the concurrent existence of: 
o Confidentiality (CON) – unavailability to non-enabled persons;  
o Integrity (INT) – impossibility of introducing changes into the system by 
non-enabled persons;  
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o Accessibility for enabled users only (ACC); 
• Resilience (RE) – a collective term describing the ability of a system to absorb 
and withstand the failure impact, and still continue to operate at acceptable 
predefined performance level, is described by: 
o Absorbability (ABS)  – capability of a system to fulfil its function, in a 
timely manner, in the presence of failures (survivability); 
o Recoverability (REC)  – capacity of a system to recover from a failure, 
within the acceptable time and costs limits (restoration); 
o Adaptability (ADA) – ability to adapt to changed working conditions 
(flexibility, agility, ability to learn). 
Based on this structure of properties the dependability of a system, for a given time 
interval (t1, t2), can be described by the model: 𝐷 𝑡!, 𝑡! = {𝐴𝑉 𝑡!, 𝑡! ; 𝑆𝐴 𝑡!, 𝑡! ; 𝑆𝐸 𝑡!, 𝑡! ;  𝑅𝐸 𝑡!, 𝑡! }   (5) 
This model can be interpreted as follows: A system’s dependability is the collective 
term that describes its ability to continuous, safe and secure fulfilment of the required 
functions in a risky environment.  
The availability attribute is a research object of an area of reliability engineering, the 
safety attribute belongs to safety engineering, and the security attribute is a subject of 
security engineering. All these areas of knowledge have been studied for several 
decades and are currently well developed. However, the fourth of the attributes - 
resilience - is presently under intensive research, and the field of resilience 
engineering is in constant development. 
4. Modelling resilience using the service continuity approach 
From the operational perspective, the typical ‘mess’ (see Ackoff et al. 2006)  for 
complex engineered systems  is caused by losing the continuity of production or 
service processes. This type of risk sources is called disturbance and can lead to 
disruptive event in a given system. The behaviour of the system in ‘mess’ situations 
depends to a large extent on system’s structure and its operational features. Table I 
shows the summary of the basic operational features for the main types of systems. 
The basic issue for our consideration is the problem of how the system behaves in 
response to disturbances. We can distinguish four basic types of responses: resistance, 
robustness, absorption and recovery, as well as learning and adaptation. 
Table I: The main types of systems and their operational features (based on Bukowski 2019) 
Type    Complexity      State adjustment          Response to disturbances Example 
I - Passive      low      constant           resistance   elements 
II - Reactive      medium     static control           robustness   parts 
III - Responsive     high      dynamic control         absorption & recovery subsystems 
IV - Active       very high     smart control           learning & adaptation SoS (e.g. CI) 
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In order to develop the resilience model of complex engineered systems we proposed 
the following basic definitions of the main terms: 
• Disruptive event (DE) – an act of delaying or interrupting the process continuity 
(e.g. system failure, natural catastrophe, man-made fault). 
• Continuity (CON) – a system capability to deliver products or services at 
acceptable, predefined performance level under the real work conditions (e.g. 
despite disruptive events DE).  
• Disruptive event impact (DEI) – the degree to which a system is affected by a 
disruptive event DE. 
• Resilience to a disruptive event (RE) – the ability of a system to absorb and 
withstand the disruption impact, and still continue to deliver products or 
services at acceptable predefined performance level, as well as the adapt-
capacity to a new work conditions. 
• Resilience metric - a collective term described by four main indicators: 
absorbability (ABS), recoverability (REC), adaptability (ADA) and disruptive 
event impact (DEI). 
Based on these assumptions we propose the concept of service continuity oriented 
approach. This concept is closely related to the ideas of resilient enterprise (Sheffi 
2007) as well as business continuity management (British Standards Institute 2006). 
The model is based on a typical course of a service delivery process, interrupted by an 
occurrence of a disruptive event leading to a disruption of this process continuity. A 
quantitative interpretation of this model is shown in Figure 2. The thick line shows 
the course of an idealized system operation as it changes its performance in function 
of time. Prior to the occurrence of a disruptive event the system was functioning at 
the required level of performance (PReq). The occurrence of a disruptive event (DE) is 
immediately followed by a sharp decline in system performance, until it reaches a 
minimum level of performance higher than a critical level of performance 
(PMin>PCri). With the capacity to absorb the effects of a disruptive event, the system 
maintains its basic functions and gradually increases its performance. After the time 
t4, it achieves a recovered performance level (PRec), which lies above the acceptable 
level of performance (PRec>PAcc).The final phase of the course is characterized by the 
ability to adapt to new conditions, and as a result the system performance improves to 
the level (PAda). 
Generally, there can be distinguished the following five fundamental phases in a 
typical course of a service delivery process with a continuity disruption (see Figure 
2): 
A. Resistant state – characterized by no reaction to small disturbances, 
B. Robust behaviour – with short-term loss of performance after a disturbance and 
rapid return to the required state, 
C. Absorption phase (ABS) - distinguished by ‘coping’ with disruption and 
continuity retain of operation, 
D. Recovery phase (REC) - characterized by ‘bouncing back’ to acceptable 
performance level, 
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E. Adaptation phase (ADA) - distinguished by ‘learning’ from disruption and 
transformation to the new work conditions.  
The resilience properties appear in the C, D, and E phases, so the disruption curve 
shape will be the basis for a quantitative evaluation of these properties. As shown in 
Figure 2, the loss of performance after a disruptive event DE is proportional to the 
area between the line showing the required performance and the actual course of the 
performance. Therefore, the quantitative measure for disruptive event impact (DEI) 
can be described as follows: 𝐷𝐸𝐼 =  𝐿!"#       (6) 
where: 𝐿!"# =  𝑃!"# − 𝑃 𝑡 𝑑𝑡!!!!   – expected loss of performance P caused by DE       𝑃!"# – required performance level, 𝑃 𝑡  – performance at the time 𝑡, 𝑡! – beginning of disruption, 𝑡! – end of disruption (return to required performance level). 
The general model for resilience metric is represented as a collective term described 
by four dimensional vector as follows: 𝑅𝐸 =  𝐴𝐵𝑆,𝑅𝐸𝐶,𝐴𝐷𝐴,𝐷𝐸𝐼     (7) 
with:  𝐴𝐵𝑆 =  𝑃!"#,𝑇!"#  – absorbability                  (8) 𝑅𝐸𝐶 =  𝑃!"# ,𝑇!"#  – recoverability                 (9) 𝐴𝐷𝐴 =  𝑃!"# ,𝑇!"#  – adaptability                 (10) 𝐷𝐸𝐼 =  𝐿!"#,𝑇!"#  – disruptive event impact               (11) 
where (see Figure 2): 𝑃!"# – the lowest performance level during disruption (absorbability measure), 𝑃!"# – performance level after recovery (recoverability measure), 𝑃!"# – performance level after adaptation (adaptability measure), 𝑃!"# – the critical acceptable performance level during disruption (given for the 
process), 𝑃!"" – the acceptable performance level after disruption (given for the process), 𝑇!"# = 𝑡! − 𝑡! : absorption time (𝑡! – end of absorption phase), 𝑇!"# = 𝑡! − 𝑡! : recovery time (𝑡! – end of recovery phase), 𝑇!"# = 𝑡! − 𝑡! : disruption time (𝑡! – return to required performance level), 𝑇!"# = 𝑡! − 𝑡! : adaptation time (𝑡! – end of adaptation phase), 𝑇!"# = 𝑡!"# − 𝑡! : the critical acceptable disruption time (given for the process), 𝐿!"# – the expected loss of performance P caused by disruption event, 
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𝐿!"# – the critical acceptable loss of performance P caused by disruption event (given 
for the process). 
Parameters marked as 'given for the process' are constant values, while all other 
parameters are random variables. Therefore, based on formulas (7) to (11) the 
resilience RE is a multidimensional random variable whose probability distribution is 
very difficult to evaluate in practice (and in many cases even impossible). So, for 
practical use, a simple rules-based resilience assessment system is proposed. An 
example of such a system is shown in Table II. The application of these rules can be 
shown on the example of the run from Figure 2, for which the values of main variable 
and constant parameters are given in brackets (e.g. 𝑃!"# = 20% > 𝑃!"#  = 10%), and 
disruption impact 𝐿!"# is less than the critical limit 𝐿!"#. In this case class II 
conditions are met, but class III is not achieved (because TAda > TCri), so resilience 
level can be considered as acceptable. 
 
Figure 2. Exemplary course of a service delivery process with a continuity disruption (based on 
Bukowski 2019) 
This type of evaluation system can be integrated into an existing risk management 
system, which can contribute to a significant improvement in dependability of the 
whole complex engineered systems, such as global logistics networks. 
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Table II. An evaluation system for resilience assessment of complex engineered systems - an example 
Class Resilience level Requirements 
I Unacceptable PMin< PCri  or  PRec< PAcc or  TRec> TCri or LDis> LCri 
II Acceptable PMin> PCri  and  PRec> PAcc and  TRec< TCri and LDis< LCri 
III High PMin> PCri  and  PRec> PAcc and  TAda< TCri and LDis< LCri 
IV Very high PMin> PCri  and  PRec> PAcc and  TAda< TCri and PAda> kPReq and LDis< 
LCri 
where: k - adaptability index (recommended value k > 1). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Based on the transdisciplinary review of publications related to resilience drawn from 
different areas of knowledge, as well as our own experience we propose the following 
statements: 
• The term resilience can be used both in a narrow and broad perspective. In the 
case of complex engineered systems (e.g. system of systems type) a broad 
approach is appropriate; a concept based on two basic elements, namely 
disturbances (uncontrollable changes), and transformation (adaptive ability to 
survive and turn unexpected changes into opportunities). 
• In order to construct an analytical model of resilience, which allows for its 
quantitative evaluation, it is necessary firstly to define the object of deliberation 
and subsequently different threats that it may be subject to. This requires a 
multidimensional approach, both from the operational perspective (resources 
and processes) and from the risk perspective (threats and disturbances). 
• For this purpose we developed the service continuity oriented approach, which 
is closely related to the ideas of resilient enterprise as well as business 
continuity management. The resilience model is based on a typical course of a 
service delivery process, interrupted by an occurrence of a disruptive event 
leading to a disruption of this process continuity. 
• For quantitative evaluation of the complex systems resilience to a disruption 
risk we propose the resilience metric - a collective term described by four main 
indicators: absorbability, recoverability, adaptability and disruptive event 
impact. 
• Based on the parameters of these metrics we can built an evaluation system for 
resilience assessment of different complex engineered systems. This kind of 
evaluation system can be integrated into a general risk management system, 
which can contribute to a significant improvement in dependability of any 
complex engineered system. 
Summarizing, there seems to be a rational desire to create the knowledge domain of 
Resilience Science as the sum of experiences and concepts from different fields of 
knowledge in a transdisciplinary perspective. In this big picture General Resilience 
would mean a capacity to survive, recover and adapt in face of changes characterized 
by deep uncertainty as well as unknown unknowns. 
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Abstract 
 
A new approach to the analysis of conflict interaction between information systems 
and intruders is suggested. The approach uses mathematical models based on hybrid 
automata formalism. An estimate of the probability of the intruder’s success is given. 
The paper also demonstrates that it is possible to abstract from the specific type of 
distribution density for the duration of each possible state of the parties of the 
conflict. A model of dissemination of destructive information influence within the 
information system is suggested. It shows the connection between the dissemination 
of destructive influence and the process of state transition of the information system 
subjects. An example of the analysis of dissemination of destructive information 
influence is given. 
 
 
Key words: information systems security, hybrid automata, cellular automata, 
conflict modelling, modelling of information influence. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When studying the security of information systems (IS) based on modern 
technologies, it is vital to consider two major groups of problems: violation of 
information security of the information system and possibility of dissemination of 
destructive information influence (DII) within the IS. In actual practice, these 
problems are interconnected and should be considered together. To provide for a 
comprehensive analysis we suggest two models: a model of conflict interaction 
between the information system and the intruder based on hybrid automata 
formalism, and a cellular automaton based model of dissemination of destructive 
information influence within the information system that takes into account the inner 
factors of the systems’ subjects and their condition. 
 
2. Simulating conflict interaction between information systems and 
intruders 
 
It is first necessary to determine a typical model of conflict interaction between an 
information system and an intruder. We suggest a model based on hybrid automata 
formalism that is used to determine the ratios for approximate estimate of probability 
of security violation and the lower bound of probability of security violation in the IS. 
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The model uses the most basic parameters such as mathematical expectation and 
variance for the duration of each of the discrete states of the IS and the intruder. The 
main features of hybrid automata and their application in simulating conflict 
interaction of systems were considered in the earlier works by the authors [1, 2]. 
Let us suppose that one of the parties (Party A) of the conflict is an information 
system (IS). The IS operates successfully, if it ensures the security of the information 
within itself in a set period of time Tt ≤≤0 . The IS itself is constantly in one of the 
states typical for its operation and functioning under normal conditions. The IS fails, 
if the security of the information within it is violated, at which point the system 
transfers to a corresponding critical state. The other party (Party B) of the conflict is 
an intruder system that aims to violate the security of the information within the IS 
and thus transfer the IS into the critical state within a set period of time. The intruder 
system succeeds, if it manages to reach this target. Party B fails, if it does not manage 
to violate the security of the information within the set period of time Tt ≤≤0 . 
Fig. 1 presents two hybrid automata (HA) functioning simultaneously: automaton A  
and automaton B . For these automata the set of discrete variables },{ ba
D ssS = , 
which describe the most common states, is presented by two variables, each taking 
the values },{ AAAa DLQs =∈ , },{ BBBb DLQs =∈  [3]. State AL  represents the 
functioning of A  until the moment when the intruder takes advantage of the existing 
vulnerabilities, which results in security violation and transition of the IS to the 
critical state AD  (“failure” A ). State BL  represents the functioning of B  that aims to 
interfere with the operation of A , and lasts for a set period of time after which the 
intruder fails to breach the security of the information system (“failure” B ) and 
transfers to the state BD . Transition to AD  and BD  proceeds abruptly and is 
influenced by Battack _  and Tt ≥ , leading to failure for A  and B respectively. 
To detail the operation of both parties of the conflict, it is necessary to consider the 
inner states of the set },{ BA LLL =  as embedded hybrid automata which we will refer 
to as hybrid automata of active elements (HA AE) [3, 4]. 
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Figure 1 - A model of conflict interaction between the information system and the intruder based on 
hybrid automata 
 
The subset of symbols }{ 00 AQ
L
A =  consists of the symbol of the state that is 
responsible for getting system A into operation. The subset of symbols 
},{ 12111 AAQ
L
A =  represents the system's operation under normal conditions. The 
symbols are embedded into general state 1A , which means that “system A is secure 
from all known vulnerabilities”. The subset of symbols },{ 22212 AAQ
L
A =  represents 
the functioning of the system after a new vulnerability was found or appeared. The 
symbols are embedded into general state 2A , which means that “system A is insecure 
from a known vulnerability”. The transition from state 1A  to state 2A  is influenced by 
the event “vulnerability” under the condition that this vulnerability appears in the 
period of time ),[ Tt , set for conflict interaction between systems. To describe the 
way new vulnerabilities appear, we used a model of external random flow of events. 
Transition from state 2A  back to state 1A  is possible, if the system manages to 
eliminate the vulnerability in 2A . For active elements of party B  the following states 
and transitions should be introduced when modelling the events of a typical conflict. 
The subset of symbols }{ 00 BQ
L
B =  consists of the symbol of the state that is 
responsible for getting system B into operation. The preparatory actions do not repeat. 
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The subset of symbols },{ 12111 BBQ
L
B =  represents the states of system B when it 
searches for and identifies the vulnerabilities, system A being in state 1A  (system A is 
secure from all known vulnerabilities). State 11B  determines the functioning of the 
system aimed at gathering information about system A (analysis of the organisation 
principles, technical tools, and software, and rights and qualifications of the users and 
operating personnel). State 12B  determines the way system B searches for 
vulnerabilities when system A operates under normal conditions. Probability 12BP  is 
set by the operator of local behaviour as the probability of identification of a 
vulnerability when system A operates under normal conditions. It is time-
independent. The model shown in Fig. 1 describes the main transition type as well as 
another type of transition from 12B  into the following group of discrete states. The 
latter is determined by the event “vulnerability” (identification of a new vulnerability) 
happening in the period of time ),[ Tt . We assume that systems A and B receive the 
information about a new vulnerability at the same time. The subset of symbols 
},{ 22212 BBQ
L
B =  represents the functioning of system B after a new vulnerability was 
detected. State 21B  determines the actions performed to analyse the detected 
vulnerability and utilise it. The state is limited in time. State 22B  activates the 
utilisation of the vulnerability in order to violate the security of system A. The subset 
of symbols }{ v
L
Bv BQ =  consists of the symbol of the state when the security of 
information in system A is successfully violated. The transition to the critical state is 
followed by the event attack_A , which transfers the HA of party A  from state AL  
into eigen state AD . State vB  is absorbing for this model. Transition from state 22B  
back to state 12B  is performed, if system B fails to utilise the detected vulnerability. 
 
2.1. Assessing the probability of information security violation 
 
Here we present the analytical relations obtained in the analysis of the probability of 
success of party B [1, 3] in a situation when it does not receive any external 
information about new vulnerabilities. 
Analytical relation based on Gaussian approximation for a random variable 1,bτ  [4, 5]: 
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where ),,( dmuN  is the Gaussian probability density distribution with corresponding 
parameters.  
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To estimate the lower probability of security violation, Chebyshev's inequality can be 
used [4]. The estimate can also be specified using the Vysochanskij–Petunin inequality 
[4, 5], assuming that the distribution density of composition 1,bτ  is unimodal: 
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It is, however, much more difficult to estimate the probability of success of system B, 
if within the set period of time it receives information about a new vulnerability. The 
authors obtained analytical relations for this estimate as well, introducing a number of 
assumptions and approximations, but these results are out of the scope of the present 
paper. 
 
2.2. Results of the experiment 
 
We examined the possibility of using the obtained analytical relations by means of 
various types of distributions for the duration of each of the systems’ states. In a 
series of statistical experiments, including 1,000 tests each, we considered various 
combinations of distribution laws, their parameters, and the probability of returning 
and repeating the tests. The obtained results were summarised as the dependencies of 
the probability of success P  on the relation 1,
2
1, /)( BB dmTo −=ρ  [6, 7]. A few 
examples of such dependencies are shown in Figure 2. 
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a)                                                                               b) 
Figure 2 - Comparison of the obtained estimates with the results of simulation modelling 
 
Fig. 2 demonstrates that using analytical relations based on Vysochanskij–Petunin 
inequality and Gaussian approximation allows for precise estimate of the lower 
probability and approximate estimates of probability of information security violation 
under the condition of ambiguity of probability density distribution within the duration 
of the respective states of the information system and the intruder system. Analytical 
relation based on Chebyshev's inequality yields rougher estimates. The precision of the 
analytical relations in each case is determined by preset parameters and the use of 
assumptions. Without specific assumptions, the margin of error introduced by the said 
analytical relations is offset by the possible errors of selecting the distribution law that 
may occur when the relations are strictly set. 
The dependencies calculated for a specific IS and shown in Fig. 2 allow us to conclude 
that the larger the value of the parameter oρ , characterising the relative average 
difference between the duration of the conflict and the time needed for security 
violation, the higher the probability of security breach in the observed information 
system. This means that for preventive influence, time is more important than the 
probability of failure at the later stages of vulnerability search and utilisation. 
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3. Simulating dissemination of destructive information influence 
within the information system 
 
When modelling and analysing the process of dissemination of DII we regarded the IS 
as a two-dimensional cellular automaton. A two-dimensional cellular automaton is a 
set of finite automata (subjects of the IS) allocated on the reference frame and marked 
with integer coordinates ),( ji . Each automaton can have certain properties and be in 
one of the states },..,,{ 21, kji SSSS ∈ . The state of a finite automaton ),( ji  at a certain 
moment in time 1t +  is determined as follows [8, 9]: 
),),,(),(()1( ,, tjiNtSFtS jiji =+                                       (3) 
where F  is the rule for the transition of state of the automaton; ),( jiN is the point 
neighbourhood ),( ji ; t  is a step on the axis of time. 
In the cellular automaton model each cell changes its state while interacting with a 
limited number of other cells, normally adjacent ones with the same side or vertex. 
Therefore, it is easy to see the connection between the processes occurring on the 
micro level and the processes of spatial interaction between the elements [8].  
To describe the process of dissemination of DII within the IS the following model is 
suggested. Information interaction within the IS is presented as a two-dimensional 
cellular automaton, whose grid is a two-dimensional array, where each cell is 
numbered with an ordered pair ),( ji . Each cell is an information system subject. The 
nearest neighbours of each cell are considered the cells that have a common vertex 
with the one observed (Moore neighbourhood). Thus, each cell has 8 nearest 
neighbours. To eliminate the tip effect, the grid of the cellular automaton is 
topologically twisted into a torus [8], i.e. the first line is considered to be the 
continuation of the last one, and the last one precedes the first one. The same applies 
to the columns [9]. 
Each cell may be in one of the following states: S0 - initial state; S1 - the subject 
developed a reaction to the DII, but does not distribute it; S2 - the subject took in the 
DII, but does not disseminate it; S3 - the subject developed a reaction to the DII and 
distributes it; S4 - the subject took in the DII and disseminates it. Depending on the 
state and the inner properties, a cell may or may not disseminate the DII (by 
influencing the neighbouring cells). The state and behaviour of cells change according 
to the rules set for the suggested model. This rules consider the inner parameters of the 
IS subjects and their state. A state transition graph is presented in Fig. 3.  
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Figure 3 - State transition graph 
 
The subject may either take in the destructive information influence or resist it. 
Depending on the inner parameters, the subject may also disseminate the DII within 
the IS, or not. 
In our study we used the following modelling algorithm: initial stage - main properties 
of the IS subjects are determined; first stage (corresponds to the origin on the time 
axis) 0=t - the whole grid consists of cells in state 0S , except for certain cells that 
initiate the DII; second stage - the DII is disseminated along the time axis 1t t= + , the 
inner parameters of the subjects are determined basing on the suggested model; cells 
with the value of DII dissemination equal 1 pass on the information to the 
neighbouring cells. 
 
3.1 Results 
 
Fig. 4 demonstrates the functioning of the automaton when most subjects are neutral to 
the DII. Fig. 5 demonstrates the functioning of the automaton when most subjects are 
negative to the DII. Fig. 6 demonstrates the functioning of the automaton when most 
subjects are positive to the DII. Figures “a” demonstrate the functioning of the 
automaton when the subjects take in the DII from other subjects. Figures “b” 
demonstrate the functioning of the automaton when the subject can resist the DII. 
 
 
a                                                                 b 
Figure 4 - Distribution of cells according to the discrete time (most subjects are neutral to the 
DII) 
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a                                                                 b 
Figure 5 - Distribution of cells according to the discrete time (most subjects are negative to the 
DII) 
 
 
a                                                                 b 
Figure 6 - Distribution of cells according to the discrete time (most subjects are positive to the 
DII) 
 
Analysis of Figures 4-6 shows that 
- the character of dissemination of the DII within the IS is practically exponential; 
- when the subjects are neutral to the DII (Fig. 4a), just a small number of initiators 
can successfully perform the DII; 
- when the subjects are negative or positive to the DII (Fig. 5a and 6a), the DII does 
not influence their state; 
- when the subjects can resist the DII (Fig. 4B, 5b, and 6b), the number of subjects in 
states S3 and S4 is similar, irrespective of their initial state. 
 
The suggested model demonstrates the connection between the process of  
dissemination of DII within the IS and the changes in the states of the IS subjects 
resulting from the interaction of interconnected subjects. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The suggested model of conflict interaction between the information system and the 
adversary, and the obtained analytical relations for approximate estimate of probability 
and lower probability of information security violation, demonstrates that it is not 
necessary to determine the specific type of distribution density for the duration of each 
possible state of the parties of the conflict. This model can be successfully applied to 
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various problems concerning the security of ISs. The suggested model of 
dissemination of destructive information influence within the information system 
shows the connection between dissemination of destructing information influence and 
the process of state transition of the information system subjects. It is very important 
for studying security problems of information systems based on modern information 
technologies. Using both models together allows for a comprehensive study of the 
main factors effecting the security of modern information systems. 
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Abstract 
 
The problem of output characteristics for reliability and risk models to shapes of their 
input elements distributions is considered. Some classic results about strong and 
asymptotic insensitivity for these models and some recent investigations are 
mentioned. The project of further investigations are proposed. 
 
Keywords: reliability and risk models, strong and asymptotic sensitivity. 
 
 
1. Motivation and notations 
 
Most of all Critical Infrastructures (CIs) sectors as well as threats to them contain 
essential random part such as reliability and risk. For CIs study, they should be 
represented as mathematical models, which will be models of stochastic systems. 
Input information for most of sectors Cis usually cannot be precisely found (mostly 
can be estimated statistically). Stability or insensitivity or weak sensitivity of system 
output system characteristics to their input parameters distributions is one of the key 
problem of whole natural sciences including CIs. 
 
Thus, investigation of sensitivity of output system characteristics to shapes of their 
input information is a very important problem for such systems. In the talk, some 
examples of classic results about strong and asymptotic insensitivity of reliability and 
risk models output characteristics to their elements distributions are mentioned. Some 
recent results also will be considered and the problem for their development in 
framework of International Project will be proposed. 
 
In the paper for reliability and risk models, we will use a little bit modified Kendall’s 
notations [1]. Accordingly, to this notation any stochastic model is denoted with four 
symbols ( | | | )α β γ δ , where 
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• α – symbol of an input flow; 
• β  – symbol of a service mechanism; 
• ( , )m nγ =  – symbol of the system structure where m  is buffer size, n  is 
number of servers; 
• δ  – symbol of service discipline. 
 
For closed system (as well as reliability models) the round parenthesis “()” change to 
the angles “<>”. Each of these elements is also describes with their own model. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some classical examples about 
insensitivity output characteristics of queueing systems and networks to shapes of 
their input information distributions will be remind. Next section deals with some 
known results about strong and asymptotic insensitivity in reliability models and 
some recent results in this direction. In the last section, some methodology for 
insensitivity in risk models is proposed. In conclusion, further investigations in the 
considered directions are proposed. 
 
2. Classic results on sensitivity in queueing systems and networks 
 
2.1 Erlang system 
 
For Queueing System (QS) ( | | (0, ) | )M M n FIFO with Poisson input flow of 
intensity α and exponentially distributed service time with mean 1β −  consider a 
stochastic process.  
 
( )J T = number of busy servers at time t  
 
and define ( ) { ( ) }j t J t jπ = Ρ = . For steady states probabilities (s.s.p.) of the system  
 
lim ( )j jt tπ π→∞=  
 
Erlang [2]  found the formula 
 
1
0
lim ( )
! !
j j
j jt i n
t
j j
ρ ρπ π
−
→∞
≤ ≤
 
= =  
 
∑                                     (1) 
 
where 1ρ αβ −= . 
 
In 1975 B.A. Sevast'yanov [3] generalize this result and prove that the s.s.p. of the 
Erlang's system exists for any service time distributions ( )B x  with finite mean 
(1 ( ))b B x dx= − < ∞∫ , and Erlang's formulas (1) for them hold with bρ α= . 
 
Thus, Sevast'yanov's theorem means that the Erlang's system s.s.p. insensitive to the 
shape of its service time distributions with fixed their mean value. 
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2.2 Open networks 
 
For s.s.p. of open Stochastic Network (SN) (M ǀ M ǀ (n,Q) ǀ FIFO), consisting of r  
QS 1 2, ,..., rS S S  with transition matrix ijQ q =    Jackson [4,5] in 1957 obtained the 
following result.  
Under condition i i inλ β<  for all 1,i r= the s.s.p. of the open SN has the product 
form  
 
( )
1
1
( ,..., ) ,ir ji
i r
j jπ π
≤ ≤
= ∏                                             (2) 
 
where ( )ijiπ  are s.s.p.'s of the i -th node ( | | | )iM M n FIFO  with input intensity iλ , 
which is solution of the equation 
 
λ' = α' + λ'Q0,                                                   (3) 
 
such that i i inλ β<  for all 1,i r= , and 
• 'α
ur
 is the vector with components 0i iqα α= , and 
• 0 (0) , ( , 1, )ijQ q i j r = =   is the matrix of the calls transmission between 
subsystems  (sub-matrix of matrix Q  without the first row and column). 
 
At that s.s.p.'s of the i -th node given by 
 
0
0
, 1,
!
,
!
j
j j nn
j n
j
j n
n n
ρ π
π
ρ ρ π
−

=
= 
  >   
 
 
and 
 
1
0 ( ) !
n
ne n n
ρ ρπ ρ
ρ
−
 
= + − 
. 
 
2.3 Closed networks 
 
For closed SN < N ǀ Mr ǀ nr,Q > consisting of   r   nodes, in which N calls served 
analogous result has been found in 1967 by Gordon and Newell [6]. 
 
If  Q  is a non-decomposable stochastic matrix of 1r − -st rang, so the system s.s.p.'s 
have the product form 
 
1
1
1
( ) ( ,..., ) ( , ) ,
( )
ji
i
r ji
i r i i
zj j j G N r
B ji
π π
β
−
≤ ≤
= = ∏                            (4) 
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where 
 
•  iz  are the solution of traffic equation 
1
i ij j
i r
z q z
≤ ≤
=∑                                                  (5) 
 
•  the functions ( )iB k  are determines recursively 
 
(0) 1,iB =  ( ) min( , ) ( 1),i i iB j j n B j= −  
• the normalizing coefficient is  
 
( , ) 1
( , )
( )
ji
i
ji
k E N r i r i i
zG G N r
B jiβ∈ ≤ ≤
= = ∑ ∏                              (6) 
 
2.4 BCMP Theorem 
 
The above results have been obtained under assumption about Poisson input flow and 
exponentially distributed service times. So called BCMP theorem [7] mark out the 
conditions for class of networks (open, closed and mixed) with Poisson input,  the 
s.s.p. of which admit product form representation for general service time 
distributions in nodes. 
 
Thus, the BCMP-theorem can be treated as a statement about insensitivity of the 
network s.s.p. to the shapes of service time distributions in the system nodes up to 
their mean values. 
 
3. Reliability models 
 
3.1 Strong insensitivity 
 
In 1976 I.Kovalenko [8] found the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
insensitivity of stationary reliability characteristics of redundant renewable system 
| | |nM GI m FIFO< >  with exponential life time and general repair time distributions 
of its components to the shape of the latter. These conditions consist in sufficient 
amount of repairing facilities m n= , i.e. in possibility of immediate start to repair any 
of failed elements. 
 
The sufficiency of this condition for the system with general life and repair times 
distributions | | |nGI GI m FIFO< >  has been found in [9] with the help of multi-
dimensional alternative processes theory. However, in the case of limited possibilities 
for restoration these results do not hold. 
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3.2 Asymptotic insensitivity 
On the other hand in series of work of B.V. Gnedenko, A.D. Solov'ev [10-12]  and 
others it was shown that under ``quick'' restoration the  reliability function  of a cold 
standby double redundant heterogeneous system tends to the exponential one for any 
life and repair time distributions of its elements. This result also means the 
asymptotical insensitivity of the reliability characteristics of such system to the 
shapes of their elements life and repair times distributions. 
In  series of our papers [13-15] the problem of systems' steady state reliability 
characteristics sensitivity  to the shape of life and repair time distributions of its 
components for the double redundant renewable systems 2 | |1|GI GI FIFO< >  has 
been considered, for the case,   when one of the input distributions (either of life or 
repair time lengths) is exponential. For these models, explicit expressions for 
stationary probabilities have been obtained. For the system 2 | |1|M GI FIFO< > they 
have form 
These formulas show the evident sensitivity of the s.s.p. to the shapes of non-
exponential distributions in the form of their Laplace-Stiltjes transforms. However 
under rare failures (as well as under quick restoration) as it was shown in [13,16] this 
sensitivity become vanishingly small. The numerical investigation and simulation 
results, given in [17,18] demonstrate enough quick appearance of practical 
insensitivity of the time dependent as well as stationary reliability characteristics to 
the shapes  of life and repair time distributions with fixed their mean values. 
In [19] these results have been generalised for heterogeneous systems and in [20] for 
systems with dependent failures. 
4. Insensitivity in risk models
For reliability of complex system investigation in the middle of 60-th last century in 
Bell Lab it was proposed to use the fault tree. Later the same methods has been used 
also for the risk models investigation. There is wide literature, devoted to this 
problem (including also computer tools for the methods applications).  
Based on this approach in a recent book [21] it was proposed methods for complex 
risk events analysis. It is based on 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
183
• risk tree construction and its structure function calculation, 
 
• risk tree rigging with initial information, 
 
• main risk parameters calculation,  
 
• sensitivity  of risk indexes to input information  investigation, and 
 
• critical paths accordingly to different criteria in risk tree finding. 
 
The details of this approach in the talk will be done. Some Program for realization of 
this approach as a special computer tools for wide application in practice is proposed. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the talk the problem of sensitivity analysis of output characteristics for reliability 
and risk models to shapes of their input parameters distributions is proposed. 
Examples of some classic results about strong and asymptotic insensitivity of such 
models are remind. Some recent results in this direction for reliability models has 
been done. Further development of the ideas of insensitivity of reliability and risk 
models is proposed. 
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Abstract 
 
Various infrastructure information is gathered nowadays in databases, which have 
become rather large after years of development and data collection. For thorough 
search and broad exploitation of the available information, even beyond its original 
scope, advanced data analysis approaches need to be employed. The present work is 
concerned with the exploitation of the data in the US National Bridge Inventory (NBI) 
maintained by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), which includes 
information for over 500,000 bridges. The information provided in NBI was analysed 
in combination with additional data from other sources (for climatic conditions, 
earthquake hazard, etc.). Where needed, data were converted to correspond to bridge 
locations using spatial interpolation techniques. Then, Exploratory Data Analysis 
(EDA), Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and regression analysis methods were utilized 
to study the causes of bridge deterioration. These statistical methods yield 
quantitative results and allow the identification, ranking and measurement of 
intensity of factors contributing to the decrease of the structural condition of bridges 
with time. 
 
 
Keywords: deterioration; spatial interpolation; exploratory data analysis; analysis of 
variance; regression analysis. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Today’s society relies on data collected from multiple sources, which are combined 
and processed to produce information that assists decision making at various levels, 
ranging from everyday life to very specialized cases. All these processes can be 
included in the broad term of ‘Data Analysis’, which refers to various tools, such as 
data visualization, hypothesis testing and other statistical methods, that are employed 
to handle samples and select the most appropriate variables for modelling reality. 
 
Infrastructures, and more specifically bridges, are exposed to various factors that 
could worsen their structural condition. When reliable data are available, a data 
analysis process can confirm or challenge building practices and design processes 
already applied, but also assist in modelling deterioration by identifying factors 
affecting it. 
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In many countries, inspections are performed on bridges to monitor the 
infrastructure’s stock condition. The US Federal Highway Administration maintains 
an up-to-date National Bridge Inventory (NBI), which includes over 500,000 bridges 
in US territory. The NBI contains a considerable amount of information; this includes 
116 coded items to describe each bridge, its characteristics, its condition, etc. [1]. An 
updated NBI is published annually, as each bridge must be inspected visually 
biennially. Bridge condition ratings are recorded on a scale 0-9, with 9 representing 
‘excellent’ and 0 ‘failed’ conditions. Inspections are carried out by qualified 
personnel complying with standard procedures set out in National Bridge Inspection 
Standards (NBIS) [1]. 
 
The NBI has been used by several researchers to investigate structural deterioration 
and material performance for bridges. In the various statistical methods utilized for 
this task, the explanatory variables have been usually selected by expert judgement 
[2,3]. Such approaches may derive erroneous models due to the neglect of other 
variables, which may be affecting structural deterioration more. Another common 
practice usually employed is the utilization of bridge data for only one individual 
State of the US and inclusion in the assessment of additional explanatory variables, 
such as weather data and other data available from GIS [4]. In these cases, although 
maintenance policies and acquired data can be considered uniform, the limited 
variation of exposure factors can lead to modelling errors. On the other hand, when 
utilizing the whole US bridge sample, many exposures have to be taken to account 
and not including them in the analysis may also lead to misleading results due to 
unjustified averaging. Furthermore, questions arise regarding the effect of typical 
factors suggested by experts, which have already been taken to account during the 
design process. Thus, a process is needed to formally select the variables, which 
should be incorporated in modelling structural deterioration. Recently, some data 
analysis procedures have started to be utilized, in order to select among factors 
affecting deterioration. Relevant efforts either include limiting assumptions for the 
factors considered [5] or study an individual State and consider only NBI factors [3]. 
 
In this paper, NBI data for the conterminous US States are utilized to study the factors 
affecting the superstructure condition of bridges. To enable this, it is assumed that 
hazard-driven maintenance and rehabilitation policies are predominant and that the 
effect of potential State policies can be neglected. Additional reliable sources were 
used, such as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for 
climatic data [6] and United States Geological Survey (USGS) for earthquake hazard 
data [7]. These were combined with NBI data using spatial interpolation methods. 
Data analysis procedures were utilized to explore the data and attain an appropriate 
model for the combined dataset, whose main purpose is to reveal predominant factors 
affecting structural condition. 
 
 
2. The data analysis process 
 
Data analysis is a broad term used to describe a set of procedures utilized to process 
data, comprehend and quantify their important relationships and finally generate 
models that aim to describe reality. The data analysis process followed herein is 
graphically summarized in Figure 1. Initially, various relevant data collections (from 
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NBI, NOAA, USGS) are utilized to attain the necessary information. From each 
dataset, a number of variables are selected and filtered to exclude unwanted 
information (i.e. bad records, outliers, etc.), a process performed with the aid of 
Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA), whose tools are mainly graphical and assist the 
analyst in identifying problematic/unexpected features [8]. The filtering process is 
repetitive and ends when the datasets are clear from outliers or errors, which could 
affect the actual data analysis that follows. 
 
 
Figure 1. The data analysis process. 
 
The cleaned datasets are then combined and EDA is once again performed to show 
variable distributions and intercorrelations, as well as to assist the analyst in selecting 
the appropriate data analysis methods to utilize [8]. The data analysis performed 
herein employs statistical modelling tools, such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
and regression analysis, which unveil and quantify relationships between the 
variables considered. Only parts of the conducted data analysis are presented. 
Specifically, initial variable selection, its filtering and the process of combining the 
different datasets are briefly discussed. Then, main EDA results are given, followed 
by the most important findings of ANOVA and indicative results of the regression 
analysis. 
 
 
3. Formation of the analyzed dataset 
 
Structural deterioration of bridges is linked to corrosion, which depends on various 
factors, such as temperature, aggressive chemicals (i.e. deicing salts, sea chlorides), 
freeze-thaw cycles, wet-dry cycles, among others [9]. Furthermore, accidental factors, 
such as earthquake hazard/action, are also important, as they dictate the implemented 
design standards and may add sudden induced damage to gradual/continuous 
deterioration. In this paper, to investigate deterioration, bridge characteristics, 
properties and current structural condition were extracted from the NBI, while 
climatic and earthquake attributes at bridge locations were obtained from NOAA and 
USGS, respectively. 
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The set of variables considered are presented in Figure 2. The variables are grouped 
based on the database they were extracted from and the variable type. Hence, the 
dependent variable is actually the product of evaluation (i.e. structural condition 
rating), while the independent variables offer information regarding bridges and 
potential deterioration factors. Further categorization was performed in numerical or 
categorical variables according to the form of information contained. Moreover, 
categorical variables were grouped in ordinal and nominal ones. 
 
 
Figure 2. Variables considered in the data analysis. 
 
3.1 NBI variable selection and filtering 
 
A total of 25 variables (Figure 2) were selected from the NBI database regarding 
bridge superstructure condition, age, clearances, geometry, traffic (numerical 
variables), as well as ownership, water presence under the bridge, traffic type over 
and under the bridge (categorical variables). Of the total 614,387 structures included 
in the NBI database, not all were of interest in this study, therefore certain criteria 
were used to exclude e.g. culverts or bridges made of timber or stone. The exclusions 
performed regarded 166,750 structures, leaving a remaining population of interest of 
447,637 bridges with year of construction after 1900 and specific utilized materials 
(reinforced/prestressed concrete, structural steel). 
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3.2 Climatic data 
 
Structures are affected in the long term by local weather conditions, therefore the 
most appropriate respective data to take into account are the ’climatic normals’. 
NOAA manages and maintains a relatively dense network of weather stations all over 
the US and sustains a large collection of climatic and weather data. The US climatic 
normals are average values of climatological variables over a 30-year period (1981-
2010) characterizing the conditions at each location [6]. The climatic normals utilized 
herein were: annual precipitation/rainfall, days of snow depth above 1 inch in a year, 
monthly average minimum temperature, monthly diurnal temperature range, hourly 
dew point temperature. The data were filtered for errors and processed to transform 
monthly and hourly data to annual ones. Furthermore, calculations were performed to 
attain values for annual average temperature and humidity. 
 
3.3 Deicing region limits 
 
Climatic data affect also the users of a bridge, inducing interventions to prevent 
accidents that may accelerate corrosion. Such is the case of deicing salts spread on the 
road surface to prevent frost. Deicing salts can be effective if snow depth is less than 
few centimeters. Thus, the FHWA map of US regions, where deicing is allowed, was 
copied as an image [10] and, using Google Earth, the coordinates of deicing region 
limits were identified, to be included in the analysis as complimentary data to the 
climatic variable of snow depth above 1 inch. 
 
3.3 Earthquake hazard data 
 
Earthquake resistance is a crucial attribute for a structure’s service life in a seismic 
region. Seismic damage to bridges results usually from complex effects by various 
contributing variables that interact together. Peak ground acceleration (PGA), usually 
measured in terms of the acceleration of gravity (g), is the main variable typically 
used to represent the intensity of ground motion [11], although the seismic effect can 
be magnified by other factors. Seismic hazard maps are a product of analysis that 
considers past faults and earthquakes, behavior of seismic waves travelling the crust 
and near-surface site conditions [7]. Such maps are available from USGS, as derived 
from analyzing data from the whole US network. The seismic hazard expressed as the 
PGA with 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years was chosen to be incorporated in 
the analysis process. Relevant data were downloaded from USGS [7] for the 
conterminous US in the form of PGA values at gridded data-points (every 6 km) that 
formed a dense network of calculated hazard locations. 
 
3.4 Combining the datasets 
 
The aforementioned non-NBI databases offered information at locations, where data 
had been collected (weather stations) or calculated (grid of PGA values). To assign 
the corresponding climatic and earthquake hazard values to bridge locations, two 
different interpolation methods were utilized. Specifically, ordinary kriging 
interpolation was used for climatic data, as it is preferred for climatic and weather 
information [12]; linear interpolation for the densely gridded data of USGS was 
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selected among the suggested methods by USGS. Results for two characteristic cases 
are presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Maps of interpolated values regarding snow depth (kriging interpolation) and earthquake 
hazard (linear interpolation) at bridge locations. 
 
 
4. Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA) 
 
The EDA conducted for the whole sample included histograms and charts to visualize 
and explore distributions and frequencies of all selected variables. Additionally, 
correlograms were utilized to investigate the existence of statistical dependences 
among the variables. 
 
Correlation is a statistical measure that shows whether and how strongly pairs of 
variables are statistically related. In particular, the Pearson correlation coefficient, 
which takes absolute values between 0 (no correlation) and 1 (full correlation), 
reveals how close two variables are to having a linear relationship with each other. 
Weak correlations are usually associated with absolute values in the range 0-0.65, 
moderate in the range 0.65-0.75, while strong correlations correspond to coefficients 
taking values higher than 0.75. A negative correlation value indicates that the two 
variables are negatively correlated. In Figure 4, correlation results are represented 
circles of appropriate size and color intensity. Specifically, larger circles with intense 
colors reveal stronger correlations, while small circles with faded colors weaker 
correlations. The color map given allows negative or positive correlations to be 
distinguished. The reported correlation results were calculated only for numerical 
variables. 
 
The correlation analysis was conducted separately for NBI-based independent 
variables (regarding bridge characteristics and properties) and for independent 
climatic and earthquake hazard variables. The results for NBI independent variables 
(Figure 4(a)) showed that there are mostly weak correlations among them. Exceptions 
were geometric variables measuring similar properties (deck width and lanes on a 
structure; length and maximum spans). On the other hand, independent climatic and 
earthquake hazard variables (Figure 4(b)) showed strong correlations among the 
different temperatures and days of snow depth above 1 inch. 
 
Earthquake hazard – PGA (g) Snow depth above 1 inch (measured in days) 
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Figure 4. (a) Correlogram of independent NBI variables (min vertical clearance over bridge, min 
lateral clearance, average daily truck traffic, year built, year rehabilitated, min vertical under clearance, 
length, max span, number of spans, lanes under bridge, detour length, average daily traffic, deck width, 
lanes on bridge). (b) Correlogram of independent climatic (non-NBI) variables (snow depth above 1 
inch, PGA – earthquake hazard, diurnal range temperature, dew point temperature, min temperature, 
max temperature, precipitation rainfall, relative humidity). 
 
 
5. ANOVA 
 
ANOVA is a technique that, in its simplest form, provides a statistical test of whether 
or not the population means of a number of samples are equal. It is usually employed 
to analyze categorical independent variables (herein, deterioration factors) for their 
effect on the dependent variable (superstructure condition). In the present study, all 
numerical variables were transformed to categorical variables by utilizing their 
distributions to form meaningful groups of values. To assess the importance of the 
differences found for each variable’s groups, ANOVA results were visualized using 
multiple comparisons Tukey-Kramer method [13]. Certain cases were selected to be 
presented herein that show important patterns found among groups of the variables 
studied. 
 
The multiple comparisons presented in Figure 5 show the effect of each variable’s 
groups to superstructure condition. For each group of values, an average value of the 
superstructure condition is represented by a circle. The magnitude of the error of the 
average estimate is indicated with a line in the center of each circle; actually, dots 
indicate small errors, while lines larger ones. Furthermore, increased difference 
between a variable’s group means indicate the higher importance of the variable to 
superstructure deterioration. 
 
Figure 5(a) demonstrates the high importance of year of construction or rehabilitation 
in the structural condition of bridge superstructures. It is also clear from the same 
figure that differences in superstructure condition between rehabilitated bridges 
(upper part of Figure 5(a)) and non-rehabilitated bridges (lower part of Figure 5(a)) 
exist. On the other hand, as regards Average Daily Traffic, only minor differences are 
observed between group means (Figure 5(d)). 
 
(a) (b) 
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Figure 5. ANOVA results for selected bridge deterioration factors displayed using multiple 
comparisons. 
 
The structural materials utilized in superstructures also appear to have increased 
differences between their group means (Figure 5(b)). Simple-span superstructures 
made of structural steel seem to be in the worst condition, while prestressed concrete 
superstructures with continuous span are on average in the best condition. 
 
Regarding the earthquake hazard variable, Figure 5(e) shows that up to a certain 
group (PGA 0.14-0.2g), bridges tend to have decreasing mean condition for 
increasing PGA level. This effect is reversed for the means of the higher PGA groups, 
which could be attributed to the more demanding design standards for bridges built to 
withstand higher seismic actions in locations with increased earthquake hazard. 
 
Figure 5(f) shows that, as expected, the use of deicing salt negatively affects the mean 
condition of superstructures. According to Figure 5(c), the days of snow depth above 
1 inch do not have an effect on the mean superstructure condition, with the exception 
of the first group (0-0.5 days). However, as can be seen in Figure 3, the first group 
roughly coincides with the non-deicing region, where the use of deicing salts is not 
allowed, which explains the better mean superstructure condition for this group. As 
regards the other groups exhibiting practically the same mean condition, it seems that 
superstructures are affected by the presence of deicing salts, irrespective of the snow 
volume on the deck surface. 
 
 
6. Regression analysis 
 
Regression analysis is a statistical process for modelling and analyzing the 
relationship of a dependent variable with one or more independent variables. It is 
commonly used for prediction and forecasting, but it has also been utilized for 
achieving a better understanding of the relative importance of each independent 
variable in modelling the dependent variable. 
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In the negative binomial regression analysis performed herein, the initial number of 
variables studied were reduced based on the obtained results from correlation analysis 
and ANOVA. The independent variables included in the analysis are shown in Table 
I. For these variables, an additive, generalized linear model fit was calculated using 
MASS library in R [14]. An initial regression was performed to fit a model using all 
independent variables. Then, a stepwise regression process was utilized, according to 
which independent variables were added (forward regression) or removed (backward 
regression) and the so-called Akaike Information Criterion was employed to indicate 
whether a better model was achieved. By comparing the results of successive 
regression models, conclusions on omitting unnecessary variables were reached. 
 
Table I: Regression analysis results for superstructure condition rating. 
Variable	 Coefficient	Estimate	
-	 Intercept	=	-5.3E+00	
Length	(m)	 C1	=	-4.8E-05	
Maximum	span		(m)	 omitted	
Deck	width	(m)	 C2	=	7.1E-04	
Year	constructed	(date/year)	 C3	=	3.6E-03	
Detour	length	(km)	 C4	=	1.4E-04	
Average	Daily	Traffic	-	ADT	(vehicles)	 C5	=	2.7E-08	
Truck	traffic	(%	ADT)	 omitted	
Earthquake	hazard	-	PGA	(g)	 C6	=	4.9E-02	
Precipitation	(inches)	 C7	=	-5.6E-04	
Snow	depth	above	1	inch	(days)	 C8	=	1.6E-04	
Deicing	
	
Not	allowed	 -	
Allowed	 C9	=	-2.5E-02	
Material	 Concrete	continuous	 -	
	 Concrete	simple	 C10	=	-9.6E-03	
	 Prestressed	concrete	continuous	 C10	=	2.1E-02	
	 Prestresssed	concrete	simple	 C10	=	1.8E-02	
	 Steel	continuous	 C10	=	9.8E-04	
	 Steel	simple	 C10	=	-4.6E-02	
Water	Underneath	 No	 -	
	 Yes	 C11	=	-7.3E-03	
 
In the regression function obtained, the logarithm of the superstructure condition 
rating is equated to an intercept term and the added independent variables multiplied 
by each variable’s coefficient: 
 
 ln (Superstructure Condition) = Intercept + C1*Length + C2* Deck width 
 + C3* Year of construction + C4*Detour Length+ C5*ADT + C6*PGA 
 + C7*Precipitation + C8*Snow depth + C9*Deicing + C10*Material 
 + C11*Water underneath (1) 
 
The intercept term is a grand average of the dependent variable, while the effect of 
the various independent variables is indicated by the estimated coefficients provided 
in Table I. The categorical independent variables included in this table are handled 
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through binary dummy variables (one dummy variable is introduced for each group of 
a categorical variable). These dummy variables can take only the values of 1 (to 
activate the coefficient for the specific group) or 0 (to deactivate it). For example, as 
regards superstructure material, there is no coefficient for ‘concrete continuous’, thus 
C10 is deactivated (the dummy variables for all other groups take the value 0), i.e. 
Eq. (1) is by default calibrated for the particular material. If another material is used, 
then Eq. (1) needs a ‘correction’ to shift its result, which is achieved by activating the 
C10-value (with a dummy variable value equal to 1) of the corresponding group of 
Table I. Clearly, only one group of a categorical variable and its coefficient value can 
be active and have a dummy variable value equal to 1 at any time (all other dummy 
variable values for the remaining groups of the categorical variable are equal to 0 to 
deactivate the corresponding regression coefficients). 
 
The increase of the value of each independent variable causes either increase or 
decrease of the value of superstructure condition, depending on the sign of the 
respective regression coefficient. The regression analysis results reveal the most 
influencing factor, which is the year of bridge construction, as well as the least 
influencing ones, which are the bridges’ geometric characteristics. The traffic 
characteristics appear to have a small effect on the superstructure condition. Indeed, 
the results for ADT are in agreement with the corresponding results obtained with 
ANOVA in the previous section. The same applies for earthquake hazard, with 
increase of the PGA value having a positive effect on superstructure condition. 
Increased annual precipitation and days of snowfall above 1 inch cause a decrease in 
superstructure condition. The same applies for bridges, which are located in deicing 
regions or have water underneath. Furthermore, the structural materials used in 
superstructures appear to have effects similar to the ones observed with ANOVA. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, factors affecting the superstructure condition of bridges were studied 
using data from existing bridges located in the US. To perform this task, recorded 
inspection data for more than 600,000 bridges included in the NBI database were 
utilized. Since the US territory contains a large variety of environmental exposures, 
the databases of NOAA and USGS were used to introduce additional (non-NBI) 
variables regarding climate and earthquake hazard. To estimate data values for each 
bridge location, spatial interpolation methods were implemented. The combined 
dataset including NBI and non-NBI data was then analysed using data analysis 
procedures, to determine which variables affect the structural condition of bridges. 
 
The exploratory data analysis performed showed that there are low correlations 
among the selected NBI variables in contrast to climate variables, which were 
moderately to highly intercorrelated. ANOVA and multiple comparisons revealed 
useful patterns, which indicated the effect of each variable to structural condition 
rating. Moreover, the analysis showed the existence of certain thresholds, after which 
variables have a different effect to the condition ratings, such as the deicing policy 
implemented and the days of snow depth above 1 inch: although the deicing region 
coincides with the region of more than 0.5 days of snowfall above 1 inch, further 
increase in days of snowfall do not affect superstructure condition rating. 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
195
 
The regression analysis confirmed that superstructure condition is mostly affected by: 
1. Year of construction 
2. Materials of superstructure 
3. Earthquake hazard 
4. Deicing practices region 
5. Precipitation 
6. Water underneath. 
 
Less important factors for the superstructure condition were: 
1. Average daily traffic 
2. Truck traffic 
3. Detour length 
4. Geometric characteristics 
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Abstract  
 
 
In this article, we present a simulation-based approach for measuring risk and 
resilience, which combines the assessment of potential threats for individual 
infrastructures with the estimation of their resilience against those threats. In 
particular, our approach focuses not only on the individual infrastructures but takes 
the whole network of critical infrastructures (within a region or an entire state) into 
account. To achieve that, we explicitly consider the network of critical 
infrastructures, which is made up by the interdependencies between the individual 
infrastructures. By applying stochastic models, the cascading effects of an incident 
within this critical infrastructure network can be simulated. Using a simplified 
example, we show how the risk and resilience measure can be computed and how the 
results can be interpreted.  
 
Keywords: risk and resilience measure, critical infrastructure network, cascading 
effects 
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 1 Introduction  
 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) provide core functionalities for the well-being of society, 
including the supply with necessary utilities (power, gas or water), communication 
infrastructures as well as goods and medical care. In recent years, CIs have become 
an attractive target for attackers, in particular from the cyber domain, and such attacks 
might cause a limitation of the infrastructures operation or even a complete shutdown 
(as, for example, the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 [1], [2]). 
Furthermore, the constantly growing number of ever more complex connections 
between the individual CIs increased the degree of mutual dependencies among them. 
Thus, the interconnected network of CIs, e.g., within a region or a state, has 
developed into an overall system that is sensitive to disruptions [3]–[6].  
Because of these strongly interrelated dependencies, an impairment or even total 
failure of a critical infrastructure not only affects this infrastructure alone but may 
also have an impact on a number of other critical infrastructures as well as on the 
economic and social well-being of the population (cf. for example [7]–[11]). 
Therefore, an in-depth risk and resilience management has become a core duty of 
critical infrastructure operators to be aware of the effects and consequences of 
incidents potentially threatening the infrastructure. Although such systems to assess 
risk and resilience of a CI are often already used by the operators, it is difficult to take 
the complex dependencies to other CIs into account and evaluate the cascading 
effects of an incident on the entire system.  
In the course of a national research project called CERBERUS (Cross Sectoral Risk 
Management for Object Protection of Critical Infrastructures), which was funded by 
the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), we developed a simulation-based 
analysis which considers aspects from risk as well as resilience management. For this 
purpose, stochastic models (in particular Markov chains) are used, which describe the 
potential consequences of interdependencies between different CIs. The effects of a 
capacity reduction or a total failure of an infrastructure are simulated on the basis of 
this model over a fixed period of time.  
In this article, we want to describe how this simulation-based analysis can be used in 
practice to evaluate a risk and a resilience level of the individual CIs in a CI network. 
The main focus is to identify and estimate cascading effects among the CIs, which 
can manifest due to the interdependencies in the CI network. To achieve that, we 
combine elements of a static and a dynamic risk analysis with a methodology to 
compute resilience. All three models are build on the same stochastic model for 
describing the operational states of a CI and how these can change due to external 
influences. In more detail, we will provide a short overview in the following Section 
2 on how we use the concept of CI interdependency graphs in our approach. Section 3 
describes how the static and dynamic risk model is defined and how the simulation is 
building on these models. The resilience model is sketched in Section 4 and Section 5 
brings both models together in an example, showing the results of the risk and 
resilience computation. Interpretation and additional thoughts on the results are given 
in Section 0. 
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2 CI Interdependency Graph 
 
The approach developed in the course of the CERBERUS project builds upon the 
concept of the CI interdependency graph. The modelling of interdependencies among 
critical infrastructures has been widely discussed in the literature [3]–[6] and 
therefore this concept is extensively used by several approaches. Particularly when it 
comes to describing and simulating cascading effects among the critical 
infrastructures, the CI interdependency graph is used as a basic structure for the 
simulation and estimation of cascading effects [12]–[16]. The main benefit of such a 
graph representation is that general graph-theoretic concepts and algorithms can be 
applied to describe the propagation of the effects of an incident through the network 
of interrelated critical infrastructures. 
In more detail, our approach represents each CI as 
a node and each dependency between two critical 
infrastructures as a directed edge. Let’s consider a 
water provider 𝑊 as critical infrastructure that 
depends on a power provider 𝑃 to supply 
electricity and the transport infrastructure 𝑇 for the 
supply with materials and other equipment (cf. 
Error! Reference source not found.). In the 
infrastructure graph, we can indicate these two 
dependencies as directed edges from the nodes 𝑃 
and 𝑇 to the node 𝑊. Furthermore, the water 
provider is an essential supplier for other CIs, e.g., 
a hospital 𝐻 and a food supplier 𝐹; both require 
water in their daily business to work properly. This 
is represented by a directed edge from 𝑊 to 𝐻 and 𝐹. In this way, an interdependency graph for all the 
CIs within a region or a state can be built up, 
indicating a general “supplier / customer” 
relationships between them.  
However, the graph itself does not provide any details on how much the individual 
infrastructures influence each other. Therefore, the interdependency graph in our 
approach takes one step further and models the operational state of each CI, i.e., each 
node can be in one of several different states, since an incident within a critical 
infrastructure might not always (and immediately) cause its total breakdown. Rather 
an impairment in the functionality of the power provider 𝑃 could have a small or 
large effect on the operational state of the water provider 𝑊, depending on how 
dependent CI 𝑊 is on the resource or service provided by CI 𝑃. Thus, each node has 𝑛 different operational states 𝑘!, which can be represented by categories (𝑘!⋯ 𝑘!) or 
colors, and each state is connected (via the dependency between the two CIs) with the 
operational state of its suppliers. Hence, the operational state of a CI may or may not 
change depending on the operational state of its suppliers.  
 
 
Figure 1 Simple illustration of  
the CI interdependency model 
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3 Risk Analysis 
 
The risk model consists of two main components, the static and the dynamic risk 
model. The static risk model focuses on the basic characteristics within a CI by 
breaking it down into individual components. In the dynamic risk model, the 
operational states of a CI and how they can change due to dependencies on other CIs 
are considered. Risk analysis is then achieved by simulating the effects of an incident 
on the dependent critical infrastructures, which can lead to a partial or total failure of 
one or multiple CIs.  
 
3.1 Static Risk Model 
The static risk analysis in our approach is based on detailed information about the 
individual CIs in the network and describes their internal structure and generally uses 
the principle of a gap analysis. The existing measures and controls, which are already 
implemented within a CI, are compared with the potential threats and the extent to 
which the measures affect the respective threat is analyzed. For each control, a 
maturity level can be specified which describes the effectiveness of the control 
against a particular threat and thus influences its effects.  
In the course of a risk assessment, both the relevant threats and the implemented 
measures are identified for each infrastructure. In principle, we follow the intuitive 
rule: the higher the degree of maturity, the lower the damage caused by a hazard. The 
damage can be expressed in various term, i.e., by an abstract qualitative scale, by the 
monetary loss directly connected to the effects of the threat, or by using several 
different indicators to assess the effects in multiple domains. In the context of CIs, the 
monetary approach is not the best one since a failure within a CI will often effects on 
the society itself, which can’t be measured in monetary terms. For the remainder of 
the article, we will use an abstract scale of ordinal numbers based on the operational 
state of the CI to describe the impact of a threat. This scale will range from 1 to 3, 
where “1” means that there is no problem and the CI is fully operational, “2” 
indicates that there are some problems but the CI is still working to some extent and 
“3” represents a complete breakdown of the CI. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Risk Model 
The dynamic risk analysis builds upon the CI interdependency graph described in 
Section 2 above, i.e., on the relations between the CIs, and on the operational state of 
each individual infrastructure (cf. Figure 2). A CI can be in one of 𝑛 different 
operational states, given as a category 𝑘 that we hereafter synonymously associate 
with the CI’s state, and the CI might change from one state to another based on the 
operational states of its suppliers. In order to model a state change, each edge between 
two CIs is extended by a multinomial distributed random variable [17], which 
describes the probability that, e.g., the water provider 𝑊 goes from state 𝑘! to 𝑘! 
based on the current state of the power provider 𝑃. This can be understood as a 
(generalized) Markov chain, similarly to the approach described in [15], [16].  
To describe this in a more formal way (cf. also [18]), we model each individual CI as 
a bipartite weighted graph, i.e., each node in the CI interdependency graph also has a 
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graph structure (as displayed in Figure 2). This sub-graph representing an individual 
CI consists of two sets of nodes, i.e., one set 𝑉! representing the combination of all 
possible operational states for all of the CI’s supplier nodes, and one set 𝑉! 
representing the different possible states which the CI itself can be in. Looking at our 
running example, each CI can be in one of three different operational statuses, 
ranging from “1” (fully operational) to “3” (complete breakdown). Thus, 𝑉! consists 
of 𝑛 = 3 nodes in our example and 𝑉! consists of a multiple of three nodes based on 
the number of suppliers for the CI (e.g., with two suppliers, 𝑉! would consist of six 
nodes). In this sub-graph, the edges run from 𝑉! to 𝑉!; each edge has a weight 𝑝!" 
indicating the probability that the CI changes to the state 𝑣! ∈ 𝑉! given that one of its 
suppliers is in state 𝑣! ∈ 𝑉!. These probabilities can then be arranged in matrix form, 
i.e., as a transition matrix. Hence, these weighted edges formally described the fact 
that a change in the operational state of one CI is based on the operational state of its 
suppliers.    
Moreover, since there might me several suppliers for one CI, the set 𝑉! takes all 
possible operational states of all the suppliers into account. Accordingly, there will be 
in general more than one edge leading to one of the nodes in 𝑉! (i.e., to one of the CIs 
operational states). In this case, there might be several options in which operational 
state a CI could end up in. Therefore, we are using a maximum approach, i.e., after 
evaluating the probabilities given by the edges from 𝑉! to 𝑉!, we take the worst case 
state (i.e., the highest number) as the new operational state of the CI.  
 
 
Figure 2 Description of the internal graph model for a specific CI 
 
Referring to our scenario, the water provider 𝑊 has two suppliers it depends on (cf. 
Figure 2). In case the road to the water power plant is blocked and thus the 
transportation infrastructure breaks down (i.e., it changes to state “3”), the immediate 
effect on the water provider 𝑊 might be minimal. We assume that 𝑊 does not need 
constant supply for its daily business and can still operate at full capacity for some 
time even if the transportation infrastructure 𝑇 is blocked. Thus, the state change in 𝑇 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
202
from “1” to “3” will not change the state of 𝑊. In terms of the sub-graph representing 
the water provider W, there is an edge from one node 𝑡! ∈ 𝑉! (which represents 𝑇 
being in state “3”) leading to 𝑤! ∈ 𝑉! (which represents 𝑊 being in state “1”) with 
the weight 1. Further, if the power provider 𝑃 suffers severe damage and has to shut 
down (i.e., changes its operational state to “3”), the water provider might be seriously 
affected. Hence, there is an edge from one node 𝑝! ∈ 𝑉! (which represents 𝑃 being in 
state “3”) leading to 𝑤! ∈ 𝑉! with weight 1. Thus, the water provider switches to state 
“3”, since there is no emergency power supply in our example. Further, this also 
represents the worst case for the water provider and thus 𝑊 will go into state “3”.  
 
3.3 Dynamic Simulation Model 
Based on the specification of the dynamic risk model in the previous section, 
simulations are used to describe the evolution of the overall CI network in case one or 
more CIs are exposed to a threat. This is achieved by implementing and evaluating 
the stochastic model based on a specific incident initiated in the beginning by the user 
and by performing a large number of simulation runs. Based on that, the operational 
states of the CIs in the network change according to their interdependencies which 
will lead to an overall finite state at the end of a simulation run. When looking at the 
total number of runs, the distribution over these final operational states for each CI 
can be estimated, providing an overview on the cascading effects of the incident 
within the entire CI network. 
Additionally, to achieve a more realistic impression of the CI network’s evolution, we 
further extend the graph model and the Markov chain model described above with a 
time-dependent aspect, thus allowing the chain to be inhomogeneous. Therefore, we 
allow the weights of the edges between 𝑉! and 𝑉!, i.e., the probabilities for a change 
of the operational state, to change during the runtime of the simulation. Thus, we can 
also model the case that a threat becomes more sever the longer it affects a CI. For 
example, taking a complete outage of the power supplier 𝑃, the water provider might 
still be able to fulfill its services for some time, because an emergency power 
generator is present. However, when the capacity of the emergency generator is 
exhausted, the water provider will become seriously affected and also have to shut 
down due to the lack of power supply.  
Technically, this time-dependency of the state changes can be realized using 
individual transition matrices for the different time periods. In the course of the 
CERBERUS project, we are looking at three time frames, i.e. short, medium and long 
term. These time frames can be defined individually for each CI, since short, medium 
and long term have different meanings for different sectors. As briefly mentioned 
above, the blocking of the transportation infrastructure could be tolerated for much 
longer time than the lack of a power supply. 
Practically, the probabilities for each of the individual transition matrices have to be 
defined. Accordingly, the more operational states are used and the more fine grained 
the time frames are defined, the more values need to be gathered, most likely from 
experts. Hence, a trade-off is required between the accuracy and efficiency when 
using the model in a real-life environment. In the CERBERUS project, we found that 
using three operational states and three time frames represents a practically feasible 
tradeoff. 
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 4 Resilience Model 
 
For measuring resilience, we are also relying on the CI interdependency graph as a 
basis and understand the term as the ability to “resist” the consequences of an 
incident. Therefore, [19] defines the resilience for a CI 𝑊 as  
 
 𝑅 𝑊 = 𝜔!!!!! ∙ 𝑃!,! − 𝐸 𝐼!,!  (1) 
 
with the sum running over all considered scenarios 𝑠, 𝜔! being the probability of the 
respective scenario to occur, 𝐸 𝐼!,!  denoting the expected impact for the CI 𝑊 and 𝑃!,! indicating the preparedness of CI 𝑊 against the scenario 𝑠. The resulting 
number 𝑅 𝑊  representing the resilience can either be positive, which indicates a 
good robustness or negative, which indicates that additional measures need to be 
taken. It has to be noted that the sum in (1) is a weighted average over all considered 
scenarios. Hence, if the resilience is negative, the preparedness against the individual 
threat scenarios will contribute to a different amount to this value. Accordingly, when 
measures to increase the preparedness are considered, they will not equally help to 
increase the resilience measure.  
For estimating the parameters required to compute the resilience measure, detailed 
information about the CI and its dependencies is used (cf. also [19]); such information 
is already at hand from the risk analysis described in the previous sections. In detail, 
the static risk model described in the previous Section 3.1 provides a list of the 
controls and measures, which are implemented in a CI. Based on the maturity level 
that is assigned to each of the measures, the preparedness level 𝑃!,! can be estimated, 
i.e., the higher the maturity level, the better the preparedness. Further, the impact is 
coming directly from the dynamic model and the simulation approach described in 
Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, respectively. More precisely, the simulation describes the 
operational state of all CIs in the network when a specific threat scenario affects one 
(or more) CIs in the network. Since the simulation is based on a stochastic process, 
we take the expected impact 𝐸 𝐼!,!  as each impact category (from “1” to “3”) 
weighted with the respective probability coming out of the simulation process. 
Finally, the list of the threat scenarios that need to be considered can come from a 
classical risk analysis. As part of this, also the probabilities of a scenario to occur are 
estimated by experts within the CIs. 
 
5 Example 
5.1 Example Setup 
For our example, we are looking at a water provider at the core of a CI network 
consisting of infrastructures from several different sectors (this example is based on 
previous work in [18], an illustration is given in FIG). Besides a power plant, a 
hospital and a (generic) food supplier, we model the electric power grid, the 
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telecommunication network and the gas distribution network as single node for 
reasons of simplicity. Additionally, we also consider an emergency gas supply, i.e., a 
node which can provide gas for a limited amount of time in case the gas distribution 
network encounters any problems. Furthermore, we also look into the water provider 
and model its internal components: a mountain spring, a river spring, a water well, a 
river pump, a water well pump, a water reservoir, and a water facility. Thereby, we 
want to show that our simulation approach can handle the external view on CIs as 
well as their complex internal structure.  
In the example, we look at three different scenarios. These scenarios mark the initial 
events of the simulation (but could also take place a certain point in time later on), 
have a specific duration and affect one or more of the CIs in the network. The first 
scenario is a classical natural threat, i.e., an extreme weather condition, which lasts 
for three hours and affects the electrical grid. The second scenario describes a 
technical threat, i.e., an accident with hazardous goods, which lasts for two hours and 
affects the natural gas network and the hospital. The third scenario is a cyber threat, 
i.e., an attack by hackers on the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems controlling the pumps within the water provider. This attack causes the 
pumps to stop their operation immediately at the beginning of the simulation.  
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Figure 3 Illustration of the example setup 
 
5.2 Simulation  
As a main output, the simulation computes the final operational states of all CIs 
within the network and also keeps track of the intermediate changes in the network. 
Therefore, a large number of simulation runs (the number can be chosen by the user) 
is carried out and the statistics are created for all runs. In this way, the user obtains a 
distribution over how often a CI ended in one of the three operational states. Further, 
the simulation also provides a percentage of the intermediate state changes, i.e., the 
numbers how often the state of one CI changes from “1” to “2”, from “2” to “3” and 
from “1” to “3”. In this connection, the results also show the most common trigger for 
a state change, i.e., for each CI 𝑋 it shows which other CI 𝑌 that CI 𝑋 is directly 
depending on caused the operational state of CI 𝑋 to change. This information can be 
used to identify CIs in the network, which cause a lot of problems at other CIs due to 
their interdependence. Additionally, the simulation also keeps track of the results of 
each individual run. Hence, a chronological record of each CI’s operational state 
changes can be generated, which indicates at which point in time a CI switched to a 
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more critical state. Furthermore, it is also recorded which CI triggered a state change 
in another critical infrastructure in each individual run, too.    
 
Figure 4 Distribution of the final states  
for the water plant after all simulations 
 
Figure 5 Number and time when the  
water plant was in final state “2”  
 
Figure 6 Distribution of the final states  
for the hospital after all simulations 
 
Figure 7 Percentage of state change  
for the hospital 
 
With regards to the three scenarios defined in the previous section, we performed 
1000 simulation runs and will focus only on the average outcomes from all of those 
runs (and not look at individual runs) since those results will be relevant to compute 
the risk and resilience for individual CIs. Further, we will only focus on three CIs in 
the overall network, i.e., the water provider, the food supplier and the hospital, to 
provide examples of how the risk and resilience can be computed for these three 
infrastructures. Table 1 presents the percentages of the final operational states for the 
three CIs at the end of the simulations. From that, we can already see that for all three 
scenarios, the water plant never reaches a complete breakdown (state “3”), whereas 
the hospital will have a high chance to end up in this most critical state.   
  
 
state “2” state “3” 
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Table 1 Simulation output for the three scenarios 
 Scenario 1:  
Weather 
Scenario 2:  
Accident 
Scenario 3:  
Cyber Attack 
 Operational State Operational State Operational State 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Water 
Plant 56,8% 43,2% 0,0% 19,1% 80,9% 0,0% 0,0% 100% 0,0% 
Hospital 16,6% 13,5% 69,9% 2,5% 11,8% 85,7% 1,7% 8,1% 90,2% 
Food 
Supply 63,2% 24,6% 12,2% 33,2% 45,2% 21,6% 16,7% 59,1% 24,2% 
 
To compute the risk for each CI under each of the scenarios, we are relying on the 
classical formula Risk = Probability × Impact. In this context, we use the operational 
state as an abstract notion of impact and take the weighted sum over all three states 
(which corresponds to the Expected Impact 𝐸 𝐼!,!  from eq. (1) above). The 
likelihood for each scenario is usually estimated by experts or taken from historical 
data. For our small example, we make some guesses and thus a risk value for the 
scenarios as given in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Risk values for each CI and for the respective scenario 
 Scenario 1:  
Weather 
Scenario 2:  
Accident 
Scenario 3:  
Cyber Attack 
 Prob. Imp. Risk Prob. Imp. Risk Prob. Imp. Risk 
Water 
Plant 0,33 1,43 0,47 0,20 1,81 0,36 0,15 2,00 0,30 
Hospital 0,33 2,53 0,84 0,20 2,83 0,57 0,15 2,89 0,43 
Food 
Supply 0,33 1,49 0,49 0,20 1,88 0,38 0,15 2,08 0,31 
 
Looking at the resilience, we take the formula given in eq. (1) to compute the values 
for each of the three CIs. The only value missing is the preparedness of each 
individual CI against each of the scenarios. As already mentioned in Section 3.1 
above, the preparedness can be derived from the maturity of security measures or 
controls already implemented by the CI. Since there will be, in general, a number of 
different controls at various maturity levels, we will have to take an average over 
these levels; for reasons of simplicity, we chose integers as preparedness levels. In 
detail, we estimated the water plant to be very prepared (“3”) for scenario 1 but 
hardly prepared (“1”) for scenarios 2 and 3. The hospital is rather well prepared (“2”) 
for scenarios 1 and 2 but hardly prepared for scenario 3 and the food supplier is 
hardly prepared for all three scenarios. Thus, we obtain the results given in Table 3 
below. 
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Table 3 Resilience values for the three CIs 
 Water Plant Hospital Food Supply 
Resilience 0,21 - 0,63 - 0,50 
 
 
6 Interpretation of Results 
 
When looking at the risk values given in Table 2, we can directly see that they are no 
longer expressed in the same abstract categories as the impact (i.e., categories “1” to 
“3”). More precisely, values can be between 0 and 3, although risk values around or 
larger than 1,5 already represent high impact events which are highly likely to occur. 
Therefore, a risk scale needs to be defined, either for each CI individually or a general 
one for all CIs in the network. For example, a three tier scale with categories “low”, 
“medium” and “high” could be defined, where values up to 0,66 are considered as a 
“low” risk, values up to 1,5 are considered as “medium” risk and risk values starting 
from 1,5 and above are treated as “high” risks. In this case, almost all risk values 
from our example would be in the “low” category (except for the hospital in scenario 
1). Since we just guessed the probabilities for this small example, a deeper inspection 
might show that, e.g., a cyber attack is much more likely to happen which could bring 
risk values in the “medium” category. This already indicates the importance of 
choosing adequate values for the probability of a scenario but also of defining 
suitable risk categories to fit a CI’s requirements. 
Regarding the resilience, there is an interpretation already given in [19] stating that a 
positive value reflects that the CI is – on average – well prepared against all scenarios 
considered. Accordingly, a negative value indicates that the maturity of existing 
measures should be developed or additional measures should be implemented to 
increase the preparedness of the CI. In our given example, we can see that the water 
plant has enough measures set in place for the considered scenarios although it is not 
well prepared for scenarios 2 and 3. This shows that the resilience measure only 
returns an average score and that there still might be opportunities for improvements 
in the individual preparedness levels. Additionally, we can see from the hospital that 
a high potential impact requires a very high preparedness level. This reflects quite 
well the real-life conditions since if there is a potential threat which could cause a 
rather big impact, respective security measures need to be implemented to strengthen 
the infrastructure’s resilience and reduce the risk.   
 
7 Conclusion  
 
In this article, we presented an approach to compute a risk and resilience measure for 
interdependent CIs. The approach is based on a stochastic model, which allows to 
simulate the change of the CIs’ operational states over time. In this way, the 
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cascading effects of a single incident happening to one of the CIs can be described 
and taken into account when evaluating the risk and the resilience of the individual 
CIs in the overall network. This provides a comprehensive overview on the risk and 
resilience of an entire CI network and allows to support the decision making process 
on which security measures should be implemented.  
There are still some limitations to the approach, one of them being that the impact and 
preparedness are treated as abstract categories but the probability of a scenario is 
given as a decimal number. This makes the results more difficult to interpret; 
however, simply using categories for the probability does not solve the issue. A 
second limitation is that the preparedness of a CI needs to be estimated. The concept 
presented here, i.e., looking at the maturity of security measures already implemented 
by the CI, marks a good starting point but retrieving the information on the maturity 
level and combining these levels into one value is still an issue. Thus, we are looking 
to solutions towards these limitations and in our future research. 
 
8 Acknowledgements 
 
This work was conducted in context of the project “Cross Sectoral Risk Management 
for Object Protection of Critical Infrastructures (CERBERUS)”, supported by the 
Austrian Research Promotion Agency under grant no. 854766. 
 
9 References 
 
[1] E-ISAC, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid,” 
Washington, USA, 2016. 
[2] J. Condliffe, “Ukraine’s Power Grid Gets Hacked Again, a Worrying Sign for 
Infrastructure Attacks,” 22-Dec-2016. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603262/ukraines-power-grid-gets-hacked-
again-a-worrying-sign-for-infrastructure-attacks/. [Accessed: 26-Jul-2017]. 
[3] S. M. Rinaldi, J. P. Peerenboom, and T. K. Kelly, “Identifying, understanding, 
and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies,” IEEE Control Systems, 
vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 11–25, 2001. 
[4] D. D. Dudenhoeffer, M. R. Permann, and M. Manic, “CIMS: A Framework for 
Infrastructure Interdependency Modeling and Analysis,” in Proceedings of the 
2006 Winter Simulation Conference, Monterey, USA, 2006, pp. 478–485. 
[5] Y. Y. Haimes, “Hierarchical Holographic Modeling,” IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, vol. 11, no. 9, pp. 606–617, 1981. 
[6] R. Setola and S. D. Porcellinis, “Critical Infrastructure Dependency Assessment 
Using the Input-Output Inoperability Model,” IJCIP, vol. 2, pp. 170–178, 2009. 
[7] J. Reichl and M. Schmidthaler, “Blackouts in Österreich (BlackÖ.1) - 
Endbericht,” Linz, Österreich, 2011. 
[8] J. Reichl et al., “Blackoutprävention und -intervention - Endbericht,” Linz, 
Österreich, 2015. 
Proceedings of the 56th ESReDA Seminar, May 23-24, 2019 
Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria 
210
[9] Schweizer Bundesbahnen SBB, “Nationaler Stromausfall: netzweiter 
Stromunterbruch auf dem Bahnnetz,” 2005. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.sbb.ch/de/meta/news.html/2005/6/26822. [Accessed: 05-Apr-
2018]. 
[10] H. Pidd, “India blackouts leave 700 million without power,” The Guardian, 
2012. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/31/india-blackout-electricity-
power-cuts. [Accessed: 21-Mar-2018]. 
[11] S. C. Srivasta, A. Velayutham, K. K. Agrawal, and A. S. Bakshi, “Report of the 
Enquiry Committee on Grid Disturbance in Northern Region on 30th July 2012 
and in Norther, Eastern and Noth-Eastern Region on 31st July 2012,” Ministry 
of Power, Government of India, New Dehli, India, 2012. 
[12] T. J. Gordon and H. Hayward, “Initial experiments with the cross impact matrix 
method of forecasting,” Futures, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 100–116, 1968. 
[13] M. Turoff, “An alternative approach to cross impact analysis,” Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 3, pp. 309–339, 1971. 
[14] Z. Wang, A. Scaglione, and R. J. Thomas, “A Markov-Transition Model for 
Cascading Failures in Power Grids,” in 2012 45th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, 2012, pp. 2115–2124. 
[15] M. Rahnamay-Naeini, Z. Wang, N. Ghani, A. Mammoli, and M. M. Hayat, 
“Stochastic Analysis of Cascading-Failure Dynamics in Power Grids,” IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 1767–1779, 2014. 
[16] M. Rahnamay-Naeini and M. M. Hayat, “Cascading Failures in Interdependent 
Infrastructures: An Interdependent Markov-Chain Approach,” IEEE 
Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 1997–2006, 2016. 
[17] S. König and S. Rass, “Stochastic Dependencies Between Critical 
Infrastructures,” presented at the SECURWARE 2017, The Eleventh 
International Conference on Emerging Security Information, Systems and 
Technologies, Rome, Italy, 2017, pp. 106–110. 
[18] T. Grafenauer, S. König, S. Rass, and S. Schauer, “A Simulation Tool for 
Cascading Effects in Interdependent Critical Infrastructures,” in ARES 2018 
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability 
and Security, Hamburg, Germany, 2018, pp. 1–8. 
[19] S. König, T. Schaberreiter, S. Rass, and S. Schauer, “A Measure for Resilience 
of Critical Infrastructures,” in Critical Information Infrastructures Security, 
Kaunas, Lithuania, 2019, pp. 55–71. 
Critical Services continuity, Resilience and Security
211
Refining Stochastic Models of Critical Infrastructures by 
Observation 
 
 
Stefan Rass 
Institute of Applied Informatics, Universität Klagenfurt 
Universitätsstrasse 65-67 
9020, Klagenfurt, Austria 
 
Stefan Schauer 
Center for Digital Safety & Security, AIT Austrian Institute of Technology 
Lakeside B10a  
9020 Klagenfurt, Austria  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The simulation of cascading effects in networks of critical infrastructures (CIs) can 
be approached in various ways, all of which at some point call for the specification of 
(numeric) model parameters. Taking stochastic models as one popular class of 
methods, finding proper settings for the values that determine the stochastic models 
can be a challenge. In this work, we describe a method of graphical specification of a 
probability value on a qualitative scale, and how to convert and use the obtained 
value as a prior for Bayesian statistics. The connection is made to the point of having 
the initial value specified only as an “initial guess”, which can be refined using 
Bayesian statistics. Eventually, under consistency conditions depending on the 
application, this amounts to an online learning approach that takes the parameter to 
convergence towards their true values, based on the user’s subjective initial guess, 
but never challenging a person to give a reliable number for a probabilistic 
parameter. 
 
Keywords: simulation, cascading effect, risk management, stochastic model, security 
 
1  Introduction 
Among the biggest challenges in stochastic models is probability. Scientists often 
provide people with sophisticated model having beautiful theoretical properties, but 
left with the highly nontrivial challenge of finding proper values for a set of 
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parameters, many of which are probabilities. What if the person simply does not have 
these values or cannot reliably estimate them? This work proposes to avoid the issue 
of pulling numbers “out of the air”, by instead resorting to a purely graphical method 
to specify probabilities. Probabilistic modelling has the appeal of being easy to define 
and plausible to use, yet the ease of model specification turns into a difficulty when 
creating a model instance in many cases. Suppose that the model includes some 
probability parameter 𝑝 that “simply” quantifies the likelihood of some event to 
occur; for example, the impact of an incident on related parts in a system (e.g., a 
dependent infrastructure). Likewise, we may use a parameter (probability) 𝑝 to 
describe the likelihood of a threat along risk analysis, or call 𝑝 the likelihood for 
human error to bring the human element into a model. How do we set such values in 
practice? It is tempting to use them in a model because they are easy to argue and 
statistics enjoys a solid mathematical fundament, but the practitioner facing the 
challenge of assigning some reasonable value to the variable 𝑝 may find this to be an 
almost impossible task to accomplish reliably. In many cases, the setting of such 
parameters thus resorts to choices on qualitative scales, say, defining the probability 
just to be “low” or “high”, with the meaning of these values remaining vague or 
defined by representative standard values specified elsewhere. In many practical 
cases when people try to apply or use (not define or invent) stochastic models, the 
choice of probability parameters is a matter of asking experts for numbers that they 
simply do not have. This can practically limit the applicability of such models despite 
any theoretical beauty. 
Statistics has lots to offer to people seeking to estimate parameters of stochastic 
models, since the whole theory of point- and interval estimation is dedicated to the 
problem of finding values or ranges of values for unknown quantities. Common to 
most of these techniques is their use of empirical data to compute the estimators. In 
risk management, and particularly in the context of critical infrastructures (CIs), the 
situation is just not satisfying the assumptions: data is scarce, and we cannot expect 
having hundreds of data samples from past incidents in a critical infrastructure 
(simply because the CI would not have survived the necessary lot of incidents to 
gather enough data for a statistically reliable estimation). 
Instead, we need to come up with a reasonable initial guess for the probabilistic 
parameters and look for a way to refine that value upon continuous experience. 
Bayesian estimation thus appears as a reasonable way to go, and this work describes a 
very straightforward and easy to implement version of such a Bayesian estimation 
approach, where we explicitly exploit the absence of much prior knowledge as an 
advantage. Indeed, if there is not too much robust prior knowledge about how a 
probability parameter should be set numerically, this also means that any choice is as 
good as the other. While it would not make sense to step forward by just picking 
parameter values at random, the Bayesian method is much more elegant in letting us 
choose a prior distribution to our own convenience, and – realistically reflecting the 
uncertainty of the person instantiating the model – leaving the parameter 𝑝 actually 
unspecified in the beginning. The actual value for 𝑝 is then obtained from the prior 
distribution in first place, and iteratively refined by bringing in experience about the 
model performance to continuously refine it towards an accurate setting for the real 
model. 
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To the end of using that method for model parameterization, we thus have to devise 
(i) a method to pick a reasonable initial guess for a parameter 𝑝 (as described in 
Section 3), and (ii) describe a method to define that guess, which assures that we will 
eventually end up with the correct value for 𝑝 over the long run (as covered in 
Section 4).  
As a running example, we will pick a specific model to describe critical infrastructure 
dependencies, to study cascading effects by simulation. Our choice of the 
CERBERUS model [1] is arbitrary here, and can be replaced by any other stochastic 
model based on Markov chains, percolation theory, or others. The palette is rich, and 
we refer the reader to [2]–[11] for models to which our work may offer an aid to get a 
practical instance, meaning concrete numeric settings, for the involved probability 
parameters. 
2 The CERBERUS Risk Simulation Model 
Consider a network of interdependent critical infrastructures that we represent as a 
directed graph 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) with edges 𝐴 → 𝐵 meaning that CI 𝐵 somehow depends 
on CI 𝐴. For example, 𝐴 could provide energy, water, food, transport, etc. for 𝐵. To 
all infrastructures in the (node) set 𝑉, we assign one out of 𝑘 possible operational 
states, reflecting their degree of “health”. Typically, this state ranges from “fully 
functional” (state 1) to “outage” (state 𝑘), with intermediate states from 2 to 𝑘 − 1 
corresponding to ascending limitations in a CI’s service(s). The dependency of a CI 𝐵 
on one or more of its providers may be of arbitrary form and dynamic. For example, a 
CI may have providers that it vitally depends on, or whose service can be substituted 
for a limited period of time (e.g., emergency power generators can cover a power 
outage for some time, until they run out of fuel). Other dynamics of dependency may 
involve the kind of service more explicitly, say, if CI 𝐵 relies on online-services of 𝐴 
(e.g., an outsourced data center) in order to coordinate the shipping of goods from 
another provider C to 𝐵. 
Commonly, authors distinguish the type of dependency here, dividing it into physical 
dependencies (e.g., supply with physical utilities), cyber-dependencies (e.g., 
communication and data exchange), geographic dependency (often physical 
proximity or reachability), and others (cf. [6], [12]–[15]), including temporal 
dependencies (that are outside our scope here since we look for the setting of 
probability parameters). 
To study cascading effects in such models, we thus need to describe what happens to 
an infrastructure if its providers fail. While there is lots of work on understanding 
dependencies (see [16] for a considerable collection of respective references), 
quantitative studies on how to describe the parameter value for some stochastic model 
are rare (not so the models themselves; see the references in the introduction). In this 
context, we want to highlight the work in [16], where an empirical study on how 
strong the impact of several critical infrastructures may be on others is provided. 
The CERBERUS model uses precisely such information to describe an infrastructure 
model and cascading effects therein in the following way: 
• The behavior of a CI 𝐵 is described by a bipartite graph, with two layers of 
nodes (see Figure 1): 
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o The top layer has exactly 𝑘 nodes, one for each operational state in 
which the CI can be 
o The bottom layer has 𝑘 nodes per CI 𝐴 that CI 𝐵 depends on. That is, 
each supplier CI 𝐴 is represented in the graph model as its own set of 𝑘 nodes, one per operational state of CI 𝐴, and every other supplier of 𝐵 having its own copy of these 𝑘 input nodes. 
• The bipartite inner graph is complete, meaning that there is an edge from each 
state node of each supplier to the overall state node of CI 𝐵. These edges are 
annotated by probabilities, indicating how likely it is that CI 𝐵 moves into 
state 𝑗, if infrastructure 𝐴 is in state ℓ. For each ℓ ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑘}, we thus have 
to specify a probability 𝑝ℓ! = Pr (CI B is put into state 𝑗| CI 𝐴 is in state ℓ). If 
the change is a (deterministic) fixed consequence, we can put 𝑝ℓ! ≔ 1 to 
model this. 
• Since the edges connect only two nodes at a time (the model is a graph, not a 
hypergraph), the effects of a supplier on 𝐵 are independent on what other 
suppliers do. Moreover, 𝐵 can be put into distinct operational states upon 
different of its providers changing their state individually. Intuitively, this 
reflects the real world quite well, since a problem at provider 𝐴! may cause 
only slight stress for CI 𝐵, while another (independent) problem at provider 𝐴! may have a substantial impact on 𝐵’s functionality. Thus, there is an 
aggregation function being applied on the states that probabilistically follow 
from the supplier states, which in the simplest case is just the maximum of all 
possible states that the suppliers may put 𝐵 into. For example, if provider 𝐴!’s 
failure puts 𝐵 into state “normal” (i.e., no immediate effect), but supplier 𝐴!’s 
outage causes severe problems in 𝐵, the overall state of 𝐵 is the worst of the 
two, set to be “severe problems”. 
This kind of maximum-aggregation assumes that higher state indices correspond to 
more severe problems (taking the lowest state as the best). Logically, it corresponds 
to an OR, since 𝐵 has troubles if at least one of its critical providers fails. This logic 
can be changed into an AND by resorting to a minimum-value aggregation, causing 
the state of 𝐵 to remain “healthy”, unless all of its providers fail. The proper choice 
per infrastructure is up to the application. 
 
 
Figure 1 CERBERUS Model (picture adapted from [2]) 
The CERBERUS model includes this simplification to avoid a combinatorial 
explosion of parameters that would need specification otherwise. For example, the 
most powerful description of dependency (that includes the above OR/AND 
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dependencies as trivial special cases) is that of a Bayesian network [17]. This 
approach is similar to the CERBERUS model, however, requires a worst-case 
exponential number of parameters specified to describe the dependency as a full-
fledged conditional distribution. The above reduces that number to “only” 
polynomially many (exactly 𝑘 ⋅ 𝑛 conditional probability values, if 𝑘 states are used 
and the CI depends on 𝑛 other CIs). Since both, 𝐴 and 𝐵 have a common set of 
possible states, the transition regime can be described as a matrix of the general form: 
 
  State of CI 𝐵 (depending on 𝐴’s state) 
  1 2 … 𝑘 
St
at
e 
if 
C
I 𝐴 1 𝑝!!!  𝑝!"!  … 𝑝!!!  2 𝑝!"!  𝑝!!!  ⋱ 𝑝!!!  ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 𝑘 𝑝!!!  𝑝!!!  … 𝑝!!!  
 
The superscript 𝐴 is here only a reminder that these transitions relate to infrastructure 𝐴, and more such matrices would be required to describe the dependency of 𝐵 on 
other CIs. The specification is very much like (though not identical) to a transition 
matrix of a Markov chain, since in each row, there has to be one target state for CI 𝐵. 
Our problem in the following will thus be the specification of these (many) values, 
using an initial guess and online learning to refine it. 
Again, we stress that the choice of this model for illustration is arbitrary, and 
replaceable by others. The reader feeling more familiar with Markov chains or other 
models is safe to think along these lines during the remainder of this work. Indeed, 
we will become more general than the above in considering the estimation of a whole 
vector of probability values, constrained to form a probability distribution (thus 
covering the more complex case of Bayesian network specification too). 
3 Model Parameterization: Initial Guesses 
In absence of empirical data, the best that we can do is resorting to domain expertise, 
subjective experience and empirical studies as far as they are available (e.g., [16]). 
However, the problem remains one where experts have to provide (qualitative or 
better quantitative) values that are usually hard to obtain. One possibility is getting 
domain experts into discussion to agree on a common assessment (e.g., using 
systematic methods such as Delphi and/or opinion pooling [18]), which generally 
means aggregating different assessments into an object (number) that we can start 
with – an initial guess. Lossless aggregation into a distribution is also possible and 
has been described for general risk management in [19]; however, this method is out 
of our scope here, but mentioned as another option to get a prior distribution for 
Bayesian updating (met later in Section 3.2). 
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3.1 Graphical Specification of Parameters 
To avoid asking people for numbers, graphical ways of specifying probabilities and 
general risk parameters have been developed. One method aiming to help with the 
quantification of risk as the product of “likelihood” and “impact” is to let experts 
draw a “risk rectangle”, whose horizontal length reflects the person’s (subjective) 
assessment on a range for the unknown likelihood, and the vertical breadth acts as an 
interval estimate for the potential impacts; see Figure 2 for an illustration. The area of 
the rectangle can, but with care, be associated with the usual formula 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑×𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, where both inputs are ranges reflecting uncertainty. Intuitively, the 
larger the rectangle is, the more uncertain would the specification be, stressing that 
even for small areas, the width and height still need consideration in their own 
meaning of uncertainty (a very thin rectangle has small area, yet may express large 
uncertainty about one of the coordinates). 
As an initial guess for a parameter, such a graphical method may serve as a 
replacement for a number, since the actual numeric value is easy for a computer to 
compile from the rectangle’s coordinates. 
In any case, this is just a heuristic and there is no formal or scientific reason (so far) 
why any such graphical method should deliver more reliable results than a direct 
specification. It is as such a matter of usability and convenience to specify values in 
this way. This potential benefit becomes even more evident if we transfer the idea to 
the specification of a whole matrix of values, say, a transition matrix of a Markov 
chain. Why not think of the matrix as a rectangular grid, on which our task is to place 
masses, proportionally to as how likely it is that state 𝑖 will take the chain into the 
target state 𝑗. Returning to the CERBERUS model above, we would, for each supplier 
CI A, have one such matrix to tell B’s target state based on A’s current state. 
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Figure 2 Graphical Risk Specification Method (picture adapted from [20]) 
The idea is a straightforward extension of the graphical specification from before: 
assuming that the states are ordered (in ascending or descending levels of criticality), 
we can go and draw a bunch of rectangles into the grid, which may even overlap, and 
each of which places some mass onto a cell in the grid, i.e., element in the matrix. 
The amount of weight being placed is then a matter of how much the rectangle 
overlaps the respective region. Intuitively, if we draw a rectangle over several cells 
(horizontally and vertically), we may express something like “any state between 𝑖! 
and 𝑖! may put the dependent CI B into some state between 𝑗! and 𝑗!” – not becoming 
too specific on how likely a specific transition is, but only telling what one may think 
is possible. The more such possibilities are supplied, the more weight accumulates on 
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a cell, and the more likelihood is assigned accordingly. Figure 3 displays the idea, 
with some example values being assigned. 
 
 
→ 
18 18 18 14 14 18111 111 311 311 211 111115 215 15 415 415 115114 17 314 314 314 17112 112 16 14 14 1618 18 18 14 14 18
 
Figure 3 Graphical Specification of a transition matrix 
 
3.2 Prior Distribution for Online Learning 
Suppose that we have a set of probabilities 𝑝!,… ,𝑝! that jointly form a distribution, 
i.e., satisfy 𝑝! + 𝑝! +⋯+ 𝑝! = 1. For the example of the CERBERUS model, given 
a dependency of CI 𝐵 on 𝐴, such a set would be a matrix as outlined above, or at least 
a single row in it.  
Most likely, the initial guess is inaccurate, subjective, not well founded on empirical 
data or experience, or suffers from other sources of vagueness. This is most naturally 
so, since we cannot expect an(y) expert to have precise or objectively reliable figures 
for likelihoods in a quality better than to the best of her/his knowledge. 
It is, however, possible to refine and “correct” these initial guesses in the long run by 
observing the system, tracking the real state changes, and refine our hypothesis 
iteratively, knowing that it will converge to the “objective” and hence correct 
probabilities. The mechanism is Bayesian updating of a properly chosen prior 
distribution, which makes the whole process even computationally efficient and 
trivial to implement. 
Our choice is the Dirichlet distribution, having 𝑘 ≥ 2 parameters 𝛼!,… ,𝛼!  
satisfying 𝛼! > 0 for all 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘, and the probability density function  𝑓!"#"$!!"# 𝑥!,… , 𝑥! 𝛼!,… ,𝛼! = Γ 𝛼!!!!!Γ 𝛼!!!!! 𝑥!!!!!!!!! . 
The interesting point for our purpose is the fact that this distribution relates to a 
vector 𝑿 = 𝑋!,… ,𝑋! ∈ 0,1 ! constrained by 𝑋! +⋯+ 𝑋! = 1, so that it can be 
used to describe a probability distribution. That is, our sought probability vector, the 
distribution to be specified, is viewable as a sample of the random vector 𝑿, whose 
distribution is Dirichlet with the density as above. Under that perspective, we can 
equate the needed likelihoods 𝑝! ≔ 𝐸 𝑋!  with 𝑋! being the 𝑖-th coordinate in 𝑿. 
For the Dirichlet distribution, this expectation is simply 𝐸 𝑋! = 𝛼! 𝛼!!!!!  
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Now, suppose that we have an initial guess for the values 𝑝!,… ,𝑝!; then even without 
those normalizing to unit sum, we can plainly specify the parameters 𝛼! as 𝛼! ≔ 𝑝! to 
start with, since the denominator in the above expression is nothing else than a 
normalization, so that the so-instantiated Dirichlet density, encodes our initial guess 
for the probability parameters by the component-wise expectations. 
Remark: The case for a single parameter is treated only slightly different; noting that 
above, we require at least two values. If there is only a single probability parameter in 
question, the prior would be the Beta distribution, having the density 𝑓!"#$ 𝑥 𝛼!,𝛼! ≔ 𝑓!!"!#!!"# 𝑥, 1− 𝑥 𝛼!,𝛼! , with the expectation following the 
same formula as given above. The major (only) difference is that while the Dirichlet 
distribution describes a set of 𝑘 probability values, the Beta distribution describes 
only a single value that is also a probability; in both cases, the last value (𝑥! = 1− 𝑥 
or 𝑥! = 1− 𝑥! − 𝑥! −⋯− 𝑥!!!) is fixed by its predecessors (not surprisingly so, 
since we have the constraint of all these values to sum up to 1). 
4 Bayesian Updating 
On a level of abstraction, the CERBERUS model is a set of Markov chain instances, 
where a state transition of a CI triggers another state transition of a dependent CI. 
Suppose that this switch is observable, i.e., we would note the change in reality, and 
can relate it to an edge in the model (depicted in Section 2). 
Adopting a Bayesian statistics perspective, the observation is nothing else than data 
sampled from a distribution whose parameters we seek to estimate. More specifically, 
consider only the 𝑖-th row 𝒑!,⋅ in a transition matrix 𝑷, telling us that if the current 
state is 𝑖, then the next possible states 𝑗 ∈ 1,2,…  will occur with probabilities 𝑝!!,𝑝!!,…. This single row is a categorical distribution, and the values in it are exactly 
the parameters (the distribution is, in a way, not only determined, but actually directly 
represented by its parameter set). Now, suppose that an observation is made, which 
tells that out of the current state 𝑖, our system has (physically, in reality) moved into 
the state 𝑗. Formally, this is 𝒙 = 0,0,… , 1,0,0,… , with only the 𝑗-th entry being 1, 
sampled from the aforementioned categorical distribution 𝒑!,⋅ (which in turn is just 
the 𝑖-th row in the transition matrix 𝑷). 
More importantly, this view takes the incoming observations as samples from a 0/1-
valued random variable. Such a variable is an indicator, and the expectation of an 
indicator variable is a probability, thus making the approach meaningful to estimate 
probability parameters. 
Now, let us put this to practice: suppose that we observed the event of our system to 
have undergone a transition from state 𝑖 into state 𝑗. If the Bayesian prior distribution 
is a Dirichlet (or Beta), with parameters 𝛼!,… ,𝛼! (in the case of a single parameter 𝑝 
to be estimated, we would only have 𝛼! and 𝛼!, with 𝑝 = !!!!!!!), the Bayesian update 
of the row 𝒑!,⋅ in the transition matrix 𝑃, which is described by a prior distribution 
with parameter vector 𝛼!,… ,𝛼! , proceeds via the assignment 𝛼!,… ,𝛼!!!,𝛼! ,𝛼!!!,… ,𝛼! ← 𝛼!,… ,𝛼!!!,𝛼! + 1,𝛼!!!,… ,𝛼! , 
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i.e., only the 𝑗-th parameter gets increased by 1. What could be simpler? It essentially 
amounts to counting the occurrences of each transition! Even if several observations 
are collected in a data vector, say, 𝒅 = 𝑛!,𝑛!,… ,𝑛!  with 𝑛! observed transitions 
into state 1, another 𝑛! transitions observed into state 𝑛!, etc., the update to 𝜶 = 𝛼!,… ,𝛼!  would simply be 𝜶 ← 𝜶+ 𝒅. 
The current estimate  𝑝! of the 𝑗-th (not precisely known) probability parameter 𝑝! 
vector is for each 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘 given as 𝑝! = 𝐸 𝑋! = 𝛼! 𝛼! + 𝛼! +⋯+ 𝛼! 
Now, let us suppose that we started from initial values (guesses) 𝛼!∗,… ,𝛼!∗ . What 
would happen in the long run? If we observe the transition into the 𝑗-th state for 𝑁 
times out of 𝑀 ≫ 𝑁 cases and let 𝑀 → ∞, then the estimator 𝑝! after a total of 𝑀 
updates is  𝛼!∗ + 𝑁1− 𝛼!∗ +𝑀 − 𝑁 + 𝛼!∗ + 𝑁 ; 
this is easy to see from the fact that we increase the pseudo-count1 𝛼!∗ for 𝑁 times, 
whilst increasing any of the other parameters for the remaining 𝑀 − 𝑁 times (whose 
totality is collected in the term 1− 𝛼!∗ +𝑀 − 𝑁). Overall, since the initial guess does 
not change, the limit is  𝛼!∗ + 𝑁(1− 𝛼!∗ +𝑀 − 𝑁)+ (𝛼!∗ + 𝑁) → 𝑁𝑀 = 𝑝! , 
Since this is merely the fraction of “good cases” among “all cases”, i.e., by definition 
the sought probability. The key insight here is that this limit does not depend on the 
initial guess! That is, no matter if we were wrong with our initial parameter choice 
(and in most cases, we may have been wrong), the long-run updating will 
asymptotically “correct” our error automatically. Of course, the speed of convergence 
depends on how far off the inaccuracy of the initial guess put us away from the real 
value of 𝑝!. The closer our initial guess has been, the earlier we get into a reasonable 
proximity of the true value 𝑝!. 
Let’s also take a closer look at the case of a single parameter: if we don’t have a 
whole Markov chain, but rather a single parameter that describes an event by a 
probabilistic value, there is no conceptual change to the above. The respective prior 
has two parameters 𝛼!,𝛼! , which we update to 𝛼! + 1,𝛼!  if the event has been 
observed, or into 𝛼!,𝛼! + 1  if the event did not occur; both cases assume that the 
parameter 𝑝 in question describes the probability of the event’s occurrence 
(otherwise, the update would be done with the roles of 𝛼! and 𝛼! being switched). 
                                                
1 A pseudo-count is a fractional count value; this term is technically exact here since we may start from 
a fractional value 𝛼!, but add 1 upon an observation of the respective transition. Thus, although we do 
count, the counter’s value remains fractional at all times; hence it is called a pseudo-count. 
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We refer to [21] for a fully detailed elaboration of this prior idea, which we here 
generalized. The reference cited treats the topic in the different direction of using the 
idea for predictive analytics (see [22] for a survey). 
4.1 Example for the CERBERUS Model 
The application of the above scheme in the CERBERUS model is straightforward, 
based on what we have: suppose that a history of cascading effects was recently 
observed in the network of critical infrastructures, or is available from documented 
cases of incidents or experience. Then, we can consider each part of the chain of 
events described in the following form: “CI A changed its state from 𝑥 to 𝑦, causing 
CI B to change its state from 𝑢 to 𝑣”. To update our model, we look into the inner 
model for CI B, which embodies a transition matrix 𝑷! that tells us how likely a 
change into state 𝑣 is for CI B, provided that CI A is in state 𝑦. Taking that row 𝑖 of 𝑃! that corresponds to state 𝑦, and associating it with its (Bayesian) Dirichlet prior 𝜶!,⋅! = 𝛼!,… ,𝛼! , where 𝑘 ranges over the possible states of CI B, the update is 
simply an addition of 1 to the 𝑗-th coordinate in the vector 𝛼, relating to the state 𝑣 
that CI B turned into. The Bayesian update on this set of transitions is done by that 
point.  
Note that here we did not make any use of the previous states 𝑥 of CI A or 𝑢 for CI B. 
This is due to the fact that the change of state for CI A would be subject to an 
according update of the inner model for CI A (just as described). The prior state of CI 
B plays indeed no role here. 
5 Conclusion 
The above idea is applicable whenever a probabilistic parameter describes an 
observable event, so that data for a Bayesian update is collectible. A practical issue 
can indeed be the speed of convergence, since the above argument is nonetheless 
asymptotic, and the true value is reached only after a hypothetic infinitude of updates. 
Therefore, we may need to update upon every incoming ticket at the IT 
administration office, or as often as we can, in practice.  
We also stress that the above model does not serve too well as a model of human 
trust: the updating is in some sense “symmetric” and “self-stabilizing”, meaning that 
(i) the likelihood changes eventually become smaller as more updates come in (self-
stabilization), and the likelihoods will update with roughly comparable magnitudes in 
both directions. The latter is contrary to human subjective changes to trust, since 
confidence in an event to occur may substantially change upon recent experience and 
differently in the direction towards zero or towards one. In other words, if the 
probabilistic parameter is interpreted as a “trust value”, say, if we take it as the 
expectation of some event (that we rely on) to occur, then subjective trust may be lost 
upon a single incident, but may be regained only over a much longer period of 
positive experience. On the contrary, the above model would not reflect such 
asymmetry due to human pessimism. This leads to the advice of applying the above 
model only for the estimation of parameters that describe physical processes, and not 
subjective human factors. The latter are subject to much deeper psychological 
mechanisms for whose capture the above model may be overly simplistic. 
If the parameter in question, however, relates to a physical event that can be 
observed, then the Bayesian updating as described above offers a computationally 
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efficient and elegant way of online learning parameters in absence of reliable domain 
expertise to specify a (more) accurate model or prior guess. 
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Abstract 
 
The services supply disruption of any infrastructure may be due to: systemic 
(/hardware) failures, procedural (including organizational and human’s) failures or 
a deviation from its normal operation environment. In order to develop robust models 
to be used in determining the risk of the services supply disruption, one should be 
able to trace the failure roots as far as the most basic levels. A field of wind-turbines 
may disrupt its power supply because of a systematic failure of one or more of the 
basic components of the wind-turbine. This is the case of one of the basic critical 
components in the wind turbine such as the bevel gear system. The paper proposes an 
approach to describe the random dynamic behaviour of the bevel gear system of the 
vertical axis wind-turbine. The polynomial chaos approach is commonly used to treat 
the random dynamic behaviour of rotating mechanical systems and components. 
In the paper, we propose a method for taking into account uncertainties based on the 
projection on polynomial chaos. The proposed method is used to determine the 
dynamic response of a bevel gear system with uncertainty associated to power 
coefficient. We developed a lumped dynamic model with 14 DoFs. Lagrange 
formalism is used to formulate the governing equation of motion of the model. The 
simulation results are obtained by the polynomial chaos method for dynamic analysis 
under uncertainty. The proposed method is an efficient probabilistic tool for 
uncertainty propagation. 
 
 
 
Keywords: uncertainty, bevel gear system, polynomial chaos, Vertical Axis Wind 
Turbine, performance coefficient. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The services supply disruption of any infrastructure may be due to: systemic 
(/hardware) failures, procedural (including organizational and human’s) failures or a 
deviation from its normal operation environment. In order to develop robust models 
that may be used in determining the services supply disruption/continuity, one should 
be able to trace the failure roots as far as the most basic levels. A field of wind-
turbines may disrupt its power supply because of a systematic failures of one or more 
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of the basic components of the wind-turbine. This is the case of one of the basic 
critical components in the wind turbine such as the bevel gear system. 
The drive train experiences higher failure rates than the other components in the 
vertical axe wind turbine, [1]. Therefore, studies of dynamic behaviours of the drive 
train are essential to describe and improve the performance of the system. 
Talking into account different sources of uncertainties is a crucial task in accessing 
the dynamic behaviours of gear systems. Gearbox is identified as the major source of 
reliability concerns. Nowadays, probabilistic methods have been widely used to solve 
uncertain dynamic problems of the wind turbine gear system [2-5].  In practice the 
physical parameters of the aerodynamic model are not exactly known or can be 
subject to inherent large physical variability. Since the gearbox systems are sensitive 
to input variations, the uncertainty in the parameters can have a strong effect on the 
dynamic behaviours of such systems. Subsequently; it is necessary to assess the 
contribution of the uncertainties into the VAWT dynamic behaviour modelling. 
Several methods are often proposed in the literature to quantify physical uncertainties 
in a variety of computational problems. Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is a well-
known method in this field [6]. It is based on solving the deterministic problem for 
randomly chosen parameters values. For reasonable accuracy, a great numbers of 
samples are usually required. Therefore it is computationally expensive and only used 
as the last resort.  Polynomial Chaos Expansion (PCE) [7] has proven to be a 
successful probabilistic tool to solve uncertainty quantification problems. The 
fundamental idea of the Polynomial Chaos method is to establish a separation 
between the stochastic components of a system response and its deterministic 
components. The stochastic Galerkin approach, collocation and regression methods 
are used to solve the polynomial chaos expansion coefficient called stochastic modes 
in an intrusive and non-intrusive manner while uncertain components are 
concentrated in the polynomial basis used. The capabilities and efficiency of 
polynomial chaos approach have been reported in numerous fields, such as 
uncertainty quantification in computational fluid dynamics and aeronautics [8], in 
solid mechanics [9], in dynamic systems [10], etc. 
The dynamic behaviour of nonlinear system is studied to analyse the robustness and 
reliability. For that, a dynamic lumped model of one-stage bevel gear system is 
developed. Three-bladed Darrieus wind turbine are considered with fourteen degree 
of freedom in the presence of the external aerodynamic torque that is highlighted by 
an uncertain power coefficient. 
 
 
2. Dynamic modelling 
 
Fig.1 presents the global model of the one stage bevel gear system in 3D. This model 
is made up of two blocks. Every block is supported by a flexible bearing. Bending 
stiffness are donated by kψ1, kΦ1 and traction–compression stiffness by kx1, ky1, 
kz1 for the first block  
Stiffness components for the second block are kψ2, kΦ2 and kx2, ky2, kz2. 
The two shafts between wheel (11) -gear (12) and gear (21) -whee1 (22) respectively 
admit torsional stiffness kθ1 and kθ2. 
Angular displacements of every wheel are θ11, θ12, θ21 and θ22. Besides, the linear 
and angular displacements of the bearings are noted by x1, y1, z1 and Φ1, ψ1 for the 
first block, and x2, y2 ,z2 and Φ2, ψ2  for the second block. 
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Fig.1. Model of the one stage bevel gear system 
 
 
The kinematic differential equations governing the system motion established 
according to Lagrange’s formalism are given by Equation (1). 
 
kθ2 
kθ1 
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m1&&x1+ kx1x1+ k(t)c1 L Q{ }= 0
m1&&y1+ ky1y1 + k(t)c2 L Q{ }= 0
m1&&z1+ kz1z1+ k(t)c3 L Q{ }= 0
m2&&x2 + kx2x2
+ k(t)c4 L Q{ }= 0
m2&&y2 + ky2y2
+ k(t)c5 L Q{ }= 0
m2&&z2 + kz2z2 + k(t)c6 L Q{ }= 0
Iφ1&&φ1+ kφ1φ1+ k(t)c7 L Q{ }= 0
Iψ1&&ψ1
+ kψ1ψ1
+ k(t)c8 L Q{ }= 0
Iφ2&&φ2 + kφ2φ2 + k(t)c10 L Q{ }= 0
Iψ2 &&ψ2
+ kψ2ψ2
+ k(t)c11 L Q{ }= 0
I11&&θ11+ kθ1(θ12 −θ11) = Tr (t)
I12&&θ12 + kθ1(θ11−θ12)+ k(t)c9 L Q{ }= 0
I21&&θ21+ kθ2(θ22 −θ21)+ k(t)c11 L Q{ }= 0
I22&&θ22 + kθ2(θ21−θ22) = TG(t)
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
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⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
   
 
 𝑚! is the mass of block (j). 𝐼!! is the inertia of the rotor, 𝐼!! is the generator inertia, 𝐼!" and 𝐼!" is the inertia of the bevel spur gear 12 and 21. 𝐼!! and 𝐼!" represent the 
inertia in the y and z-directions respectively. L is defined by: 
 
   5 71 2 3 4 6 8 10 11 9 12L = c c c c  c c c  c  c c 0  c c  0      (2) 
 
The components of tooth deflection are given in Table 1. 
{Q(t)} is the vector of the model generalized coordinates, it is given by: 
 
{ } [ ] T1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 11 12 21 22Q(t) = x y z x y z ψ ψ θ θ θ θφ φ   (3) 
 
 
3. Numerical results 
 
In this work, the input torque of the bevel gear system is considered with uncertainty 
according to the performance coefficient (Cp). We use the ODE45 solver of the 
MATLAB software to calculate the Polynomial Chaos results.  
The generalized polynomial chaos theory [article] is proposed to deal with the robust 
analysis of the dynamic system. The technological and dimensional parameters of the 
one stage bevel gear system are summarized in Table 3. 
         (1) 
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Table I: System parameters 
Density (42CrMo4) 7860kg/m3 
Teeth number Z12=45   Z21 =18 
Pressure angle 20α = °  
Teeth module m=0.004 
Contact ratio εα=1.56 
Average mesh stiffness(N/m) Kmoy=4108 
Bearing stiffness (N/m) kx1 = ky1 = kx2 = ky2 = 2.108  kz1= kz2= 4.108 
 
kz1 = kz2 = 4.108 
Torsional shaft stiffness(N/ m/ rad) k θ1 = kθ2= 3108 
 
 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation of the dynamic component of the angular 
displacement 𝜃!"(𝑡) are presented in Fig.2. 
The mean values and standard deviation of the linear displacement of the second 
bearing in z- directions are presented in Fig.3. 
These figures show that the obtained solutions have random oscillations around the 
boundary conditions. The standard deviation allows estimating the variation domain 
of response. One can observe that the dynamic response and the standard deviation 
have the same order of amplitude. 
These results also indicate that small parameter uncertainty might be propagated in 
the vibration of the bevel gear system and leads to relatively large uncertainties of the 
dynamic behaviour of the VAWT geared transmission system. 
It can be understood from the above discussion that the Polynomial Chaos method is 
an efficient probabilistic tool for uncertainty propagation. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Mean value and standard deviation of θ12 (t) 
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Fig. 3. Mean value and standard deviation of z2 (t) 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
An approach based on the polynomial chaos is proposed to study the dynamic 
behaviour of a bevel gear system. A complete study of the dynamic behaviour 
including dynamic response analyses is carried out considering 14 degrees of freedom 
model describing a bevel gear system with uncertainty according to the power 
coefficient. The main results of this study show that the polynomial chaos may be an 
efficient tool to take into account the dispersion of the power coefficient in the 
dynamic behaviour study of a bevel gear system. 
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